



'MODERN WARS' AND 'BACKWARD SOCIETIES'

The Balkan Wars in the History of Twentieth-Century European Warfare

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The Balkan Wars have been perceived in ambivalent and contradictory ways, both among the general public and in scholarly works. Whereas in the Balkan countries they have generally long been glorified as 'wars of liberation', with little attention given to their violence and social consequences,¹ the European public and historiography often described them, as Enika Abazi has recently put it, 'exclusively in terms of atrocities'.² The contemporary European public was divided about the wars. Some observers reaffirmed what Maria Todorova has termed the 'orientalist' perception of the region,³ attributing the extremely violent character of the wars to the 'semi-culture of the Balkan tribes',⁴ while others acknowledged or even welcomed the Balkan Wars, in particular the first, as a legitimate fight for 'the nation'.⁵ In addition, while many considered the wars to be 'traditional' and 'typically Balkan', others, such as military experts, who travelled in great numbers to the Balkan theatre, viewed the conflicts at the same time as 'modern', and foreshadowing many of the experiences that Europe could anticipate in its next war.

Scholars in military history no less have yet to reach a consensus about how to deal with the Balkan Wars and where to situate them in the history of twentieth-century European warfare. Some, like the doyens of military historiography John Keegan and Michael Howard, downplay their significance to a footnote, viewing them as totally overshadowed by the Great War.⁶ Others have placed the wars outside the traditions of 'European' warfare. In their view, to quote the German-Israeli historian Dan Diner, these wars 'in their intensity and

cruelty were alien to the regulated military wars between states in the European continent'⁷ and, to quote another German historian, therefore should be placed in the category of colonial warfare.⁸ It is only recently that the violence of the Balkan Wars has been considered in the broader context of what happened in other parts of Europe during the 'age of extremes'.⁹ Reflecting upon the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and trying to save the region and its people from the 'orientalist' accusation of being inherently violent, authors like Mark Biondich have regarded the wars and violence in the Balkans as an integral part of the 'dark' European twentieth century.¹⁰

It seems that these disparate perspectives in fact reflect the deeply ambivalent character of the two Balkan Wars. On the one hand, they were rather 'conventional' small-scale and local conflicts, by all criteria far removed from the dimension of warfare that the Great War would bring two years later. They can also scarcely be categorized as 'total war', neither in terms of their intensity and resources nor in their consequences for society. However, on the other hand, the Balkan Wars were also a watershed, at least in the history of wars in the Balkans. They were 'the last Turkish wars' in the tradition of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 'Oriental Question', but at the same time they went very much beyond the kind of warfare that the region had witnessed during the previous centuries. The Balkan Wars were hybrid in nature, a blend of traditional warfare with many of the features that would characterize the subsequent twentieth-century European conflicts. In the following, I illustrate this hybrid character by focusing mainly on four aspects of the wars: the relationship between war and society; the changing experiences of war; the intensity and extensity of war; and, finally, the question of the character of violence during the wars.

'Modern Warfare' and 'Backward Societies'

The armies that were involved in the Balkan Wars already reflect a tension between 'modernity' and 'backwardness'. In Serbia and Bulgaria in particular, and to a lesser degree and with a certain delay in Greece, the armies of the last quarter of the nineteenth century had developed into military formations that were 'modern' by almost all criteria. In Serbia, for example, military reform had been stimulated by the many deficits that the Serbian army had revealed during the war against the Ottomans in 1876 and, in particular, in Serbia's disastrous defeat by Bulgaria in 1885. Reform had transformed the army from 'peasants in arms' into a well-organized, well-trained and disciplined military

force.¹¹ The first attempts to replace the traditional way of fighting in local and decentralized *četa* by a centrally commanded, 'standing' army had been undertaken during the 'First Serbian Uprising' in 1808 and 1811, but had failed. Nor had they materialized after the Serbian state had been established.¹² Demands for a professionalized standing army arose in particular during the 1860s, inspired by the French idea of a 'nation in arms' and guided by French concepts and advisers, but these demands were not satisfied, mainly because of the lack of financial resources. No more than a small prince's 'guard' of up to 4,000 standing soldiers came into being, while the bulk of the army of up to 100,000 men consisted of largely untrained peasants.¹³

The defeat in the first Serbian-Ottoman war of 1876 had revealed the flaws of the army, and even victory in the second war of 1877–78 could not hide the limitations of the 'peasant in arms'. The army was ill-equipped in technological terms, and it lacked clear command structures and often discipline as well. It had been more the weakness of the Ottoman army and the favourable international conditions than the quality of the army that had made Serbian military victory possible.¹⁴ Nationalist ambitions, which in political terms became more concrete during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, could hardly be achieved in the long run with such a 'premodern' army. A fundamental restructuring of the Serbian army therefore took place in 1883 and 1897. The *narodna vojska* (people's army) was abolished in favour of a standing professional army, based on regular conscriptions and a two-year period of service.¹⁵ The number of soldiers under arms grew constantly after the 1880s. The command structures were professionalized, and for the first time a regular general staff was established as a permanent body after 1876, in line with overall European practice.¹⁶ While the wars of the nineteenth century had been fought without any real strategic preparation, the war against the Ottoman Empire in 1912 had been prepared for professionally since the turn of the century.¹⁷ In particular, officers' education and qualifications were improved. After early attempts to establish a specific military education during the 1830s and 1840s had seen only unstable results, since the mid-century specific officers' schools, combining general education and military qualification, had been opened, finally leading to the foundation of a higher military academy in 1880.¹⁸ While in 1880 only 187 candidates enrolled in the higher military academy, on the eve of the Balkan Wars the number had risen to more than 1,700.¹⁹ The officers' material conditions had improved considerably with the turn of the century, and pensions had made the military profession particularly attractive. More importantly, the officer's social status had been enhanced, and as

a result the officer corps had become a part of the urban and educated elite.²⁰ Just as in other European countries, as General Mišić noted in 1907, the Serbian state began to secure the social position of the officer as a major representative of the state and the nation.²¹ The qualifications and regular training of the ordinary soldiers improved no less. Military manoeuvres were held, involving between 10,000 and 30,000 soldiers, numbers unknown in former times.²² In 1909, the Serbian journal *Srpski Književni Glasnik* published statistical data, indicating that the Serbian army had even fewer disciplinary cases than the German army.²³

Parallel to these institutional reforms, the army's technical equipment, which in 1877–78 and in 1885 had proven to be outdated, was substantially renewed by importing up-to-date weaponry, mainly from France and Germany.²⁴ Certainly the project of military modernization had not been accomplished when the war started, as foreign military attachés observed. Only the first army contingent was equipped with the most modern weaponry, while the second contingent lagged behind and the third contingent resembled the old peasant militia.²⁵ And despite the fact that the government had taken up substantial loans and almost plundered its treasury, the equipment did not allow more than a relatively short war.²⁶ In general, however, both diplomats and military specialists considered the Serbian army to be 'a well-conceived and well-functioning institution',²⁷ unprecedented in its size, restructured according to European standards, updated in its technological capabilities and well prepared in strategic terms.

Bulgaria, too, had taken a similar route towards 'military modernization'. Having been dependent largely on Russian equipment, know-how and officers after the 'liberation' of 1878, beginning with the era of Stefan Stambulov the Bulgarian army replaced the strong Russian influence with a more diverse system of institutional models, contacts and technical supply, relying in particular on France. The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, which left a great impression on the Bulgarian military, had an especially deep impact on the country's reorientation as far as military education, strategy and equipment were concerned.²⁸ Since that time, the country had established what the correspondent of the German *Kölnische Zeitung*, Richard von Mach, called a 'well-conceptualized and excellent organization of the army ... [based on] substantial financial means'.²⁹ Regular conscriptions, which had been introduced after the establishment of the Bulgarian state in 1878 and which were implemented, unlike in Greece, with few exceptions, gave the army a strong numerical basis. The number of officers increased constantly, reaching more than 2,200 on the eve of the wars.³⁰ They became qualified through a close network of

military schools and academies and held, even more than in Serbia, a highly respected social status, being considered part of the country's *intelligentsia*.³¹ Because officers were almost the only civil servants who had job security, higher military service became an important avenue of upward social mobility.

In terms of technology, the late 1890s also witnessed the transition in Bulgaria from an army relying on traditional warfare to one relying on machine-led warfare, much like industry had gone from artisan or manufacture production to machine production. Modern weapons were imported, mostly from Germany, and up-to-date artillery was obtained from France.³² As the Bulgarian ambassador to Russia told the Russian prime minister on the eve of the Balkan Wars, for more than thirty years his country had concentrated all its energy and power on bringing the army to the highest level possible.³³ Even an airplane department was established in the Bulgarian War Ministry as early as 1906, and the first airplanes for the army were bought shortly thereafter. In the efforts of military preparation, officers were sent to France for training. Still, most of the airplanes were flown by foreign pilots, particularly Russians.³⁴ The actual military effect of aircraft during the Balkan Wars, as was also the case for the Ottoman Empire or Serbia,³⁵ was more than limited. The twenty-nine airplanes – among them eighteen that had been imported from Russia, six from France and four from Germany – flew 230 operations in both Balkan Wars, but only 79 of them in combat. The remaining flights served to provide supplies or intelligence, or to drop leaflets to the general population. Only four aircraft carried bombs, which were employed, among others, during the attack on Adrianople. They caused more psychological stress than military damage. Often planes were out of order, or operations had to be cancelled due to supply or weather problems.³⁶ Nevertheless, Bulgarian airpower drew considerable attention both domestically and internationally. It was seen as a striking sign of the country's military modernizing efforts.³⁷

Military reform took root much later in Greece's army, which in the late nineteenth century was limited in size and weak in organizational capacity. Even decades after the country's independence in 1830, the army had minor military importance in comparison with the many irregular units, which often operated under the control of local 'warlords'.³⁸ The numerical strength of the army in the middle of the nineteenth century was not more than 10,000. It fluctuated between 15,000 and 25,000 soldiers during the following decades, until just before the Balkan Wars. Conscription, introduced only in 1880, was enforced with many exceptions, so that only a small percentage of

those formally subject to conscription were actually drafted.³⁹ Lagging behind Bulgaria and Serbia, and despite severe financial limitations, military reforms in Greece nevertheless took shape after the turn of the century, improving the army's professionalization, equipment and qualifications, largely on the basis of French concepts and with France's support. On the side of the Balkan Alliance, only the tiny Montenegrin army remained at the beginning of its transformation from a militia-type *plemenska vojska* into an army with professional structure by the time of the Balkan Wars.⁴⁰ Command structures, however, were in practice still unregulated, and even the Montenegrin military leaders would complain of the lack of discipline among the soldiers and the lack of military education among the officers.⁴¹

