

## The Balkan Wars: violence and nation-building in the Balkans, 1912–13

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### ABSTRACT

This article examines the place of the Balkan Wars (1912–13) within the framework of the evolution of the modern nation-state in the region. The two Balkan Wars represented a form of ‘people’s war’ insofar as the region’s nation-states collectively marshalled their resources to prosecute wars of national liberation against a declining imperial power but also against the indigenous peoples who were deemed to represent the progeny of the Ottoman state. This article explores patterns in the evolution of political violence in the region, and in doing so seeks to address the impact of the Balkan Wars on the region and its societies. The critically important decade between the First Balkan War (1912) and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) can be seen as an integral whole. The Balkan Wars were not simply a prelude to the First World War but rather, when viewed in the sequence of conflicts played out to 1923, one of the catalysts for forced population displacement. Rather than viewing the Balkan Wars only in a regional context, as the endpoint of a century of national liberation struggles, they may be regarded equally as marking a beginning, even as one of the starting points in the history of twentieth-century violence in Europe, in terms of the role of the state, the trend towards more radicalized forms of warfare (i.e. widespread and systematic attacks against civilians) and their homogenizing, ‘ethnic’ character.

### Introduction

The modern Balkans were born in the period between the Treaties of Berlin and Lausanne, that is, between 1878 and 1923, as a post-imperial political space with distinctive albeit mutable cultural frontiers. The Berlin settlement had conferred independence on the nascent Balkan nationalizing states, while the Lausanne settlement confirmed the victory of the nationality principle, which is to say that the modern nation-state won out over other possible types of polity.<sup>1</sup> The Balkan Wars (1912–13) have an important place within the framework of the evolution of the modern nation-state in the region. Despite their relative brevity, the two Balkan Wars represented a form of *Volkskrieg* insofar as the region’s nation-states mustered their resources simultaneously to prosecute wars of national liberation against a declining imperial power and the peoples who were deemed to represent the progeny of the Ottoman state. This article serves as an overview of the evolution of patterns of political violence in the region, culminating in the Balkan

Wars (1912–13), and in doing so provides a synthesis of recent work addressing the impact of these wars on the region and its societies.

### **The Balkan state and monopolies of violence**

In the discussion of Balkan political violence, the purveyors of irregular warfare (militias, paramilitaries) are often acknowledged as the primary perpetrators of mass violence against civilian populations.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, Wolfgang Höpken has argued that in the Balkans a clear state monopoly of violence had not been firmly established by 1912, and that ‘a borderline between society and the military was never clearly drawn’.<sup>3</sup> This had obvious implications for the treatment of civilians in Balkan conflicts. This stemmed from the circumstances prevailing in the Ottoman Balkans in the early nineteenth century. The widespread existence of brigandage in the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries reflected the decentralized nature of the Ottoman state, which created conditions conducive to the rise of armed non-state actors that challenged the Ottoman state’s monopoly of violence through irregular warfare. These actors supported themselves or supplemented their compensation through plunder and extortion of local inhabitants, although the Ottoman state occasionally availed itself of these forces when it required additional manpower to quell internal unrest.<sup>4</sup> The phenomenon of irregular armed bands persisted in several of the Ottoman Empire’s Balkan successor states, whose governments early on faced problems in consolidating legitimate armed force.<sup>5</sup> In Balkan nationalist historiography, these irregular bandits generally served as an important trope: they were first and foremost national heroes who supposedly struggled for the liberty of their peoples. But the continued existence of the phenomenon raised critical issues of how the newly formed Balkan nation-states were to deal with rural lawlessness and whether they could become ‘civilized’, modern European states.

By the turn of the twentieth century, as professional militaries were developed and conscription was enforced, the larger Balkan states (Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia) had largely albeit not entirely eradicated brigandage as an autonomous social phenomenon. The one important exception was the Ottoman Empire, whose authority was violently contested by nascent Albanian and Macedonian nationalist movements and constrained by a lack of resources and Great Power-mandated reforms; as a result, it still failed to exercise a monopoly of legitimate force in its remaining Balkan territories. This created ample space for the Balkan nation-states to contest Ottoman authority, turning the Ottoman Balkans into a putative zone of violence between the late 1890s and 1912. By the turn of the twentieth century, irregular warfare persisted principally albeit not exclusively as a means by which the Balkan states could conceal what was in effect state-sponsored violence in the Ottoman Balkans. It should be noted, however, that the collapse of empire and old regimes in the region, and the emergence of new states after 1918, created a novel set of political circumstances which facilitated the proliferation of armed irregular groups. After 1918, political violence was wielded by irredentist groups against established governments for control of contested territories, particularly in Macedonia and Kosovo. The irredentist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) employed violence against Yugoslav and Greek officialdom in the 1920s until it was suppressed by the Bulgarian authorities. Similarly, in the early 1920s Albanian nationalists and armed irregulars (*kaçaks*) contested Serbian governance in Kosovo. The violence of the Croat Ustaše was

similarly irredentist, directed against Serbian rule through assassination and armed insurrection. However, once these groups were neutralized by the states that harboured or sponsored them—by Ahmed Zogu in Albania (1925), fascist Italy in the Ustaša case (1934) and the pro-Zveno dictatorship in Bulgaria (1934)—they became relatively marginal phenomena. In all likelihood they would have remained on the political margins had not the Second World War enabled their recrudescence.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the armed forces of the Balkan states underwent 'a staggering transformation',<sup>6</sup> as part of the region's political modernization.<sup>7</sup> The goal in each Balkan state was to create modernized mass armies with offensive capabilities. Balkan militaries soon became comparatively large, in relation both to the size of their populations and available economic resources, and possessed an elevated status in Balkan society that stemmed from the new states' emphasis on irredenta. There was widespread recognition among Balkan political elites by the turn of the twentieth century that strong armies were needed to accomplish national unification. These elites also realized that the problem of irredenta would be resolved through the armed action of modern states and militaries. This realization only reinforced the need to allocate ever greater financial resources to the construction of effective, modern militaries employing the latest European armaments. Admittedly, most contemporary European military observers continued to misjudge the quality, capabilities and professionalism of Balkan military forces,<sup>8</sup> and regional military competencies certainly still varied considerably from one state to the next in the Balkans. In 1910 a Bulgarian general proclaimed that his country was able to field more than 350,000 men,<sup>9</sup> a claim proven correct two years later. During the First Balkan War, the Balkan allies—known as the 'Balkan League'—fielded and sustained more than 700,000 troops; their superiority in numbers and Western technology (modern artillery, aerial reconnaissance, wireless telegraphy, ships) dictated a disastrous outcome in 1912–13 for the Ottoman Empire, which for the first time confronted modern Balkan armies rather than motley brigands and insurgents.