All in all, the military in the Balkan states was surely one of the most successful arenas of 'modernization'. The cost was high, however. Given that none of the countries was able to produce much of the necessary military equipment by itself – not even ammunition for the new weapons – imports required huge financial resources. Military expenditures, reaching more than a quarter of the entire budget and exceeding, on a per capita basis, even those of industrialized Western European countries like Great Britain and Germany, constantly overstretched the budgets and contributed to the indebtedness of all the Balkan states at the turn of the century. Short-term loans and plundering the reserves in foreign currency to finance the purchase of weapons and ammunition had exhausted the countries' financial resources even before the war had started.⁴² Even if this 'expensive army' was consuming more than a quarter of the Bulgarian budget, as the politician Stojan Danev, at that time head of the Bulgarian parliament, explained to the Austrian ambassador in early 1912, this was an 'inevitable sacrifice' in order to fulfil the country's 'national aspirations'.⁴³

Foreign observers usually spoke with high esteem of most of the Balkan armies. The Bulgarian army in particular was praised for being familiar with 'the most modern practices of the most important European armies' and being 'comparable with the armies of the great European countries, which were long since used to wars'. The British Major P. Howell, who visited the Bulgarian army between the First and Second Balkan Wars, compared it to that of Japan – 'a highly successful army ... created ab ovo in one generation'. The Serbian army also, in terms of 'organization, weaponry and equipment [was considered to be] absolutely modern'.⁴⁴ The allied victories during the First Balkan War confirmed the Western perception that Serbia had proved able 'to form a well-equipped and disciplined army within a short period of time'.⁴⁵ The high opinion of the Allies' armies contrasted starkly

with the rather sceptical views of foreign witnesses concerning the Ottoman army, which at the outbreak of the wars in 1912 was still in the middle of a German-guided modernization and reform process. While these usually were full of recognition for the ordinary Turkish soldier, not without reproducing conventional European stereotypes about the 'fanatic' Muslim warrior,⁴⁶ many observations by correspondents and diplomatic observers painted a more unfavourable picture of the army's outlook and preparation.⁴⁷ German advisers to the Ottoman Empire themselves noted positive effects in this effort, but they were generally frustrated by the slow pace of reform and sceptical of the army's quality.⁴⁸

Owing not least to the apparently highly developed character of the Balkan armies, the many European military experts who witnessed the theatre of war in 1912–13 expected the Balkan War to be a 'modern one', one that offered even for their own countries insights from which they might learn. As one of them remarked, while the experiences of the Franco-German War of 1870–71 had already lost their importance, the war in the Balkans could offer conclusions for the next European war to come.⁴⁹ Prussian and Bavarian officers serving in the Ottoman Empire even asked for the opportunity to participate in the war on the Ottoman side as commanders in order to update their knowledge, requests that met with reluctance not only on the part of the Ottoman authorities, but also among the German ones. Although the German military was eager to have first-hand reports, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hesitated to give the officers permission in view of possible diplomatic frictions. Indeed, only a few managed to serve in the field, after they relinquished their German citizenship for the duration of the war. Their reports to the war ministries of Prussia and Bavaria were well received as a source of valuable information.⁵⁰ At the centre of their interest were questions not only of military theory and strategy, but also of military technology, such as the new weaponry. The new ammunition and artillery used in the wars had 'stood the test' for future wars, in the words of a German military officer describing the Serbian army and its campaigns.⁵¹ Because the warring parties had obtained their new weaponry from Germany, as was the case for the Ottoman Empire, or from France, as Serbia did, or from both Germany and France, as was true of Bulgaria, the Balkan Wars were also seen as a competition between German and French military technology.⁵²

In the end, the conclusions that the foreign military experts drew from the theatre of war were mixed. Some of them, like the Bavarian Major Endres, saw 'little [that] could be learned from'.⁵³ And while his British colleague Major Howell, witnessing the Bulgarian warfare,

saw little benefit for upcoming European wars, experiences from a war like that in Thrace, being fought more ‘under Asian than under European conditions’, could well offer something for ‘colonial wars’ such as in Afghanistan or Northern India.⁵⁴ Others, like his colleague Lossow, who served with Endres in the Ottoman army, saw valuable experiences insofar as the efficacy of the new, modern weapons was concerned. Even though the wars had offered a limited experience in strategic and technological terms, and had merely confirmed the military and strategic concepts their countries had developed,⁵⁵ they had demonstrated, at least, as German and Austrian observers noted, the importance of what was called the ‘moral preparation’ for war. More than ever, as a German officer pointed out, future wars could be won only if the soldiers were driven by a strong moral impetus to fight, and the Balkan soldiers had shown that ‘a belligerent spirit’ is nothing ‘reprehensible’, as was often heard among the German public, but an asset that must be constantly reaffirmed within the society.⁵⁶

Adoption of the European principle of a standing and professional army, however, was not consistent, and the result was an element of ‘hybridity’, even in the military’s organizational structure. Specifically, the traditional concept of a ‘peasant nation in arms’ had not been totally abandoned. Paramilitaries and ‘armed civilians’, forces that during the nineteenth century had been the backbone of the countries’ military resources – and for some of them, such as Greece and Montenegro, even the most important resources – continued to play their role during wartime even after the establishment of regular armies. In Serbia, the idea of abolishing the *narodna vojska* in 1883 had met with resistance from the influential Radical Party, which considered a standing army a contradiction to the party’s concept of an egalitarian and patriarchal Serbian society. Militia-type units were therefore kept up, albeit under the army’s control. Četnik warfare was part of the military education, and their operational activities during military conflicts were seen as an auxiliary force, acting behind the front lines and in combination with the regular troops.⁵⁷ More than that, in Serbia as well as in Bulgaria, the irregular armed groups, the *četa* and *komitadži*, which had already played an important role in former wars and, since the turn of the century, had become crucial military actors in Macedonia in particular,⁵⁸ became an important and integral part of military campaigns during the Balkan Wars as well. Since 1910–11, četnik units increasingly were trained and the general staff of the Serbian army systematically began to organize their equipment and supply. When the war against the Ottoman Empire started, their activities were coordinated by the general staff.⁵⁹ Although they were increasingly subordinated to the regular army, they

nonetheless continued to act on their own, blurring and undermining the army's monopoly on violence.⁶⁰ The traditional dualism between regular and irregular forces, which had never been eliminated during the Balkan countries' state-building process, was thus maintained, with dire consequences for the nature and, in particular, the level of violence during the Balkan Wars.

An even more striking expression of the armies' 'hybrid modernity' was the obvious contradiction between their relatively high standard in terms of number and technology and the general backwardness of the infrastructure and limited organizational capacities of their respective states. When the Balkan governments summoned their male citizens to arms in 1912 in then-unprecedented numbers, mobilization in Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece impressed foreign observers,⁶¹ but was nevertheless accompanied by many logistical shortcomings. Transport facilities in particular were inadequate for the tremendous number of mobilized soldiers. Only roughly a quarter of them could be transported by rail. Motor vehicle transport was still in its early stages anyway, and had little impact on the conduct of the war.⁶² The bulk of soldiers had to be transported by horse and oxcart or travelled on foot.⁶³ Though 'modern' in terms of the number of soldiers involved, the campaigns were thus as slow as those of the nineteenth-century wars. Soldiers, as it was reported from the Ottoman side, often were not familiar with the new and modern weapons or badly prepared to dig adequate trenches, and the newly imported heavy artillery were hard to transport on the badly prepared roads and bridges during the rainy autumn campaigns.⁶⁴ In addition, important items of equipment such as field kitchens, sometimes even uniforms and boots, were lacking, leaving soldiers often unprepared for bad weather conditions during the First Balkan War.⁶⁵ The supply of food also failed to 'meet the standards of a modern army', as observers noticed with regard to the Bulgarian army, leading to insufficient nutrition and even hunger among many soldiers in the course of the wars.⁶⁶ Although all Balkan governments had invested in communication facilities, not least for military reasons, as the Russo-Japanese war had been instructive in this respect, telegraph lines were less than half the length of those in Western European countries of comparable size. Finally, all the belligerents were prepared for an intensive but short war. As a result, there was a shortage of ammunition throughout the war,⁶⁷ which (fortunately) limited the effect of the modern weapons with which the armies were supplied.

Most dramatic and most painful, however, was the almost total lack of medical support during the wars. None of the Balkan states had provided for medical care, at least not in relation to the increased

military capacities they had built up. In Serbia, serious ideas concerning medical care of the army had appeared only in the 1860s. They had been promoted largely by Vladan Djordjević, a physician who had tried to introduce the Prussian-style practice of military medicine in Serbia.⁶⁸ His ideas, however, were not put into effect during the following decades. As a result, Serbia entered the Serbian-Ottoman wars of 1876 and 1877–78 with about sixty doctors for more than 100,000 soldiers, less than a quarter of the number that would have been appropriate.⁶⁹ A foreign observer noted that ‘the history of warfare in the last 25 years affords no example of an outright undersupply of medical personnel, in relation to what was actually required, that is commensurate with the situation in the recent Serbian-Turkish war’.⁷⁰ The picture had not changed in 1885, when only twenty-two military doctors were responsible for the care of Serbian soldiers during the war with Bulgaria.⁷¹

With the military modernization and expansion of the Serbian army, the number of doctors, both civilian and military, increased substantially over the following two decades. Considering the tremendous increase in troop strength and the army’s technological progress, however, the roughly 290 doctors for more than 350,000 soldiers at the beginning of the Balkan Wars represented a proportion as insufficient as thirty years earlier.⁷² Nurses were also lacking, both in numbers and still more in terms of qualifications. Women’s organizations, which appeared on the scene during the second half of the nineteenth century, such as the *Kolo srpskih sestara* (Ring of Serbian Sisters), had taken it as one of their primary tasks to prepare young women as volunteers for wars to come.⁷³ But the ‘ladies from all strata of society’ who joined the hospitals in great numbers during the Balkan Wars, and were described by contemporary witnesses as well as later historians as having been inspired by a high patriotic passion,⁷⁴ had totally inadequate qualifications. Foreign doctors serving in the Balkan states complained almost unanimously about the lack of skill of the nurses, who sometimes worsened rather than improved the condition of the wounded.⁷⁵

Medical supply in Bulgaria also was considered to be ‘generally deficient’.⁷⁶ Despite ‘preparing for the war for such a long time’, as remembered by the German doctor Kirschner, who served during the war in Bulgarian hospitals, preparations in the medical field had been almost totally neglected,⁷⁷ and, following Bulgarian figures, there was a lack of about six hundred medical doctors to cope with the increasing number of wounded soldiers, not counting in international assistance.⁷⁸ Indeed, it was in part the disastrous experience of the Balkan Wars that finally led to the decision in Bulgaria as well as Serbia to open a medical

faculty at the universities in Sofia and Belgrade, something that had been discussed since the 1890s and long demanded by the military.⁷⁹

Montenegro had no institutionalized system of medical care for the army at all. It had four doctors for 40,000 soldiers.⁸⁰ When the war quickly involved more losses than expected, it became clear to the Montenegrin public, as the Austrian delegate to Cetinje reported, that fighting had been started 'with a carelessness recalling barbaric times'.⁸¹

In the Ottoman Empire, the situation, particularly at the beginning of the war, encountered just as many difficulties.⁸² Here, the growing number of refugees who, in addition to wounded soldiers, poured into the cities in poor health made the situation even worse.⁸³ The situation became disastrous when cholera hit the armies in November 1912. For the Ottoman army, the disease proved to be 'an opponent more dangerous than the enemy'. With little professional and efficient treatment, many of the infected were left alone or sent behind the front lines, where San Stefano became a real 'cholera camp', causing up to 6,000 deaths.⁸⁴ The situation was only little better among the Bulgarian army, severely affecting its military capacities. Neither the medical personnel nor the institutional facilities were prepared to cope with the epidemic, at least not at the front.⁸⁵

It was the many foreign doctors and nurses who came to the battlefields of the Balkan Wars who eased the situation, although they could hardly compensate for the numerous structural deficits. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, the International Red Cross, the national Red Cross organizations, governments and universities sent doctors to the individual warring countries. This had been a practice in former wars, but participants reached unprecedented numbers during the Balkan Wars,⁸⁶ thus also reflecting the new dimension of the war. While for some, like the experienced British Red Cross nurse Claire Stobart, their service was motivated by Christian compassion,⁸⁷ others had a combination of altruistic and practical motives. Like many military men, foreign doctors saw the Balkan Wars as an opportunity to gain first-hand experience for future wars. The last first-hand experience of war in Europe had occurred in 1870–71; the Russo-Japanese war and Second Boer War had offered only limited opportunity for practical observations, owing to the distance of the theatres of war from Europe. Thus, it was the Balkan Wars that enabled medical personnel to gain expertise in contemporary battlefield medicine. In particular, they could learn the effects of the new weaponry and ammunition. The usage of chloroform and bacteriological issues were also of interest.⁸⁸ Alfred Exner, the leading expert among military surgeons, went to the Balkan Wars to study new opportunities to perform field surgery

near the front line,⁸⁹ and the annual congress of the German Society for Surgery dedicated a specific panel in 1913 to experiences during the Balkan Wars. Anton Waldmann, who in the 1920s would become one of the leading military medical specialists in the *Reichswehr*, praised the experience that German doctors had gained during the Balkan Wars.⁹⁰ Even American military doctors made use of more than one thousand X-ray images of wounded Turkish soldiers from the Balkan Wars to study the effects of new weapons and ammunition used during combat.⁹¹ For all of them, as for the military experts, the Balkan Wars were not an expression of an apparently 'archaic' violence, but the first example of a new type of warfare they expected in the future. The Balkan Wars, as the Austrian medical doctor Josef Hamburger concluded from his service in the Bulgarian army, had shown not only the necessity to professionalize medical support for future wars to come; the medical competences that were demonstrated during the wars by foreign doctors could also help soldiers to better master their fear of combat when it took over their former feelings of 'honour and patriotism'. As Hamburger said of his experiences in the Balkans, not only did the current 'modern ammunition' produce injuries that were easy to cure, but experts should also think about how to produce more efficient bullets that could 'put the wounded out of action'.⁹² Even if most medical doctors did not bring home anything 'totally new', the Balkan Wars nonetheless for them had 'great significance as a school of practical action'.⁹³

In the Balkan Wars, the effects of inadequate medical care were disastrous on all sides. 'No treatment at all on the field would have been preferable to the well-intended but shocking ignorance', as the American war correspondent Fred Fox wrote from the Thracian battlefield.⁹⁴ The insufficient number and equipment of field hospitals left many wounded soldiers without quick and appropriate treatment.⁹⁵ Ivan Popov, a young reserve-officer, even writes in his war memories about 'marauding first-aid attendants', about witnessing wounded men who had not been treated but 'whose pockets had been turned upside-down'.⁹⁶ Because the new military technology meant that battles lasted much longer than in former wars, the wounded often lay on the battlefield for hours or even an entire day before they could be cared for after the fighting ended.⁹⁷

The major problem, however, was the lack of adequate transportation facilities. Trains to transport wounded soldiers to the hospitals were lacking and the few transport facilities were badly organized.⁹⁸ Just as in the other countries and just as during the wars of 1877–78, the bulk of the wounded had to be transported by oxcart over bad roads, taking

sometimes a week or even longer to reach a hospital.⁹⁹ This delay led to a high number of casualties among the wounded, particularly during the early weeks of the campaign.¹⁰⁰ There was, as foreign medical observers correctly recognized, 'a striking disproportion between the great number of heavily wounded as a result of the modern weaponry on the one hand, and the insufficient and primitive facilities for their transport on the other',¹⁰¹ thus illustrating again the dichotomy between 'modernity' and 'backwardness' that characterized the entire war. As the historian Béla Király has put it, 'the Balkan Wars were wars in which the soldiers of underdeveloped societies operated technology far above their own developmental level'.¹⁰²

Experiencing 'Modern Wars'

Technological modernization also produced new experiences of warfare, not only for the ordinary soldier, but also for society as a whole. The Balkan soldiers certainly did not face the 'industrialized warfare' their European companions would experience during the Great War just two years later. They were not confronted with the apocalyptic experience of trench warfare lasting for months on end, the nerve-racking alternation between silence and continuous fire, and the trauma of shell shock, as were soldiers on the Western Front during the First World War. Even some of the nineteenth-century wars, like the Crimean War, which Orlando Figes, for good reason, has recently labelled as an early example of 'total war',¹⁰³ were far larger in scope and intensity than the Balkan Wars. For the Balkan combatants, however, the two wars of 1912–13 produced a new sense of warfare. For many soldiers, combat differed from everything they had experienced in previous military confrontations.

To begin with, the sheer number of soldiers involved in the war overall and during the battles gave the war a new character. Serbia, which in 1876–78 in its last two wars against the Ottoman Empire had mobilized 124,000 and 82,000 soldiers, respectively, and in 1885 against Bulgaria just 52,000, called to arms almost 400,000 men, 14 per cent of the entire Serbian population.¹⁰⁴ Bulgaria mobilized almost 600,000 soldiers during the two wars, almost 12 per cent of the entire population – 'a nation in weapons' and 'something never seen before', as the leading army general Radko Dimitriev remembered.¹⁰⁵ Greece, which had never had an army exceeding 25,000 men, mobilized its biggest army ever, with more than 150,000 soldiers. During the Second Balkan War, Greece even recruited orphans, expatriates and men who

originally were found unfit for service at the front.¹⁰⁶ In fact, the Balkan Wars were the first to be fought as a true *levée en masse* in Europe.

Still more importantly, battles were often fought for a much longer time, sometimes over days, or even during the night, something that soldiers had rarely confronted in earlier wars. Reporting from his service with the Bulgarian army, the Austrian medical doctor Bertold Reder wrote about soldiers who had been confronted with constant attacks for seven days without any opportunity to leave the trench.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the new weapons created a new experience of organized violence. In particular, the widely used shrapnel shells of the artillery confronted the soldiers not only with new kinds of physical damage; while 'traditional' gunshot wounds still prevailed, the number of combatants wounded by artillery fire rose substantially in comparison with former wars, and accounted for more than 20 per cent of all casualties.¹⁰⁸ The sound of cannon fire made the earth tremble and resonated throughout the body, as one soldier described his impressions of the battle of Lüle Burgas. Many soldiers were unsure how to behave in the face of such force.¹⁰⁹ But it was predominantly the psychological impact of these weapons that created the feeling of a new kind of war among the soldiers. Even foreign military specialists grasped this dimension of combat. Albin Kutschbach, a German officer who had been with the Serbian army, spoke about the 'unpleasant music' of the new artillery, which with its constant fire created an 'unbearable situation' from which soldiers continued to suffer long after the battle had ended, and several even 'went insane'.¹¹⁰ The German doctor Ludwig Schliep, who claimed to have been one of the few working very close to the front lines, spoke about a 'concert of hell' when artillery guns were shaking the air, and 'pictures of horror, one never could forget'.¹¹¹ While the artillery fire was far from the continuous and hours-long bombings the First World War would bring, diplomats who witnessed the siege of the city of Scutari noticed the 'disastrous effect the new generation of artillery' had on the local population.¹¹² Anyone who might have thought that the new modern weapons would be 'more humane', the German war correspondent Colin Ross wrote, should visit the battlefields of Eastern Thrace: 'horrible is the effect of the modern artillery'.¹¹³ While the new weapons were often rather inefficient in military terms, as military specialists recognized, the psychological effects were 'very demanding for the soldiers',¹¹⁴ often producing what military doctors called 'traumatic neuroses', a term that would become common two years later during the Great War.¹¹⁵

Furthermore, according to military observers, the machine gun, which in the Russo-Japanese war had played merely the role of an