Just as important as the emergence of modern militaries, which spoke to the modernizing efforts and aspirations of the Balkan states, was the contemporary *mentalité* of political elites and officer corps who led the armed forces. Balkan ruling political elites shared a commitment to the nationalist project, the homogenization of their societies and the ideology of irredenta. Here Balkan patterns were not significantly at variance with broader European attitudes, trends and developments. The emergence of integral nationalism, Social Darwinism and mass politics at the turn of the century gave nationalism an illiberal and aggressive hue across the continent. Additionally, Balkan military officers were 'disciplined and willing ... to imbibe a simple ideological message—liberate the brethren, expand the national territory'.<sup>10</sup> This was certainly problematic in the *antebellum* period. The Balkan borderland was distinct in large measure because of its remarkable ethnic, cultural and religious heterogeneity, which was especially true of the region's remaining contested zones like Macedonia, Thrace and Kosovo. It was this heterogeneity which made the policies of national homogenization and ideologies of irredenta problematic in the Balkan context; citizenship was everywhere subordinated to the dominant nation. As the prevailing discourse of nationhood was institutionalized by native political elites, by the first decade of the twentieth century the attempts of the Balkan states to achieve national homogenization produced intense interstate rivalries, setting the stage for violence, discriminatory practices and forced population exchanges.

## The Balkan Wars, 1912–13: wartime violence

The Balkan Wars (October 1912—August 1913) took an immense toll on the entire region.<sup>11</sup> The casualties suffered by the combatants attest to the scale of the violence, but also to the region's poor infrastructure and lack of medical capabilities. All the combatants suffered significant combat losses, but infectious diseases took an even greater toll. The Ottoman military suffered approximately 100,000 to 120,000 deaths and 100,000 wounded. Among those who died in Ottoman ranks, a majority (approximately 75,000) probably died of epidemic diseases. According to an official Greek military history of the Balkan Wars, Greece suffered 2,373 combat deaths, 9,295 wounded and 1,558 deaths from disease. The official figure on Bulgarian military losses was 53,825 dead and wounded, while Serbia and Montenegro together suffered nearly 40,000 dead and 58,000 wounded.<sup>12</sup> Casualties among non-combatants are difficult to determine conclusively, but the victimization of civilians was widespread; they were killed, tortured, raped and forced from their homes and regions. It has been estimated that as much as fifteen per cent of the Orthodox Christian population living in Ottoman Macedonia was displaced as a result of the Balkan Wars.<sup>13</sup> It was the region's Muslim communities, however, who were the primary targets of Balkan military and paramilitary violence. Although a precise figure is difficult to determine conclusively, the number of Muslim refugees following the First Balkan War has been estimated as high as 400,000.<sup>14</sup>

The Balkan Wars were chiefly conducted with large conventional land forces, although the Greek naval operations ensured the Balkan League's control of the Aegean Sea by mid November. The Greek navy also undertook landings on several islands. Among other things, loss of the Aegean prevented the Ottoman navy from resupplying its landlocked forces in Macedonia. Notwithstanding the often dreadful state of communication lines—roads, railways—warfare was comparatively fluid as relatively large infantry formations traversed considerable expanses of terrain under difficult circumstances. Even though the Balkan militaries possessed their share of outdated equipment, they nevertheless had much of the latest military hardware, including aviation.<sup>15</sup> Aerial combat did not shape the fighting meaningfully or determine the wars' outcomes, but the Balkan Wars were among the first modern conflicts to involve combat aircraft.<sup>16</sup>

During the First Balkan War, military operations were conducted in two main theatres: the western, consisting of Ottoman Macedonia and Albania; and, the eastern, comprising Thrace. Nearly two dozen battles were fought, most of them in October and November 1912. The Thracian theatre was strategically more important, given its proximity to Constantinople and the Ottoman heartland; here the main military encounters were between the Bulgarian and Ottoman armies. The main Ottoman army, numbering perhaps 115,000 troops, was confronted by three Bulgarian armies numbering more than 300,000 troops; the latter advanced towards Adrianople (Edirne) and attempted to sever Ottoman communication lines to Constantinople.<sup>17</sup> In Macedonia the Ottoman western army had approximately 200,000 troops who had to contend with the combined troops of the Balkan states, who eventually deployed more than 300,000 men in this theatre.<sup>18</sup> Each theatre witnessed a decisive battle at the end of October 1912, which together resulted in catastrophic defeat for the Ottomans and determined the outcome of the First Balkan War. In the Thracian theatre, the battle of Kirk Kilisse (Kirkclareli) (22–24 October) proved to be pivotal. The Bulgarian military had laid siege to the heavily

fortified town of Edirne but in actual fact bypassed it as it pushed forward towards Constantinople. Just east of Edirne, at the fortified town of Kirk Kilisse, the commander of the Ottoman garrison took the fight to the Bulgarian armies but soon found his forces significantly outnumbered by a much better equipped opponent. On 24 October, the Ottoman forces were defeated and fell back towards Constantinople. The Ottoman defeat at Kirk Kilisse was of decisive strategic importance; Edirne was cut off from the rest of the empire and most of Thrace was exposed to direct Bulgarian military control, leaving the capital in a seemingly precarious state. Almost simultaneously, the Ottoman western army in the Macedonian theatre suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Serbian military at Kumanovo (23–24 October). This battle compelled Ottoman troops to withdraw to the south and cede control of much of northern Macedonia to the Serbian military, which then pushed further south and joined forces with the Greek military, which seized Salonika on 9 November. Within weeks of the start of hostilities, the Ottoman Empire had suffered two ignominious routs—the humiliation was compounded by the fact that defeat had come at the hands of former subjects—that in essence presaged the collapse of Ottoman power in Europe and eventually compelled the European Great Powers to initiate diplomatic negotiations to end the hostilities.