'additional weapon', in the Balkan Wars 'turned into an indispensable one' and produced what military and medical observers called a 'strong moral impression' among the soldiers, in particular those who were confronted with it for the first time.¹¹⁶ In contrast to the Great War, we have relatively few soldiers' diaries from the Balkan Wars, simply because many soldiers were still illiterate, particularly on the Ottoman side but to a lesser extent also on the Serbian side. The little that was published, however, confirms the sense of the ordinary soldier that the Balkan Wars had brought a new experience of being confronted with death. 'All the time fire, it was horrible', the Bulgarian soldier Raicho Maidovski wrote in his diary from the Second Balkan War, 'for ten days now we have been constantly in a fight, without any rest, without any sleep'.¹¹⁷ In particular, the Bulgarian siege of Adrianople in the spring of 1913 with its constant shelling was perceived as an unknown experience. The 'power of the artillery ... [and] the light effects of the flash-lightning thunder of the guns', as the Austrian consul von Herzfeld described, 'were an apotheosis of what we had seen and heard during the months before'.¹¹⁸ The constant presence of death was also noted by others as something new for the soldiers, reflecting the new forms of warfare.¹¹⁹

Even the way of fighting was often perceived by soldiers as something novel and unusual. While the Balkan Wars in general were still characterized by conventional face-to-face killing, the new weaponry also produced a new experience of killing and dying. Not being familiar with the 'modern' weaponry, soldiers often fired without interruption, using up their supplies of ammunition.¹²⁰ Ottoman soldiers in particular, many of them insufficiently trained, often had problems handling the unfamiliar weapons.¹²¹ Serbian soldiers, another source reports, initially hesitated to dig trenches to protect themselves against the enemy's artillery fire, because they considered this 'cowardly' behaviour.¹²² Some voiced mixed feelings about this new way of fighting. 'Many discussions among us were raised by the question of the importance of the bayonet and the fire', the Bulgarian officer Dimităr Azmanov wrote in his memoirs. 'And many of our officers preferred the bayonet, as a material expression of moral energy, over the new weaponry'.¹²³ With the new weaponry, the experience of death also changed. 'Death has become invisible', wrote Colin Ross, expressing a feeling that would become a common notion during the Great War.¹²⁴ Even the environment suffered the repercussions of the new and much more intense way of fighting. Destruction of houses and whole villages turned entire landscapes into devastated areas. The British nurse Claire Stobart saw a 'depopulated wilderness' when

she entered the Thracian battlefield after the fighting had ended. 'The land wore an eerie aspect', the American war photographer Herbert Baldwin wrote from the same area,¹²⁵ and the Czech pacifist and socialist Emanuel Skátula was reminded of a 'Dantesque disaster' when, as a young journalist, he visited the region around Lozengrad, where one of the fiercest battles had been fought.¹²⁶ The many casualties, which also reached unprecedented numbers, the new forms of physical disabilities, the pictures of totally destroyed and burned villages, all confronted both soldiers and civilians with a kind of war they had not known before, and with which their abilities to cope were inadequate.

On the Way to 'Total War'?

A third aspect of this 'new character' of the Balkan Wars that made them different from nineteenth-century experiences was the impact of the conflicts on the respective societies. Again, in comparison with the Great War, the differences are striking. During the First World War, as Roger Chickering wrote, it was not only the new *intensity* of warfare that turned the war into a 'total' war, but more than that, its new *extensity*, which subordinated the entire society to the necessities of the war.¹²⁷ This was not the case in the Balkan Wars. In some respects, particularly the effects upon the economy, the Balkan Wars by no means reached the same level of 'socialized warfare' as the Great War did. Yet never before had European society been so affected and involved as during the two Balkan Wars. In this sense, too, they can be seen as the 'prelude' to the First World War, as Richard Hall has called them.¹²⁸

The much deeper impact of the wars on the societies concerned can be seen first of all in the new dimension of mobilization, mentioned above, which left virtually no family unaffected. 'The war', as a member of the Austrian Red Cross Mission to Bulgaria remembered of his impressions when entering the Bulgarian capital Sofia during the early weeks of the war, 'was not only felt in each home, it had become a dictator, whom the entire engine of the people's and the state's life had to serve'.¹²⁹ Almost all areas of economic life were interrupted when mobilization began.¹³⁰ Mobilization extended deep into society, and not only in quantitative terms. It affected social groups that in former times had not really been touched by war. Now, in contrast to previous wars, governments, in particular the Greek one, tried to call their emigrants back from abroad.¹³¹ Bulgaria, with the silent support of the Russian government, even recruited compatriots from Odessa and Bessarabia who were not formally Bulgarian citizens.¹³² For the

first time, the Ottoman Empire called non-Muslim citizens to arms in substantial numbers, a measure that later caused a debate as to whether this had contributed to the country's disastrous defeat.¹³³ While the contribution of the non-Muslims to the conduct of the war was probably of minor significance, whether in 'positive' or 'negative' terms,¹³⁴ recruiting non-Muslims for the Ottoman army was certainly an example of the new dimensions of mobilization that were reached in the Balkan Wars. Women had been recruited for medical support in former wars, for example in 1877–78 or 1885, but during the Balkan Wars their inclusion became more widespread than ever before. In some countries, particularly the Ottoman Empire, recruitment of women as volunteers for the military medical service opened the door to hitherto unknown professions for young Muslim women. According to a recent author, the Balkan Wars 'played a pivotal role in the orientation of Turkish women toward nursing'.¹³⁵ Sometimes the role of women was even extended into semi-military activities, as women were involved in the military supply of paramilitary units or were even trained to use weapons.¹³⁶ With this new dimension of mobilization and inclusion in mind, Eyal Ginio, from the perspective of the Ottoman Empire, has spoken of the Balkan Wars as the 'first total war'.¹³⁷ Mindful of the scholarly debate on the criteria for a 'totality' of warfare, I would not go that far, but clearly the wars of 1912–13 were a watershed for the Balkan societies in this respect as well.¹³⁸

Another facet of the new dimension of 'socializing the war' was the intensive and systematic preparation of society for war, both emotionally and ideologically. The decade before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars had witnessed an outburst of nationalist sentiments in all the countries of the region, in forms ranging from public discourse to textbooks and poetry. In Serbia, this intellectual mobilization centred on the idea of finally 'liberating' the Serbs in Kosovo. In Bulgaria, it was the aim of 'uniting' Macedonia and Thrace with the 'motherland'. Historian Stanoje Stanojević described the public mood during the last years before the war: 'All Serbia was turned into a workshop for the education of the people in one direction ... that Kosovo had to be revenged'.¹³⁹ In Bulgaria, poets like Kyrill Hristov and the 'literary father of the nation', Ivan Vazov, became ardent advocates of waging war with the Ottomans to fulfil the dream of an 'integral' Bulgaria. In Greece also, the nationalist discourse had gained new momentum since the late nineteenth century.¹⁴⁰

Intellectual mobilization for the war became not only more intensive but also rhetorically sharper, particularly in terms of its semantic radicalness. The official legitimization for war by the respective

monarchs and governments still followed the semantic pattern of the former ‘Turkish wars’. For example, Ferdinand I of Bulgaria called his subjects to arms to ‘help our oppressed Christian brothers’¹⁴¹ and thus turned the war into a *nouvelle croisade*. King George I of Greece spoke about the war as ‘le cours sacré de l’orthodoxie’.¹⁴² King Peter I of Serbia not only referred to the romantic claim of the Serbian ‘medieval heritage’ and the battle of Kosovo, but also employed a ‘modern’ human rights rhetoric, recalling the French Revolution’s catchwords of ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’ as a rationale for war,¹⁴³ thus turning it into a kind of *mission civilisatrice*. In the Ottoman Empire, too, the Balkan Wars produced an unprecedented level of emotionalizing war propaganda, which referred mostly to the atrocities committed by the Balkan allies against the Muslim population in the Balkans.¹⁴⁴ Differing from the Balkan opponents, however, the Ottoman Sultan refrained from making use of religious arguments. No ‘jihad’ was declared. The ‘imperial idea’, however, was obviously losing ground, even among the Empire’s Muslim citizens. Among the Anatolian soldiers, as the commander in chief Mahmud Muhtar Paşa remembered after the wars, ‘a strange emotional state of mind’ had been increasingly recognizable: ‘Four Anatolian vilayets [for them] were absolutely sufficient, and [they thought that] there was no need to shed blood for Rumelia’.¹⁴⁵

Ethnic arguments also played an important part. Here, in particular, scholarly expertise was given a new role in the preparations for war, for example in the case of the Serbian ethnographer Jovan Cvijić or the linguist Aleksandar Belić, who provided ‘academic’ arguments to legitimize Serbian territorial claims.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, war was given a strong cultural connotation, and portrayed as a kind of final struggle between ‘European civilization’ and ‘Muslim’ and ‘Asian barbarism’. An issue of a Serbian journal dedicated to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars spoke of a ‘war for freedom and civilization’,¹⁴⁷ and Cvijić saw the Serbian conquest of Kosovo as ‘recovering a new area for European culture’.¹⁴⁸ Viewing the war as a decisive clash between ‘culture’ and ‘barbarism’ in a sense foreshadowed the intellectual battles two years later between French and German intellectuals, who described the Great War as a fight between ‘German culture’ and ‘French civilization’. Sometimes this culturalist discourse slipped into a semi-racist rhetoric that explicitly dehumanized the opponent. The anti-Albanian rhetoric within Serbian public discourse, as in Vladan Djordjević’s crypto-racist description of the Albanians, is a striking example of this.¹⁴⁹ As another example, the Serbian writer Veljko Petrović saw Serbia’s military successes as proof of ‘the significance of the Serbian race and its historical mission’.¹⁵⁰ In Greece, after the short alliance with Bulgaria during the First Balkan

War, it was 'the Bulgarian' who during the Second Balkan War became the symbol of 'the barbarian' in 'a fusion of ideas of cultural and racial backwardness', as Keith Brown has put it.¹⁵¹ As for the Ottoman public, the constant experience of military defeat, foreign intervention and most of all the expulsion and flight of Turks and Muslims from the Balkans during the decade before the war radicalized the discourse and the perception of the Balkans as well, giving them more and more an essentialist and sometimes even racist undertone.¹⁵² Finally, Romania, having been absent from the First Balkan War, rationalized its short-term participation in the Second Balkan War with the idea of combat against the Bulgarian as a symbol of the *Barbari balcanilor*.¹⁵³ 'Revenge', which became a popular keyword in Serbian war propaganda with regard to Kosovo,¹⁵⁴ might also be taken as an example of this new kind of radicalized semantics, going beyond the traditional romantic and nationalist rhetoric of the nineteenth century and turning 'the other' into what Carl Schmitt has labelled the 'absolute enemy' and the war into a kind of existentialist necessity, excluding all compromise and justifying all means.¹⁵⁵