Within a matter of months in the autumn of 1912, the Ottoman Empire had lost most of its territories in Europe. By the end of the year, only the easternmost part of Thrace, the Gallipoli Peninsula and the three besieged cities of Ioannina (Janina), Edirne (Adrianople), and Shkodër (Scutari) remained under Ottoman control. The empire had been ill prepared for war in the Balkans. A quarter of the Ottoman mobilized army consisted of non-Muslims, and there were serious concerns within the Ottoman command about the loyalty of these troops. The prevailing view within the command appeared to be that these troops would be unreliable when confronting Balkan armies. To compound matters, the Ottoman mobilization of early October 1912 proved to be a failure, with virtually no enthusiasm for war.<sup>19</sup> This helps to explain at least in part why the Bulgarian army pushed as far eastwards as Çatalca, less than sixty kilometres from the Ottoman capital, where its advance was finally halted in mid November 1912. Despite Ottoman appeals for Great Power intervention and the preservation of the status quo ante, no outside intervention came until December, when the European Great Powers convened a diplomatic conference in London. The conference imposed a ceasefire on 3 December and established two parallel negotiating tracks: the first involved the five European Great Powers, with the second comprising the belligerents. The latter track broke down on 6 January 1913, but the Great Powers issued a note to the Ottoman government insisting on the need for it to accept diplomatic terms. Hostilities resumed by February 1913, leading to the collapse of Edirne on 26 March and forcing the Ottoman authorities to sue for peace.<sup>20</sup>

On 30 May 1913, the Great Powers imposed the Treaty of London on the combatants. Within a month, however, on the night of 29–30 June 1913, the Bulgarian military, which had done the bulk of the fighting against the Ottoman army and now believed that its erstwhile allies were attempting to satisfy their own ambitions in Macedonia at Bulgaria's expense, launched a surprise attack on Serbian and Greek positions in Macedonia, initiating the Second Balkan War. The assault proved disastrous for Bulgaria. The fighting ended by 31 July and was formally concluded on 10 August 1913 with the Treaty of Bucharest, between Serbia, Greece, Romania, Montenegro and Bulgaria.

Between May and August 1913, the political geography of the Balkan Peninsula was redrawn considerably. The Balkan Wars also put an end to Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The empire had lost eighty-three per cent of its land and sixty-nine per cent of its population in Europe. By contrast, the Balkan states had experienced enormous gains. Serbia's population had swelled from an estimated 2.9 million to 4.5 million (an increase of fifty-five per cent) and her territory had increased by eighty-one per cent. The corresponding percentage gains in population and territory for Greece and Montenegro were equally dramatic: 67.6 and 63.6 per cent; and 100 and 61.2 per cent, respectively.<sup>21</sup> The new frontiers were subsequently ratified in a series of separate treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria (29 September 1913), Serbia (14 November 1913) and Greece (14 March 1914). These treaties were supposed to regulate the status of Ottoman-owned property and of the remaining Muslim minorities in the Balkan states, who were given four years to decide if they wished to remain under Christian rule or to emigrate. If they opted to leave, they were theoretically permitted to sell their property and transfer their assets to the Ottoman Empire. Those who chose to remain were promised civil equality and political rights, with the freedom to practise their religion and culture. These provisions were never implemented, in part because the Great War created a new and radically different set of circumstances.

### **Violence against civilians**

The Balkan states portrayed the conflict as a war of liberation against the Ottoman yoke. But various travellers, mainly foreign journalists and European diplomats, almost immediately realized that the war was also being prosecuted against Muslim civilian populations, from the Albanian-populated western reaches of the empire to the Turkish-populated areas of Thrace near the Ottoman capital. Some of these outside observers provided poignant commentary on the calamity that had befallen these civilians. Edith Durham's accounts served as an indictment of both the Serbian and Montenegrin campaigns, which targeted Albanian Muslim civilians.<sup>22</sup> Leon Trotsky's Serbian interlocutors spoke of various outrages perpetrated against Albanian Muslim civilians in Macedonia.<sup>23</sup> As Benjamin Lieberman has noted, similar accounts were provided across the region and the two main military theatres, leaving little doubt that Muslim civilians were systematically targeted by the various Balkan militaries.<sup>24</sup> Macedonia and Thrace witnessed equally widespread attacks against civilians, for example at Strumica, Serres and Salonika's environs in Macedonia and at Kavala in western Thrace, among other places.<sup>25</sup> Many Muslims were killed or expelled, while others simply fled in fear of reprisal.

Several Western contemporaries and later observers attributed the widespread brutality directed against civilians during the Balkan Wars to the region's backwardness or cultural specifics. For most contemporary foreign observers, the Balkan Wars were seen as a contravention of normative cultural boundaries between civilian and combatant.<sup>26</sup> The International Commission on the Balkan Wars of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace claimed that the violence revealed a specific inclination among the region's peoples towards 'barbarity'; it alleged that violence was often perpetrated by neighbours against neighbours, 'a local circumstance which has its root in Balkan history'.<sup>27</sup> These peoples were allegedly driven by 'the old hatreds and resentments'.<sup>28</sup> A German military officer attributed the extraordinary brutality of the wars to the 'semi-

culture' of the region.<sup>29</sup> Notwithstanding the existence of fratricidal conflict in some areas, the crimes against civilians were perpetrated in the vast majority of cases either by soldiers of regular Balkan (or Ottoman) military units or hardened irregulars who worked in tandem with military units. In Macedonia, Thrace and Kosovo, the perpetrators were quite often from outside these regions and perpetrated violence against communities they believed were hostile to their respective national causes or states.

Several recent scholarly works have emphasized the modernity of the violence as one of the conspicuous hallmarks of the Balkan Wars. The wars prefigured twentieth-century warfare in a number of respects, combining attributes of modern technology (wireless telegraphy, aerial reconnaissance), national liberation and deliberate targeting of the enemy's culture and civilian population. The ideology of integral nationalism was combined with the revolution in fire power and communications with lethal consequences.<sup>30</sup> The widely reported atrocities were neither a discrete phenomenon nor a mere by-product of the fighting, but part of the longer-term project of nation-state building.<sup>31</sup> The Balkan Wars were arguably the Ottoman Empire's first 'total war', while the Balkan states mobilized a substantial share of their able-bodied male populations to prosecute their collective war effort.<sup>32</sup> Soldiers and civilians alike suffered the appalling effects of modern warfare, but without the infrastructure of modern medicine.<sup>33</sup> Although one can find certain parallels between the violence of the Balkan Wars and earlier conflicts in the region, particularly the nineteenth-century insurrectionary wars of national liberation, the Balkan Wars absorbed a greater proportion of the combatants' population and resources than ever before and possessed some of the elements of 'total war'. Similarly, those earlier conflicts were instigated by small ragtag bands of revolutionary insurgents, whereas the Balkan Wars were waged by modernizing, nationalizing states. As the Balkan Wars were understood by contemporaries as national liberation wars, political and military elites encouraged total victory and seemingly understood mass casualties (whether civilian or military) and the unqualified elimination of the enemy to be part of the calculus of victory. In this regard, one can discern parallels between the Balkan Wars and the First World War; as Alan Kramer has argued in relation to the First World War, mass casualties were a consequence of policy and a military culture based on the 'logic of annihilation' which equated victory with complete destruction of the enemy.<sup>34</sup> As one Bulgarian officer allegedly remarked to two Western travellers shortly after hostilities had commenced in October 1912, 'this will be a cruel war. There will be no non-combatants and no quarter'.<sup>35</sup>

There is little doubt that the violence perpetrated by the belligerents was widespread and systematic, although the violence varied across regions and was generally more pronounced in the countryside than in larger towns.<sup>36</sup> (It is equally important to note that in Bulgaria, which already possessed a sizeable indigenous Muslim population on the eve of the wars, there was virtually no violence against Turks or Pomaks.<sup>37</sup>) In Kosovo and Macedonia, Serbian troops in October 1912 wiped out entire Albanian villages. In the environs of Kumanovo, on the Serbian–Ottoman border, several Albanian villages were razed to the ground. In their liberated territories, the Serbian authorities treated the population harshly, directing most of the violence at Muslims generally and Albanians specifically. Edith Durham witnessed the war around Shkodër during the Montenegrin siege, travelling through destroyed villages and aiding those Albanian peasants who had been expelled or fled. She noted, 'The most piteous thing of all was that few of the unhappy victims



had any idea why this ruin had fallen upon them'.<sup>38</sup> Many predominantly Albanian-populated villages were reduced to ashes, 'unarmed and innocent populations massacred *en masse*, [with] incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of every kind'. The International Commission understood these methods as part of official policy, 'with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians'.<sup>39</sup> Once regular military units moved through an area, law and order often fell to irregular units to protect the rear; these units often did as they pleased.<sup>40</sup>

The Macedonian Adrianople Volunteer Corps (MAVC) serves as a case in point of the paramilitary phenomenon in the Balkan Wars. The MAVC was an independent military unit of 18,870 men organized in early October 1912 by the Bulgarian army. Although officially proclaimed to be a unit of Ottoman Balkan 'volunteers', in actual fact it consisted of a core group of Macedonian irregular veterans co-opted by the Bulgarian military; its ostensible mission was to collect information on the Ottoman armies in the Balkans, but it was also expected to conduct sabotage behind enemy lines by destroying bridges, weapons depots, railways and telegraph lines. With respect to the treatment of the civilian population, the MAVC was ordered to afford protection to the 'Bulgarian population' but not instructed specifically on conduct towards non-Bulgarians. While MAVC battalions took part in direct combat operations against Ottoman troops, alongside the Bulgarian military, several units engaged in the persecution of non-combatants.<sup>41</sup> During the First World War, the MAVC was dissolved and formed the nucleus of the 11th Macedonian-Adrianople Infantry Division of the Bulgarian armed forces. The MAVC example demonstrates how Balkan states were able, for the most part successfully, to co-opt and utilize paramilitaries in pursuit of their state objectives.

When the Bulgarian military captured Edirne in late March 1913, their violence was directed at combatants and civilians alike, Muslim, Jewish and Orthodox Christian (Greek, Armenian).<sup>42</sup> The British vice-consul in Macedonia, H. E. W. Young, reported extensively on Bulgarian atrocities against civilians in Serres, Kavala and Xanthi, despite the fact that the authorities had surrendered to the Bulgarians without a fight.<sup>43</sup> The Muslim village of Ada, which had a population of 1,900 locals and 200 refugees, was reportedly attacked, according to Ottoman sources, by Bulgarian brigands and local Greek villagers; the village was plundered, women were raped and most of the community was murdered. Fewer than 100 survived the massacre.<sup>44</sup> Retreating Ottoman forces in Thrace exacted revenge in several villages. In one case, approximately 600 Greek men, women and children were massacred, ostensibly by local Muslims 'with every conceivable circumstance of barbarity'.<sup>45</sup> During the Second Balkan War, as the erstwhile allies wrestled for control of Macedonia, dehumanizing propaganda incited brutal forms of violence; Greek war posters in Athens and Salonika depicted a Greek soldier gouging out the eyes of a Bulgarian.<sup>46</sup> At the beginning of the Second Balkan War, a Greek officer described scenes of indescribable destruction; there was 'always a burning village in sight', as the undeclared lines separating combatants and civilians had long ago been crossed.<sup>47</sup> Balkan military officers in the main appeared to have little regard for civilian casualties or the treatment of civilians by their own troops. One Greek soldier justified Greek atrocities 'as a measure of security and prudence'.<sup>48</sup> Military officers appeared to rationalize outrages against 'hostile' non-combatants as legitimate, and quite often believed they were an appropriate reaction to real or rumoured crimes perpetrated by enemy combatants against their own troops and civilians. Military officers also possessed a strong preoccupation with 'honour' to



the exclusion of other concerns; this often entailed humiliating and dishonouring the enemy, which led to a range of abuses against prisoners of war and non-combatants alike.<sup>49</sup>