In addition, the perspective on war and the characterization of violence changed in public and intellectual discourse. While much of the belligerent rhetoric still followed a traditional nineteenth-century nationalism, as in Ivan Vazov's poems about *Makedonija*, others began to style the wars as an expression of existential heroism, praising the 'beauty of the soldier's body' or the aesthetic and the dramatic pathos of battle. Examples include some of Jordan Jovkov's poems, not to mention Kyrill Hristov's belligerent poetry.¹⁵⁶ Even a poet like Isidora Sekulić in Serbia, who later moved much more to the political left, was caught up in nationalist euphoria on the eve of the Balkan Wars: '[we] might be seen as not being reasonable', Sekulić wrote in 1912, 'because we speak about gallows and revenge and because we like cannons, fire, and blood'.¹⁵⁷ Certainly this was not yet the 'fire and blood' rhetoric of the First World War, such as that produced by Ernst Jünger, but it was a literary belligerency that very much resembled the fascination with war that would obsess certain German and French intellectuals on the eve of the Great War. Praising, as a Serbian journal did, the 'terrible, the merciless, the great dead' for which soldiers now were ready to sacrifice themselves¹⁵⁸ came close to expressing the morbid fascination with war that was typical of *fin de siècle* Europe. The French historians Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker have spoken, with respect to the First World War, about a 'culture of war' as a 'crystallized corpus of imagination, which gave the war a deeper meaning'.¹⁵⁹ Something very similar can be found in the Balkans before and during the Balkan Wars.

Ideological preparation for war, also something unknown in previous wars, became somewhat institutionalized. In Bulgaria, almost the entire intellectual elite participated in various institutions that distributed propaganda, engaged in censorship or offered moral support to the soldiers.¹⁶⁰ Intellectuals in Serbia were also involved in expressing and justifying Serbia's war aims by crafting ethnographic or historical arguments,¹⁶¹ an activity that would be repeated two years later during the Great War, when they were energetically involved in drafting peace terms.¹⁶² More than ever, churches took part in the ideological mobilization of the soldiers and the civilian population.¹⁶³ The effort to influence international public opinion was not new either, but it took hold during the Balkan Wars more intensely and systematically than ever, producing the many 'documentations' on all sides accusing the opponent of war crimes and atrocities.¹⁶⁴ For the first time, and again thanks to a lesson learned from the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, strict rules of censorship were applied, making unbiased information flows close to nonexistent. This pertained to journalists,¹⁶⁵ but with very few exceptions also to foreign military attachés.¹⁶⁶ 'The Serbians allowed the correspondents to see nothing', Fred Fox wrote in his reports from the Balkan Wars, 'the Bulgarian idea was to allow nothing to be seen ... It was an aggravation of the Japanese censorship ...'.¹⁶⁷ Reporting from close to the battlefield and playing the role of an authentic eyewitness had been part of the professionalization of the 'modern' war correspondent since the Crimean War.¹⁶⁸ With the Balkan Wars this had come to a halt. The *Times* correspondent Reginald Rankin expressed his frustration: 'Having travelled thousands of miles, and spent hundreds of pounds on our paper's account ... within ten miles from an epoch-making siege, yet forbidden to travel those last essential kilometres! ... The war correspondent as we have known him is no more; fugit Carthago.'¹⁶⁹

While foreign press coverage was strongly restricted, the wars found an unprecedented representation in all kinds of local media. In Serbia alone, in addition to the daily press, four periodicals during 1912 and 1913 dedicated their thematic scope almost entirely to the wars, most of all the twice-weekly *Ilustrovana ratna kronika* (Illustrated War Chronicle). Making use not only of reports from the war theatre, but also of paintings, photos and poetry, this journal did not evade the reality of warfare, but nevertheless 'successfully suppressed any potentially disturbing reference to the actual suffering and slaughter'. Instead, it reaffirmed the mythical discourse of the Balkan Wars as the fulfilment of the heritage of the legacy of the battle of Kosovo, and of Dušan's empire.¹⁷⁰ In particular, photography and even film became

new instruments widely used to bring the war closer to the public. The Bulgarian illustrated magazine *Ilustracija Svetlina*, which during the early stages of the war dedicated almost two-thirds of its pages to the war, for the first time made use of photographs not only from the front line, but also from the 'home front' in order to represent the war as a 'war of the entire nation'. The still modest film production industry also got an important stimulus from the wars. The Balkan Wars thus contributed to what Karl Kaser has called the 'visual modernization in the Balkans'.¹⁷¹

The effects of this intensive ideological preparation for war within the Balkan societies require further research. Official sources and local observers time and again gave witness to the overall euphoria with which the decision for war was greeted by the public.¹⁷² Foreign correspondents were fascinated by the amount of emotional support for war, and sometimes they wondered with palpable regret whether this could be possible in their own society.¹⁷³ 'Would the Austrian-Hungarian soldier react in the same way?' asked Ladislaus von Fényes, a pacifist who had served in the Hungarian Red Cross mission in Serbia.¹⁷⁴ He suspected that the Austrian soldier would do his duty, but without the 'spiritual energy' that he had witnessed among Serbian troops. The military officer Major Felix Wagner, who had witnessed the war in Thrace, thought that, lacking all 'national euphoria', Austrian soldiers probably could be motivated at best by discipline and loyalty to the emperor.¹⁷⁵ Despite the many descriptions in memoirs and official sources, the presence of this kind of *August-Erlebnis* (August experience)¹⁷⁶ in the Balkan societies has been called into question. Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr., in an article in 2003, tried to show that in the Balkans, war euphoria was more an emotion cleverly staged by the political elites, one that at best struck root among the urban *inteligencija*, than the widespread condition reported by the official sources.¹⁷⁷ Indeed, some reports, including those by certain foreign diplomats and observers, portrayed a different state of affairs. While the German major Hochwaechter, one of the very few German military advisers who took part in Ottoman military operations, saw a 'great enthusiasm' for the war in Istanbul,¹⁷⁸ diplomatic reports from the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, particularly Anatolia, indicated that there was little enthusiasm among the population, and that not only Christians but also many among the Muslim population made use of the opportunity to buy an exemption from military service.¹⁷⁹ In the European parts of the Empire, the response to the outbreak of war and to mobilization was ambivalent at best.¹⁸⁰ For Serbia, usually described as full of enthusiasm for the war, Alfred Vischer, a Swiss doctor who witnessed the declaration of war in Belgrade, described less

a nationalist euphoria than a calm, if supportive response among the population.¹⁸¹ The Austrian military attaché in Belgrade also reported to Vienna that one could hardly speak of real euphoria in the streets, despite the propaganda campaign orchestrated by the press, and reports from outside the capital witnessed ‘noisy rallies’, but also ‘indifference’ among the local population.¹⁸² The peasant was more interested in his harvest than in the war, a German diplomat pointed out, questioning whether the urban euphoria had really reached the countryside.¹⁸³ In a similar way, reports from Montenegro, at least for the year 1913, spoke of ‘bitter reactions’ among the peasants when the government ordered a new conscription in June, when they had to work in the fields.¹⁸⁴ Enthusiasm among the population was ‘sufficient’, but no war is ever really popular, a Bulgarian officer noted in his diary.¹⁸⁵ In Greece, where the public remembered the bitter defeat of 1897 in the Greco-Ottoman war, there was a mixed feeling of ‘pride and apprehension’, yet no substantial ‘anti-war feeling’.¹⁸⁶ Further research may lead to a more balanced picture, analogous to what has occurred in research on the Great War. Even if there was enthusiasm at the beginning of the war, the daily experiences of fighting increasingly undermined nationalist feelings. Sometimes, for example within the Bulgarian army, frustration due to the deteriorating wartime conditions during the Second Balkan War even led to mutinies.¹⁸⁷ Confronted with the new dimensions of warfare, soldiers lost much of their nationalist sentiment, and even if they were not questioning the ‘just cause’ of ‘their’ war, they increasingly perceived it simply as ‘bloodthirsty’ and ‘cruel’.¹⁸⁸

Finally, death and physical disability resulting from the war were more common than ever. Casualties reached unprecedented numbers. Serbia had lost 6,000 soldiers in 1876 and 2,400 in 1878; 4,750 were killed or wounded during the war against Bulgaria in 1885.¹⁸⁹ During the Balkan Wars, the number climbed to 43,000 dead or wounded during the first war and 44,500 during the second war. Bulgaria lost 65,000 soldiers, dead or wounded, during the First and almost 80,000 during the short Second Balkan War; more than 30,000 died of diseases.¹⁹⁰ Battles like those at Catalça, Lozengrad and Kumanovo produced casualties on a scale never experienced before.¹⁹¹ Totals were still small in comparison with the 37 per cent of soldiers that Serbia would lose two years later during the Great War and the more than 22 per cent casualty rate that Bulgaria suffered during the same war, but the Balkan Wars were a departure from previous conflicts. Widows and disabled persons became visible in the cities and villages and could no longer be ‘hidden’ within families, as in previous wars.¹⁹² Hundreds of thousands of refugees confronted the societies still more with the war’s

human consequences. For the first time, the Balkan societies felt that the war was not over when the fighting stopped.

'Modern Wars' and/or 'Archaic Violence'

The Balkan Wars without any doubt featured a particular kind of violence. It is exactly the degree and the nature of the violence that have been treated time and again as evidence that the Balkan Wars in fact were a kind of 'archaic war', rooted in a traditional regional 'cult of violence' and deviating from the 'regulated' warfare to which 'Europe' was accustomed, at least at home. (In the colonies, it was a different story.) Indeed, there is an abundant mass of sources that describe, often in detail, all kinds of extreme violence committed during the wars by all warring parties. These sources, however, are often of dubious nature. The Balkan governments themselves time and again raised the topic through public media and diplomacy. All addressed the international powers in pointing out their enemies' deeds, accusing them of what by all international criteria amounted to war crimes.¹⁹³ The numerous documentations produced by the warring parties to convict their opponents of war crimes, and published mostly for an international audience,¹⁹⁴ are also of little value, precisely because of their political agenda. Local communities presented petitions and accusations to the international powers and their representatives, providing information that was often detailed but hard to prove.¹⁹⁵ War correspondence, often accepted as first-hand evidence even in academic literature, must be treated with equal care. Most of the journalists, including the famous Leon Trotsky, who, rather because of his name than his real first-hand informative value, has become a major source, never came close to the front line.¹⁹⁶ The reports of journalists, noted Richard von Mach, the experienced Balkan correspondent of the German *Kölnische Zeitung*, were almost without exception the product of third-hand information, if not 'even pure fiction'.¹⁹⁷ Other writers, like Carl Pauli, based their information on unnamed 'witnesses' or collected detailed evidence concerning war crimes from the press, such as the impressive notes Leo Freundlich recorded about the events in the Albanian theatre of war in 1913–14, with a deep empathy for the victims. Such notes are certainly not without significance, but their details can hardly be taken for granted.¹⁹⁸ Even the famous Carnegie Report, which became a kind of key witness for the prosecution and has been quoted time and again, cannot be read without a due deconstructive effort on the part of the historian.¹⁹⁹ Finally, the members of the various diplomatic

missions constantly sent reports with news and rumours about acts of violence on all sides, yet even they repeatedly complained of being cut off from first-hand information.²⁰⁰ Being suspicious of the reports' and complaints' authenticity, it was not only the British government that was reluctant to take any serious political action.²⁰¹ Even the Austrians, who, due to their own tense political relations with Serbia, were particularly interested in collecting news about Serbian atrocities,²⁰² were critical towards their sources and attempted to secure the reliability of their informants.²⁰³ They acknowledged that often there was 'a great deal of exaggeration' in the pieces of information they received.²⁰⁴ Still, information based on witnesses who were deemed to be reliable left no doubt about the excessive violence that was happening – the killing of civilians, including women and children; the burning down of houses and entire villages; the wholesale looting and plundering. Consulate officials, for example, confirmed having personally observed such violations.²⁰⁵ Non-partisan witnesses, such as foreign railway engineers and workers at the 'Oriental Railway', reported what they had witnessed; priests, both foreign and domestic, testified to their experiences.²⁰⁶ The widespread acts of 'ethnic cleansing' raised suspicions among some observers of a strategy of systematic extermination.²⁰⁷ This, however, does not find sufficient backing in the sources. Yet certainly they radicalized the already ongoing process of ethnic homogenization.²⁰⁸ Sexual violence against women is also reported time and again in the sources, usually in a very general way, which makes it difficult to understand its dimensions and perpetrators.²⁰⁹

In fact, information based on personal observations or provided by 'non-partisan' and 'reliable' witnesses left no doubt about the excessive violence committed against civilians on all sides, about the burning down of houses and entire villages, about a systematic 'ethnic cleansing' in conquered territories. And also going beyond the suspicious 'slaughter narratives' of second- and third-hand reports, medical doctors and nurses confirmed from what they saw in the hospitals that the warfare had gone beyond all rules and regulations.²¹⁰

Part of this excessive violence was certainly the result of the 'traditional' dualism of regular and irregular actors, of a longstanding absence of a strict line between 'combatants' and 'civilians'. Stefan Papaioannou, in his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, provides abundant evidence attesting that, on all sides, the combatants, both regular and irregular, were responsible for all kinds of atrocities against the local population,²¹¹ and often acting jointly in a coordinated manner.²¹² Papaioannou's source collection confirms what the Austrian consul in Üsküb (Skopje) reported from the battlefield in Macedonia, namely that

the violence against the civilian population in that area 'had not been acts of spontaneous brutality, committed in the heat of the battle by a gang of crude and embittered soldiers, but in cold blood and obviously by order'.²¹³ Even Balkan politicians acknowledged the excessive nature of the violence from time to time, usually attributing it to 'uncontrolled' irregular forces.²¹⁴ Taking account of the fact that the violence sometimes decreased when the regular army replaced the irregulars in a given occupied area,²¹⁵ there still can be no doubt that the armies and their leaders were responsible for atrocities as well, either by direct participation or simply by not intervening in the activities of irregular forces. Describing in a long and very personal *Stimmungsbericht* (report on the atmosphere) what he saw after the Serbian occupation of Üsküb, the Austrian consul Heimroth wrote that the Serbian troops had to be held responsible at the very least for not having stopped the excessive violence directed against the city's Muslim population after they had entered the town.²¹⁶ In another report, Heimroth added that not even in the Russo-Japanese war had he heard so many complaints about violence as was committed in a war that had begun under the slogan of liberating the Christian brothers and apparently ended with the suppression and attempted extermination of the whole non-Orthodox population.²¹⁷ Occasionally, even some of the soldiers' diaries note acts of violence that they witnessed or even took part in during the fighting.²¹⁸

Blaming irregular forces and the army, Papaioannou on the other hand explicitly exonerates the civilian population from any accusation of having played an active role in this violence. He maintains that civilians were neither willing to kill their neighbours nor were they willing to die over ethnic and religious differences.²¹⁹ While he presents some good evidence, I still wonder to what extent such a generalization is appropriate. Indeed, Christians and Muslims time and again tried to prevent violence against each other when the military situation changed and a new army arrived.²²⁰ On the other hand, the Balkan Wars created what Jörg Baberowski in a different context has called 'spaces of opportunity' (*Ermöglichungsräume*) for committing violence without the danger of being penalized.²²¹ Considerable evidence is available that 'ordinary people', too, were drawn into the dynamics of violence, not only as victims but also as bystanders and even perpetrators. Peasants took part in the fights, thus contributing to the blurring of the front lines.²²² The population distributed the land of their expelled neighbours among themselves,²²³ took part in plundering or helped the troops and paramilitaries to identify the ethnic 'other'.²²⁴ What appears as 'the mob' in diplomatic reports about the plundering of houses, in particular those left by the Muslim population, was nothing other than

'ordinary citizens', sometimes 'among the better families', making use of the situation.²²⁵ During the conquest of the city of Ioannina/Janina by the Greek army, the report of the Austrian consulate-general tells us that 'the local population was affected literally by a kind of fever' and committed atrocities that 'are totally incompatible with the cultural mission the Balkan states claim to pursue in their fight'.²²⁶ While it was certainly the armies and particularly the irregular groups that carried the violence into the local communities, it seems that the disappearance of the boundary between 'the civilian' and 'the soldier', so typical of the Balkan Wars, makes it difficult to draw any sharp line between soldiers, paramilitaries and civilians. 'The three categories merge into one', Heimroth wrote, summarizing his experiences in Üsküb. 'It seems that the liberator and the liberated join forces, acting jointly against the hated Muslims.'²²⁷

In other respects also, rules of warfare were obviously ignored. Wounded soldiers, it seems, were mistreated or even killed, albeit obviously not on a large scale and not in a systematic way. Foreign doctors observed that wounded enemy soldiers often arrived at the hospital with clear signs of physical mistreatment. 'Did you not recognize that there was not a single Turk among the wounded?', Ladislaus von Fényes asked his colleague in the hospital. 'What has happened to them?'²²⁸ And Stojan Christov Kamburov, a senior officer with the 7th Preslav regiment, describes in his diary how his commander simply shot a wounded Turkish soldier who had asked the bypassing Bulgarians for some water.²²⁹ There were also rumours among diplomatic representatives about the mistreatment or even killing of prisoners of war.²³⁰ As a matter of fact, the totally new dimension of general mobilization confronted the warring parties with an unprecedented number of prisoners.²³¹ All sides, in particular during the Second Balkan War, blamed the others for not respecting international rules as far as the treatment of prisoners of war was concerned.²³² The sources, however, present a highly inconsistent picture and do not allow a generalized interpretation. Prisoners were certainly held under bad conditions, particularly in the conquered territories. After the conquest of the city of Adrianople by the allied forces, Turkish prisoners were kept for days without sufficient food supplies or medical treatment, which caused substantial casualties. Similar pieces of information were given by the Austrian consulate official from Niš.²³³ Complaints about widespread and systematic mistreatment of prisoners of war or even large-scale murder,²³⁴ however, met with some scepticism even among the Western powers.²³⁵ Admitting the lack of precise information and not denying cases of bad supply or maltreatment, German diplomatic

sources from Bulgaria for example considered Ottoman complaints still 'heavily exaggerated'. At least from the cases about which they had received direct evidence, they saw no grave violations of international standards.²³⁶ And while the German Red Cross did notice a 'rough treatment' of the prisoners, leaving them with insufficient food, shelter and medical care,²³⁷ the International Red Cross saw no evidence of any systematic mistreatment, either.²³⁸

Much of what in contemporary literature was described as a disturbingly 'Balkan' violence actually found its equivalents in other European wars, and particularly in the Great War. Generally, Papaioannou's conclusion is correct that this violence, in many respects, represented 'practices the Balkan armies shared with their contemporaries in Western and Central Europe'.²³⁹ Indeed, it is questionable whether the idea of a regulated 'Bellona', where 'the soldier is characterized by a maximum of regulated violence, limiting violence to combatants',²⁴⁰ has ever been a reality in a war, European or otherwise.²⁴¹ The Balkan Wars in this sense can hardly be seen as exceptional. What is more, the Balkan Wars and the First World War cannot be distinguished in terms of their violence. John Horne and Alan Kramer have given abundant examples of German war crimes at the Belgian front that do not essentially differ from many of the atrocities committed during the Balkan Wars.²⁴² Joanne Bourke has found examples of 'carnevalesque rites of killing'²⁴³ that differ little from the excesses of the Balkan Wars. Mistreatment and even the killing of prisoners of war took place not only in the colonial wars outside Europe²⁴⁴ but during the Great War as well.²⁴⁵ 'Ethnic cleansing', apparently so typical of Balkan history and certainly more systematically carried out during the Balkan Wars than ever before, saw many parallels on the Eastern Front during the First World War.²⁴⁶