As occupation regimes and rudimentary administrations were established, various pressures were exerted on populations to conform to the new nation-states. In some cases, Orthodox priests were employed to 'persuade' survivors to convert. The British vice-consul, Young, reported an incident of forced conversion of Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks by Bulgarian Orthodox clergy, who were accompanied by irregular troops.<sup>50</sup> The Carnegie International Commission concluded that the Bulgarian Exarchate, with the support of the military and civilian authorities, conducted the policy 'systematically' and on a massive scale, employing various means of violence and intimidation.<sup>51</sup> The British consul in Monastir (Bitola) reported a similar phenomenon. In this case, the Serbian authorities compelled the remaining Macedonian and Bulgarian intelligentsia and peasants to sign a declaration of loyalty to their new king and to swear that, since their forefathers had allegedly been Serbs, they were merely asserting their patrimony by declaring themselves 'Serbs' in the present.<sup>52</sup> As the Serbian administration was extended to Macedonia, the Serbian Orthodox Church replaced the Bulgarian Exarchate as the dominant nationalizing institution, which entailed the cultural assimilation of the non-Serb Orthodox population. The Bulgarian and Greek churches performed the same function in their respective territories.

Since the Balkan states conceived of the First Balkan War as a war of national liberation, they were committed to the removal of potentially hostile populations through ethnic cleansing. This was achieved by various means, including murder, intimidation and expulsion. The actions of all the Balkan combatants were additionally driven by the trepidation that European Great Power intervention would dictate a settlement at variance with their own plans—as was the case in May 1913—as had occurred in the past; expelling Muslims and others from their occupation zones served to strengthen their diplomatic claims. This tendency likely only fuelled the destruction on the ground and expulsion of civilians from some regions. While Muslim civilians of diverse nationality were the primary victims of this campaign, during the Second Balkan War the violence became internecine as Bulgarians turned on Greeks and Serbs, and vice versa. In those areas of eastern Thrace returned to Ottoman control during the Second Balkan War, retribution was exacted against Bulgarian and Greek civilians alike.<sup>53</sup>

The enormous scale of violence visited upon the populations of Macedonia, Thrace and the Albanian lands during the wars left a bitter legacy. Despite a significant exodus of Muslims and the displacement of Orthodox Christians, the Balkan states now possessed significant minority populations; they ceased to be, as Serbia and Greece had been prior to the Balkan Wars, relatively homogeneous nation-states. The ruling political elites of these states were neither familiar with governing multi-ethnic societies nor inclined to respect minorities. Moreover, as the Second Balkan War had been the first modern armed conflict between Balkan Orthodox nation-states, with a high level of popular mobilization, nationalist rhetoric and killing on an unprecedented scale, it could be said to mark the final victory of secular nationalism and the modern nation-state in the Balkans. As such, the strains that came to the forefront in Balkan society after 1912–13 were associated more than ever with national identity.

In 1913 the Balkan states controlled new territories—namely Kosovo, Macedonia and Thrace—that barely possessed administrations that could be easily co-opted or seamlessly

absorbed into their own administrative systems. As a result, they had to extend their administrative systems, militaries and gendarmeries to these territories. Circumstances dictated that irregular forces would continue to thrive in such an environment, in part because they were de facto extensions of these states, which lacked formal administrative capacities to govern these territories effectively. In some cases, irregular detachments continued to exist as substitute administrators, exercising coercive force to buttress still relatively weak bureaucratic systems. As Stefan Sotiris Papaioannou has observed of Macedonia, what was exceptional about 'Balkan violence' in the relatively short period between the end of the Balkan Wars and the start of the First World War was the continued relative weakness of regional states, which permitted non-state groups occasionally to usurp state authority to exercise coercive force within their borders.<sup>54</sup> Paramilitary groups continued to exact violence against civilians, although admittedly on a lesser scale. More problematic was the increase in criminality across the region, which appeared unrelated to ethnicity but was more a function of weak administration.<sup>55</sup>

Notwithstanding the administrative weaknesses of the Balkan states in their newly conquered territories, after the Balkan Wars these states worked assiduously to ensure the political loyalty of their citizens. The first concentrated efforts were made towards systematic national homogenization, including assimilation and expulsion.<sup>56</sup> The Balkan states began to adopt new bureaucratic methods of thwarting perceived threats to their authority from minority populations.<sup>57</sup> Limited population transfers were also discussed and even enacted in 1913. Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire signed a separate protocol on population exchange and associated property settlement to the peace agreement they concluded on 29 September 1913, which codified the earlier movement of 20,000 Orthodox Christian and Muslim families to Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, respectively. The protocol served as a model for subsequent population exchanges, although the 1913 agreement called only for 'voluntary' exchanges. In 1914 the Greek and Ottoman authorities initiated similar but abortive discussions premised on a 'voluntary' exchange of populations.<sup>58</sup> These negotiations revealed a willingness on the part of regional political elites to consider bureaucratic measures of population regulation, as they increasingly came to view minority groups as threats to state consolidation.<sup>59</sup> It was primarily Balkan Muslims, predominantly from Macedonia and Thrace, who continued to leave for the Ottoman Empire, with nearly 140,000 doing so between 1914 and 1917.<sup>60</sup> What is more, in the immediate aftermath of the Balkan Wars, local governments began 'administrative deportation' of some persons from among their new minority populations, both internally and across international borders.<sup>61</sup> Population exchanges and deportations in 1913–14 indicate that, as Papaioannou's important study has shown, the notion of employing bureaucratically planned coercion to achieve a cartography of homogenization had occurred to Balkan officials prior to the beginning of the Great War.<sup>62</sup> One of the major outcomes of the large-scale warfare of the Balkan Wars (and even more so the First World War) was, as Siniša Malešević has noted, an ever greater bureaucratic penetration of societies in south-eastern Europe.<sup>63</sup>

## The aftermath

Although relatively short, the Balkan Wars were without doubt remarkably violent and created the impression that the Balkan states had utilized the conflicts to pursue demographic objectives. The wars lacked, however, the institutionalized and planned mass

murder of civilians that came to characterize later European conflicts, notably the Second World War.<sup>64</sup> It is equally significant that the Balkan Wars did not have universal domestic support; much of the rural population and segments of the political class (notably the Social Democrats and agrarians) remained indifferent or opposed to the nationalist rhetoric accompanying and following the wars, notwithstanding the observations of some contemporary observers.<sup>65</sup> Nonetheless, the Balkan Wars represented a starting point of sorts in the history of twentieth-century violence in Europe, in terms of their state-sponsored nature, the forms of violence (i.e. widespread and systematic attacks against civilians) and their 'ethnic' and homogenizing character. They arguably represented a trend towards more radicalized warfare.<sup>66</sup> The critically important decade between the First Balkan War (1912) and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) can be seen as an integral whole. The Balkan Wars were not simply a prelude to the First World War but rather, when viewed in the sequence of conflicts played out to 1923, as one of the catalysts for ethnic cleansing, forced population displacement and even genocide. In this regard, rather than viewing the Balkan Wars only in a regional context, as the endpoint of a century of national liberation struggles, they may be regarded equally as marking a beginning. Indeed, Cathie Carmichael has referred to the 'genocidal crisis' of 1912–23, which was characterized by the end of empire and the violent 'unmixing of peoples'.<sup>67</sup> In short, the Balkan Wars played an important role in escalating norms of violence in the region, which did not abate significantly across the region until 1923. The First World War proved to be a far more important watershed for the bureaucratization of violence against civilians in Europe, as the lines between civilians and combatants were increasingly blurred.<sup>68</sup> This was equally true of the Balkans, although the region was only precipitously drawn into the First World War between 1914 and 1917.<sup>69</sup>

Within the Balkans, the colossal scale of violence visited upon the populations of the region during and after the wars left an unambiguously bitter legacy. The Balkan Wars were historically crucial as they marked the end of Ottomanism as a multicultural project. In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars and in the much diminished empire, Ottoman Muslim intellectuals increasingly spoke of renewal but within a Turkist framework. National humiliation had facilitated the seizure of power in 1913 by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which now possessed a more vindictive nationalism with a narrower Turkist-Islamist orientation.<sup>70</sup> Following the catastrophe of 1912–13, the CUP adopted a more draconian approach towards minorities and was prepared to eliminate supposedly disloyal groups rather than suffer another calamity.<sup>71</sup> The Balkan Wars thus proved decisive for identity politics and the treatment of minorities. The nationalizing Balkan states worked after 1913 to inculcate their dominant identities on heterogeneous populations and to promote assimilation, albeit with varying degrees of success. Questions related to citizenship, identity and integration/assimilation became more pronounced, far more so than in decades past. This necessarily entailed the suppression or marginalization of nascent identities among Macedonian Slavs, Albanians and others. The Balkan Wars seemingly 'resolved' the Albanian Question through partition, although in reality it was only deferred to the future and remains current today. Macedonia was similarly partitioned and its indigenous Slavic population exposed to the nationalizing policies of the three partitioning states. Perhaps even more importantly, the Balkan Wars brought to the forefront the South Slav Question in the Habsburg Monarchy, which came to a head in June 1914 with fateful consequences for Europe. In the final analysis, the Balkan Wars represent a

landmark in the transition of the Balkans from a region of multinational empires to national states. The Balkan Peninsula of 1918 or 1923 was in many fundamental respects quite dissimilar from the Balkans of 1912. Empires had yielded to new nation-states such as Albania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes ('Yugoslavia'), which despite its multi-ethnic character was ideologically construed by its founding elites as the state of the trinomial Yugoslav nation. The political geography crafted in the decade 1912–23 held, with minor territorial modifications, until the end of the Cold War.

## Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the four anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. I have tried whenever feasible to address their concerns.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by author.

## Notes on contributor

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## Notes

1. Mark Mazower, *The Balkans: a short history* (New York: Random House, 2000), pp. xxxvii–xxxviii; and Justin McCarthy, *The Ottoman peoples and the end of empire* (London: Arnold, 2001), pp. 149–162.
2. Cathie Carmichael, *Ethnic cleansing in the Balkans: nationalism and the destruction of tradition* (New York and London: Routledge, 2002).
3. Wolfgang Höpken, 'Performing violence: soldiers, paramilitaries and civilians in the twentieth century Balkan Wars', in Alf Lüdtke and Bernd Weisbrod (eds.), *No man's land of violence: extreme wars in the 20th century* (Gottingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2006), p. 247.
4. See Fikret Adanir, 'Semi-autonomous provincial forces in the Balkans and Anatolia', in Suraiya Faroqi (ed.), *The Cambridge history of Turkey: the later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 157–185.
5. On this problem during the early period of modern Bulgarian statehood, see Veselin Ianchev, *Armiia, obshtestven red i vÛtreshna sigurnost. bÛlgarskiiat opit, 1878–1912* (Sofia: IF-94, 2006). On post-independence Greece, see John S. Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a cause: brigandage and irredentism in modern Greece 1821–1912* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
6. Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: nationalism, war and the Great Powers, 1804–1999* (New York: Penguin, 2000), p. 219.
7. On the region's modernization, see Diana Mishkova, *Modernization and political elites in the Balkans, 1870–1914* (Center for Austrian Studies Working Papers, Working Paper 94–1, June 1994), pp. 1–19; Victor Roudometof, 'The social origins of Balkan politics: nationalism, underdevelopment, and the nation-state in Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, 1880–1920', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2000, pp. 144–163; and John R. Lampe, *Balkans into southeastern Europe: a century of war and transition* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