Conclusion

Following Maria Todorova's influential paradigm of the 'imagining of the Balkans', scholars have warned about debating the Balkan Wars in terms of 'a 'typification' of differences between Europe and the Balkan 'other'.²⁴⁷ Indeed, in placing the Balkan Wars within European war history, one should not 'exoticize' them as 'un-European' wars deviating from the traditions of 'regulated' European warfare, nor should one simply see them as 'typical' of what Mark Mazower has called the 'dark continent'. To refer to Reinhart Koselleck's term *Sattelzeit* (a time of transition), they should be seen in their deep vacillation between

being 'traditional' and 'modern'.²⁴⁸ Highly modernized armies and an unprecedented mobilization of manpower came up against the limited institutional and organizational capacities of 'premodern' states and societies. Contemporary military observers indeed already noticed these ambiguities. The wars, as the British Major Howell acknowledged, 'cannot in every sense be classed as modern; only to a limited extent can they convey to us the impression of what modern European warfare really means The armament was up to date; but, as in Manchuria [in the Russo-Japanese war 1904–5], the general state of the country, in which all the operations took place, was a hundred or five hundred years behind the times'.²⁴⁹

The destructive capabilities of 'modern' armies merged with a 'tradition' of warfare that was not based on a clear distinction between 'regular' and 'irregular' actors. The result was a hitherto unknown level of violence and the overturning of experiences and skills that people had derived from the experiences of previous wars. In their ideological dimensions, the wars no less show their deeply ambivalent character, being fuelled by the 'traditional' romantic nationalism of the nineteenth-century 'Oriental Question', but also by the 'new' twentieth-century rhetoric of 'culturalism' and 'racism'. The wars were legitimized with conventional religious arguments, but at the same time seen by intellectuals as a field for new existential experiences. If 'modernity and primitive archaism coexisted [even] in the Great War',²⁵⁰ as Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker have remarked, then the Balkan Wars surely are to be considered an integral part of the history of twentieth-century European wars.

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Notes

- 1 Cf., for example, for the Bulgarian historiography, Ivan Ilchev, 'The Balkan Wars in Recent Bulgarian Historiography and Textbooks', in Council of Europe (ed.), *Crossroads of European Histories: Multiple Outlooks on Five Key Moments in the History of Europe* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publ., 2006), 111–18. Ilchev concludes that communist rule had no great impact on the interpretation of the Balkan Wars, nor did the end of communism, despite some new questions raised by younger scholars, 'change the scope of scholarly interest' much. There remained 'a general inability to let go of pomp and traditional rhetoric' (p. 118).
- 2 Erika Abazi, 'Between Facts and Interpretations: Three Images of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13', in James Pettifer and Tom Buchanan (eds), *War in the Balkans: Conflict and Diplomacy before World War I* (London: Tauris, 2016), 203–25, here 217.
- 3 Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
- 4 Cf., as just one of many similar examples, Friedrich Immanuel, *Der Balkankrieg 1912: Vol. 4* (Berlin: Mittler, 1913), 79.
- 5 Cf. in this sense, for example, the Irish perceptions: Florian Keisinger, *Unzivilisierte Kriege im zivilisierten Europa? Die Balkankriege und die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland, England und Irland 1876–1913* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008). Antje Weber in her dissertation on the view of German, Austrian and French war correspondents on the Balkan Wars also stresses the generally favourable perception of the First Balkan War as a war of 'liberation', but also in defence of Christian and European principles against an 'Asiatic' Ottoman Empire: Antje Weber, *Die Balkankriege 1912–1913 und das Ende der 'Türkei in Europa'*, Ph.D. dissertation (Tübingen: University of Tübingen, 2012). The picture was also highly divergent among the Swedish public: Johannes Tangeberg, 'Semi-Barbarians, Courageous Patriots, Orientalists: Swedish Views of the Balkan Wars in 1912/13', *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju* 11(1) (2004), 55–71. Tangeberg concludes that 'the image of the Balkans as particularly cruel or violent seems not to have been present among Swedes' (p. 67). Also going beyond Todorova's approach and stressing the heterogeneous view on the Balkans is Eugene Michail, 'Western Attitudes to War in the Balkans and the Shifting Meanings of Violence, 1912–1991', *Journal of Contemporary History* 47(2) (2012), 219–39.
- 6 Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); John Keegan, *Die Kultur des Krieges* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1995); see also Geoffrey Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe 1792–1914* (London/New York: Routledge, 2000). The Balkan Wars are also absent from Dietrich Beyrau et al. (eds), *Formen des Krieges: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007) and Rolf-Dieter Müller, *Militärgeschichte* (Cologne/Vienna/Weimar: Böhlau, 2009).
- 7 Dan Diner, *Das Jahrhundert verstehen: Eine universalhistorische Deutung* (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuchverlag, 2000), 33.

- 8 Dietrich Beyrau, 'Einführende Bemerkungen', in Bruno Thoß and Hans-Erich Volkmann (eds), *Erster Weltkrieg – Zweiter Weltkrieg: Ein Vergleich* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002), 729.
- 9 Cf., for example, Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998) or Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West* (London: Penguin Books, 2007).
- 10 Mark Biondich, *The Balkans: Revolutions, Wars and Political Violence since 1878* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
- 11 Cf. Slavica Ratković-Kostić, *Evropeizacija srpske vojske 1878–1903* [The Europeanization of the Serbian Army 1878–1903] (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 2007).
- 12 Mile Djurdjeva, 'Narodna vojska u Srbiji 1861–1889' [The National Army in Serbia 1861–1889], *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 10(4) (1959), 78–93.
- 13 Slavica Ratković-Kostić, 'Srpska vojska u XIX. veku' [The Serbian Army in the Nineteenth Century], *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 41(1–2) (1993), 25–45; Draga Vuksanović-Anić, *Stvaranje moderne srpske vojske* [The Formation of the Modern Serbian Army] (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1993), 45–74.
- 14 Cf. the memoirs of the leading Serbian general, Živojin Mišić, *Moje uspomene* [My Memories] (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1978), 81.
- 15 Slobodan Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića* [The Reign of Milan Obrenovich] (Sabrana dela, 5) (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1990), 72; Slobodan Jovanović, *Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića* [The Reign of Alexander Obrenovich] (Sabrana dela, 7) (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1990), 46–47.
- 16 Slavica Ratković-Kostić, 'Generalštab srpske vojske 1876–1903' [The General Staff of the Serbian Army 1876–1903], *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 41(1–2) (2003), 11–32.
- 17 Aleksandar Stojičević, *Istorija naših ratova za oslobodjenje i ujedinjenje* [The History of Our Wars of Liberation and Unification] (Belgrade: Štamparija Gl. Saveza Srpskih Zemljorad Zadruga, 1936), 70.
- 18 Miloje Pršić, 'Stvaranje i razvoj vojnog školstva u Srbiji od 1830 do 1919 godine' [The Creation and the Development of Military Schools in Serbia between 1830 and 1919], *Vojno Delo* 50(2) (1998), 115–47; Milić Miličević, *Reforma vojske Srbije 1897–1900* [The Reform of the Serbian Army 1897–1900] (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački Zavod, 2002), 99–102.
- 19 Milić Miličević, 'Vitalni činioci razvoja srpske vojske tokom XIX. veka' [Vital Factors of the Development of the Serbian Army during the Nineteenth Century], *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 41(1–2) (1993), 46–55.
- 20 Milić Miličević, 'Socijalno poreklo oficirskog kadra školovanog u Srbiji od 1850 do 1901 godine' [The Social Background of the Officer Cadre Educated in Serbia from 1850 to 1901], *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju* 2(2) (1995), 194–201.
- 21 Živojin Mišić, *Strategija* [Strategy] (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1907 [reprint 1993]), 117.
- 22 Miličević, *Reforma vojske Srbije*, 147; Slavica Ratković-Kostić, 'Razvoj doctrine u vojsci Kraljevine Srbije 1882–1903' [The Development of the

- Military Doctrine in the Kingdom of Serbia], *Vojnoistoriski glasnik* 45(1–2) (2007), 65–82.
- 23 *Srpski Knježevni Glasnik* 22(9) (1909), 704–13.
- 24 Slavica Ratković-Kostić, 'Usvojavanje savremenih sistema naoružanja u srpskoj vojsci krajem XIX. veka' [The Adoption of the Modern System of Armament in the Serbian Army at the End of the Nineteenth Century], *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 43(1–2) (2005), 11–43; Dalibor Denda, 'Tajni raport putnika Damjana Vlajića 1907 godine o naoružanju i opremi srpske vojske' [The Secret Report of the Traveller Damjan Vlajich in 1907 about the Armament and Gear of the Serbian Army], *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 46(2) (2008), 213–30; Miličević, *Reforma vojske Srbije*, 61. For intimate knowledge of the European military-technological developments among the Serbian military, cf. Ivan Mijatović, 'Šesdeset godina Vojnotehničkog glasnika: Ishodište vojnotehničke misli u vojnoj štampi Kneževine/Kraljevine Srbije' [Sixty Years of the Military-Technical Journal: The Starting Point of Military-Technical Thinking in the Army Press of the Principality/Kingdom of Serbia], *Vojnotehnički glasnik* 60(2) (2012), 7–25, here 20.
- 25 Cf. the observations by Austrian diplomats in Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (OeStA, HHStA) P.A. XII 385. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, k.u.k. Militärattaché Belgrad, no. 197, 6 October 1912: Stimmung in Belgrad; *ibid.*, v. Ugron an Berchtold, no. 114, Belgrad, 22 October 1912: Militärische Nachrichten.
- 26 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XIX Serbien 63: Berichte, Weisungen, Varia 1912, v. Ugron an Berchtold no. 62 B, Belgrad, 24 June 1912: Projektirte Waffenbestellungen.
- 27 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 386. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Abschrift pro actis k.u.k. Militärattaché Belgrad, no. 269; *ibid.*, 440, Liasse XLV/22 ad Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes Tagesbericht, 26 November 1912, B. no. 1500 res., 26 November 1912: Serbien: Die Ursachen der serbischen Erfolge. Cf. also 'Die serbische Armee', *Österreichische Illustrierte Zeitung* 23(44) (9 August 1913), 1228; similarly, 'Heerwesen der Balkanstaaten', *Streffleur's Militärische Zeitschrift* 50(2) (1909), 303–20; 'Die Armeen der Balkanstaaten', *Fremdenblatt*, 1 October 1912 (all sources from newspapers are based on HHStA Zeitungsarchiv 94).
- 28 Richard C. Hall, 'The Next War: The Influence of the Russo-Japanese War on Southeastern Europe and the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913', *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 17(3) (2004), 563–77.
- 29 Richard von Mach, *Briefe aus dem Balkankrieg 1912–1913* (Berlin: Eisenschmidt, 1913), 14.
- 30 Cf. the statistical figures in Georgiev Velichko and Staiko Trifonov (eds), *Istoriia na Bŭlgarite 1878–1912 v dokumenti* [History of Bulgaria 1878–1912 in Documents], Vol. II, 1912–1918 (Sofia: Prosveta, 1996), 37.
- 31 On the social role of the Bulgarian officers, cf. Jordan Kolev, *Bŭlgarskata inteligentsiia 1878–1912* [The Bulgarian Intelligentsia 1878–1912] (Sofia: Univ. Izdat. Sv. Kl. Okhridski, 1992), 274–87.
- 32 On the modernization of the Bulgarian army since the 1890s, cf. the memoirs by the Bulgarian officer Dimităr Azmanov, *Moiata epokha 1878–1918* [My