8. For example, see Zisis Fotakis, *Greek naval strategy and policy, 1910–1919* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 42.
9. Keith Brown, 'Wiping out the Bulgar race: hatred, duty and national self-fashioning in the second Balkan War', in Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (eds.), *Shatterzone of empires: coexistence and violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman borderlands* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), p. 299.
10. Glenny, *The Balkans*, p. 221.
11. It is not my intention here to chronicle the military and diplomatic developments surrounding the Balkan Wars. These issues have been covered well by several authors. See E. Christian Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938); André Gerolymatos, *The Balkan Wars: conquest, revolution and retribution from the Ottoman era to the twentieth century and beyond* (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: prelude to the First World War* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Edward J. Erickson, *Defeat in detail: the Ottoman army in the Balkans, 1912–1913* (London: Praeger Publishers, 2003), p. 329; Nicholas Murray, *The rocky road to the Great War: the evolution of trench warfare to 1914* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2013), pp. 171–210; and Valery Kolev and Christina Koulouri (eds.), *The Balkan Wars*, 2nd edn. (Thessaloniki: CDRSEE, 2009). For Bulgarian and Serbian interpretations, see Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić and Savo Skoko, *Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912–1913* (Belgrade: Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, 1972); and Vasilka Atanasova Tankova et al., *Balkanskite vojni: 1912–1913 g.: pamet i istorija* (Sofia: Akademichno izdatelstvo 'Prof. Marin Drinov', 2012).
12. On the estimated losses of the various combatants, see Erickson, *Defeat in detail*, Table 10.5, p. 329; Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, pp. 16, 108, 136; and Army History Directorate, *A concise history of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913* (Athens: Hellenic Army General Staff, 1998), p. 287. On Ottoman casualties, see Hikmet Özdemir, *The Ottoman army, 1914–1918: disease and death on the battlefield* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2008), pp. 16–26; and Oya Dağlar Macar, 'Epidemic diseases on the Thracian front of the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars', in M. Hakan Yavuz and Isa Blumi (eds.), *War and nationalism: the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, and their sociopolitical implications* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2013), pp. 272–294.
13. See Stefan Sotiris Papaioannou, 'Balkan Wars between the lines: violence and civilians in Macedonia, 1912–1918' (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 2012), pp. 7–8.
14. Justin McCarthy, *Death and exile: the ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922* (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1995), p. 161. However, other estimates adopt the same figure for the period between 1912 and 1920. See Benjamin Lieberman, *Terrible fate: ethnic cleansing in the making of modern Europe* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), pp. 66–67, 76–77.
15. On the role of aviation, see Radul Milkov, *Iz stranitsite na bŭlgarskata voenna aviatsiia: Balkanskata voina 1912–1913* (Sofia: Voenna izdatelstvo, 2003); Mitar Đurišić, *Srpska eskadrila u Skadarskoj operaciji, 1913* (Belgrade: Vazduhoplovni savez, 2006); and Henry Mirande and Louis Olivier, *Sur la bataille; journal d'un aviateur français à l'armée bulgare, au siège d'Andrinople* (Paris: L'Édition Moderne, n.d.).
16. See the discussion in Igor Despot, *The Balkan Wars in the eyes of the warring parties: perceptions and interpretation* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2012), pp. 175–180.
17. Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, pp. 19, 22–24.
18. Erickson, *Defeat in detail*, p. 170.
19. Fikret Adanir, 'Non-Muslims in the Ottoman army and the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War of 1912–13', in Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek and Norman M. Naimark (eds.), *A question of genocide: Armenians and Turks at the end of the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 120.
20. M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *A brief history of the late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 171–173.
21. McCarthy, *The Ottoman peoples*, p. 151.

22. M. Edith Durham, *Struggle for Scutari: Turk, Slav and Albanian* (London: E. Arnold, 1914), pp. 252–253. It is worth noting, however, that contemporary foreign observers did not consistently report on the scale of the violence or the perpetrators.
23. Leon Trotsky, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: the war correspondence of Leon Trotsky*, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monad Press, 1980), pp. 267–270. See also Maria Todorova, 'War and memory: Trotsky's war correspondence from the Balkan Wars', *Perceptions*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Summer 2013, pp. 5–27.
24. Lieberman, *Terrible fate*, p. 60.
25. Lieberman, *Terrible fate*, pp. 60–63. Far greater detail is provided in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1914), pp. 72–78, 94–97.
26. See Heather Jones, 'The Great War: how 1914–1918 changed the relationship between war and civilians', *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 159, No. 4, August/September 2014, p. 86.
27. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission*, p. 148.
28. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission*, p. 148.
29. Cited in Höpken, 'Performing violence', p. 224.
30. Alan Kramer, *Dynamic of destruction: culture and mass killing in the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 140.
31. Kramer, *Dynamic of destruction*, p. 136.
32. Eyal Ginio, 'Mobilizing the Ottoman nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913): awakening from the Ottoman dream', *War in History*, Vol. 12, 2005, pp. 156–177.
33. See Özdemir, *The Ottoman army*, pp. 16–26, on the impact of disease (especially cholera and malaria) on Ottoman troops.
34. Kramer, *Dynamic of destruction*, p. 27.
35. Cited in Philip Gibbs and Bernard Grant, *The Balkan War: adventures of war with cross and crescent* (Boston: Small, Mayward and Company, 1913), p. 35.
36. For a recent assessment of the violence perpetrated against civilians and its implications, see Ügür Ümit Üngör, 'Mass violence against civilians during the Balkan Wars', in Dominik Geppert, William Mulligan and Andreas Rose (eds.), *The wars before the Great War: conflict and international politics before the outbreak of the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 76–90.
37. Gibbs and Grant, *The Balkan War*, p. 34.
38. Durham, *Struggle for Scutari*, p. 296.
39. Carnegie, *Report of the International Commission*, p. 151.
40. Höpken, 'Performing violence', pp. 234–235.
41. Tetsuya Sahara, 'Paramilitaries in the Balkan Wars: the case of Macedonian Adrianople volunteers', in Yavuz and Blumi, *War and nationalism*, p. 399. See also Radivoje Kašanin (ed.), *Dobrovoljci u ratovima 1912–1918, doživljaji i secanja* (Belgrade: Udruženje dobrovoljaca, 1971).
42. Carnegie, *Report of the International Commission*, p. 327. On the violence in Thrace, including the process of exclusion and discriminatory practices initiated subsequently by the Ottoman Empire in their new western borderlands, see Eyal Ginio, 'Paving the way for ethnic cleansing: eastern Thrace during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) and their aftermath', in Bartov and Weitz, *Shatterzone of empires*, pp. 283–297.
43. Gerolymatos, *The Balkan Wars*, p. 240.
44. Ginio, 'Paving the way for ethnic cleansing', pp. 290–291.
45. Carnegie, *Report of the International Commission*, pp. 79, 131.
46. Carnegie, *Report of the International Commission*, p. 97.
47. Cited in Kolev and Koulouri, *The Balkan Wars*, p. 82.
48. Cited in Papaioannou, 'Balkan Wars between the lines', p. 187.
49. Papaioannou, 'Balkan Wars between the lines', pp. 188–190.
50. Gerolymatos, *The Balkan Wars*, p. 241. On the practice of forced conversions during the Balkan Wars, see McCarthy, *The Ottoman peoples*, pp. 93–94.
51. Kolev and Koulouri, *The Balkan Wars*, p. 77.
52. Gerolymatos, *The Balkan Wars*, p. 241.



53. Lieberman, *Terrible fate*, pp. 71–74.
54. Papaioannou, 'Balkan Wars between the lines', p. 226.
55. Papaioannou, 'Balkan Wars between the lines', pp. 227–230.
56. Katrin Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg: Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), pp. 200–201.
57. The Bulgarian state launched its first forced assimilation campaign against the Pomak population (i.e. Bulgarian-speaking Muslims) during the First Balkan War, which was accompanied in some places by conversion to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. The campaign was abandoned within a year, but future Bulgarian regimes would resurrect the policy in 1938–44, 1962–64 and 1971–74. See Ina Merdjanova, *Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans between nationalism and transnationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 21–22.
58. Yannis G. Mourellos, 'The 1914 persecutions and the first attempt at an exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey', *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1985, pp. 389–431. See also Stephen P. Ladas, *The exchange of minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 10–23; and Bruce Clark, *Twice a stranger: the mass expulsions that forged modern Greece and Turkey* (London: Granta, 2006), p. 53.
59. Harris Mylonas, 'Assimilation and its alternatives: caveats in the study of nation-building policies', in Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence (eds.), *Rethinking violence: states and non-state actors in conflict* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), pp. 83–116.
60. Although precise figures are difficult to determine, it has been estimated that in the years between 1912 and 1920, approximately 413,000 Muslims left the Balkans for Ottoman territory. Kolev and Koulouri, *The Balkan Wars*, table 17, p. 120.
61. Papaioannou, 'Balkan Wars between the lines', pp. 239–244.
62. Despite the de facto compulsory nature of these population exchanges, many of those involved would later attempt to return to their original homes. It was the state's priorities rather than local ethnic animosities that determined the outcome and the course of ethnic relations. See Erin K. Jenne, 'Ethnic partition under the League of Nations: the cases of population exchanges in the interwar Balkans', in Chenoweth and Lawrence, *Rethinking violence*, pp. 117–140.
63. Siniša Malešević, 'Obliterating heterogeneity through peace: nationalisms, states and wars, in the Balkans', in John A. Hall and Siniša Malešević (eds.), *Nationalism and war* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 265.
64. Höpken, 'Performing violence', p. 240.
65. The first-hand accounts offered by some Western travellers are often anecdotal but typically emphasize the broad popular support for the war effort, including among Serb and Bulgarian peasants. For example, see Gibbs and Grant, *The Balkan War*, pp. 17–18, 28–29. However, some segments of Balkan political society opposed the march to war, including the socialists and agrarians. For instance, although the Serbian Social Democratic Party (SSDP) supported liberation from Ottoman rule, it favoured social revolution and Balkan federalism. Some party leaders opposed the partition of Ottoman territory among the Balkan states, for fear of new fratricidal conflicts and that the region would be exposed to Great Power imperialism. The Bulgarian Labour Social Democratic Party supported Balkan federalism and on the eve of the First Balkan War the Bulgarian agrarian leader, Aleksandŭr Stamboliiski, opposed the war. See Mark Biondich, *The Balkans: revolution, war and political violence since 1878* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 83–84; and Richard C. Hall, 'Bulgaria, Romania and Greece', in Richard F. Hamilton and Holder H. Herwig (eds.), *The origins of World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 391. Much of the Balkan countryside still resisted the nationalist appeals of the Balkan Wars. See, for example, Malešević, 'Obliterating heterogeneity', p. 271.
66. Höpken, 'Performing violence', p. 248.
67. Cathie Carmichael, *Genocide before the Holocaust* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 5.
68. Jones, 'The Great War', p. 89.
69. Serbia and Montenegro were drawn into the war immediately and saw it as a struggle for national survival. Elsewhere in the Balkans, the mood in 1914 was generally sombre and the wave of popular enthusiasm for war seen in Paris, London and Berlin was almost



entirely absent. Bulgaria, Romania and Greece initially opted for neutrality, but under considerable pressure from both the Entente and Central Powers were drawn into the Great War. Bulgaria entered the war in October 1915, while Romania joined the Entente in August 1916. Although Greece formally declared war on the Central Powers only in June 1917, the Entente occupied Thessaloniki (autumn 1915) and Corfu (January 1916) and attempted to occupy Athens (December 1916), while Bulgarian troops occupied the area north of Thessaloniki (March 1916). Greek neutrality was routinely violated well before Athens joined the war effort. See the discussion in Hall, 'Bulgaria, Romania and Greece', pp. 389–414.

70. Adanir, 'Non-Muslims in the Ottoman army', pp. 113, 124.

71. Michael Mann, *The dark side of democracy: explaining ethnic cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 133.

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