- Era 1878–1918] (Sofia: Izdat. na Ministerstvoto na Otbranata Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1995), 83.
- 33 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 386. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Thun an Berchtold, no. 45, St. Petersburg, 12 November 1912: Aeusserungen der hiesigen Vertreter der Türkei und Bulgariens seit Beginn des Krieges über die respektiven Chancen.
- 34 N.P. Mamontov, *S bolgarskimi voiskami ot Balkan' do Chataldzhi: Zapiski voennago korrespondenta* [With the Bulgarian Armies from the Balkan to Chataldzha: Notes of a War Correspondent] (Moscow: Tovar. Tipogr. A. I. Mamontova, 1913), 79; A.A. Riabinin, *Balkanskaia voina* [The Balkan War] (St. Peterburg, 1913), 16.
- 35 For the Ottoman military aircraft, which due to the lack of pilots and technical problems had almost no impact during the First and a very limited impact during the Second Balkan War, cf. Bülent Yilmazer, 'Ottoman Aviation, Prelude to Military Use of Aircraft', in Edward J. Erickson (ed.), *Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans 1912–13* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), Appendix A, 347–70, here 356–63; for Serbia, Austrian military experts reported from the beginning of the war that Serbian aircraft could hardly be used for military activities: OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 440. Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes, Tagesbericht, 29 November 1912: B. no. 1549, 29 November 1912: Serbien. Bericht des k.u.k. Militärattachés Major Gellinek in Belgrad, 24 November 1912.
- 36 On the Bulgarian aircraft, cf. Dimităr Nedialkov, *Văzdushnata mosht na Carstvo Bălgariia*. Chast I [The Airpower of the Bulgarian Kingdom, Part I] (Sofia: Fark OOD, 2001), 11–59; Mamontov, *S bolgarskimi voiskami*, 80; Heinrich Meyer, *Der Balkankrieg 1912/13 und seine Lehren* (Munich: Meyer, 1913), 97–99. Their actual military importance is exaggerated by Georgi Marin, 'Prinosăt na bălgarskata aviaciia văv voennoto delo prez balkanskata voina 1912–1913' [The Contribution of Bulgarian Aviation to Military Activities during the Balkan Wars 1912–1913], in Bălgarsko Istoricheskoto Druzhestvo (ed.), *Bălgariia 1300: Institutsiia i dărzhaonata traditsiia* [Bulgaria 1300: Institutions and State Traditions], Vol. III (Sofia: Bălgarsko Istoricheskoto Druzhestvo, 1983), 649–57.
- 37 Cf., for example, the public image as represented in photos and postcards in *Vojnata – takava, kakoato beshe: Bălgariia v Părvata Balkanska Voina 1912–1913 g.* [The War as It Really Was: Bulgaria during the First Balkan War 1912–1913] (Sofia: Univ. Izd. Sv. Kliment Okhridski, 2012), 168.
- 38 John Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 155, 196; Dimitris Michalopoulos, 'The Evolution of the Greek Army (1828–1868)', in Béla K. Király (ed.), *The Crucial Decade: East Central European Society and National Defense, 1859–1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 317–30.
- 39 'Die Griechische Armee 1909', *Streffleur's Militärische Zeitschrift* 2 (1909), 1113–20. Cf. also Thanos Veremis, 'The Officer Corps in Greece 1912–1936', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 2(1) (1976), 113–33, here 113.
- 40 Novica Rakočević, 'The Organization and the Character of the Montenegrin Army in the First Balkan War', in Béla K. Király and Dimitrije Djordjević

- (eds), *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars* (War and Society in East Central Europe, XVIII) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 112–25.
- 41 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 440. Liasse XLV/22 ad Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes, Tagesbericht, 26 December 1912, B. no. 1930 res., 26 December 1912: Militärische Situation in Montenegro; *ibid.*, Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes Evidenz über den Balkankrieg, 23 November 1912, B. no. 1450 Montenegro (describing the command structure as 'patriarchal' rather than 'professional' in the sense of modern armies); *ibid.*, P.A. XII 441. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes: Evb.Res. 683 v 1913: Eindrücke und Erfahrungen auf dem montenegrinisch-türkischen Kriegsschauplatz 1912/13 vom k.u.k. Militärattache in Cetinje, Hauptmann des Gen. Stabskorps Gustav Hupka; *ibid.*, P.A. XII 388. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Ledinegg an Berchtold, vertraulich, Antivari, 10 January 1913.
 - 42 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XIX Serbien 63: Berichte, Weisungen, Varia 1912, Geheime Denkschrift über die Lage in Serbien, ddo. 25 June 1912; *ibid.*, v. Ugron an Berchtold, no. 123 B: Über die serbischen Staatsfinanzen, Belgrad, 1 November 1912; *ibid.*, P.A. XII 440. Liasse XLV/22 ad Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes: Evidenz über den Balkankrieg, 14 November 1912; *Neue Freie Presse*, 1 October 1912. For the financial dimension, cf. also Čedomir Antić, 'Crisis and Armament: Economic Relations between Great Britain and Serbia 1910–1912', *Balkanica* 36 (2005), 151–63.
 - 43 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XV Bulgarien 74: Berichte, Weisungen 1912: Tarnowski an Aehrenthal no. 8c, Sofia, 9 February 1912: Unterredung mit Herrn Daneff.
 - 44 'Die Mobilmachung der Balkan-Armeen', *Österreichische Illustrierte Zeitung* 22(2) (13 October 1912), 45; 'Heerwesen der Balkanstaaten', *Streffleur's Militärische Zeitschrift* 50(2) (1909), 303–32; *Streffleur's Militärische Zeitschrift* 50(3) (1909), 449–504; Major P. Howell, *The Campaign in Thrace: Six Lectures* (London: H. Rees, 1913), 152. Similar in its positive evaluation on the part of the German General Staff: *Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, hg. vom Großen Generalstabe. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung I: Heft 50: Der Balkankrieg 1912/13, Erstes Heft Die Ereignisse auf dem thrasischen Kriegsschauplatz bis zum Waffenstillstand* (Berlin, 1914), 11–13; and, from a Swiss perspective, Oberstleutnant Julius Meyer, *CVIII. Neujahrsblatt der Feuerwerker-Gesellschaft (Artillerie-Kollegium) in Zürich auf das Jahr 1913: Aus den Balkan-Kriegen* (Zurich: Kommissionsverlag Beer und Co., 1913), 49.
 - 45 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 440. Liasse XLV/22 ad Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes: Tagesbericht, 13 December 1912: Serbien. Der Zustand der serbischen Armee im Felde.
 - 46 Cf. the examples from the German, Austrian and French press in Weber, *Die Balkankriege*, 54–56.
 - 47 Cf., for example, Lionel James, *With the Conquered Turk: The Story of a Latter-Day Adventurer* (Boston, MA: Small, Mayard and Comp., 1913), 19, 50, 99. The Austrian consul-general from Üsküb (Skopje) reported in January 1911 that the local army units were making 'a rather unfavourable

- impression for European standards' [... auf ein an europäische Verhältnisse gewöhntes Auge einen sehr ungünstigen Eindruck']. OeStA, HHStA P.A. XXXVIII Konsulate 441. Üsküb 1911–1913, Dr von Heimroth an Aehrenthal: Truppen-Dislokation und militärische Vorkommnisse, no. 7 Geheim, Uesküb, 9 January 1911.
- 48 Jan Christoph Reichmann, *'Tapfere Askers' und 'Feige Araber': der osmanische Verbündete aus der Sicht deutscher Soldaten im Orient 1914–1918*, Ph.D. dissertation (Münster: University of Münster, 2009), 71. More balanced in his evaluation than most of the contemporary witnesses is Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, 332–37. Erickson acknowledges the many organizational, logistic and educational deficits of an army still 'professional unready' for a new war (p. 59), but he also sees the Ottoman army as having been able in a remarkable way to 'adapt', to 'learn' and to 'correct its mistakes'.
- 49 Hans Rohde, *Unsere Gefechtsvorschriften und der Balkankrieg* (Berlin: Eisenschmidt, 1915), 4.
- 50 Jehuda Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe: Die preußisch-deutschen Militärmissionen in der Türkei 1835–1919* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1976), 114; Michael Unger, *Die bayerischen Militärbeziehungen zur Türkei vor und im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 2003), 116.
- 51 Albin Kutschbach, *Die Serben im Balkankrieg* (Stuttgart: Franckh, 1913), 137.
- 52 'Die Artillerie der Balkanstaaten nach dem Stande der heutigen Geschützausrüstung', *Militärzeitung* 36(30) (26 July 1913), 476–78; the Balkan Wars were viewed as proof of the superiority of French military technology by the French diplomat in Bulgaria, Camille Louis de Matharel, *Balkanskata vojna prez pogled na edin frantsuzin* [The Balkan Wars as Viewed by a Frenchman] (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 1977), 247.
- 53 Quoted in Reichmann, *'Tapfere Askers' und 'Feige Araber'*, 71: 'Der Krieg ist im Großen und Ganzen aus naheliegenden Gründen nicht lehrhaft gewesen'.
- 54 Howell, *The Campaign in Thrace*, 142, 144.
- 55 German General Staff, *Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, Heft 50: Der Balkankrieg 1912/13, Erstes Heft*, 139: 'Auf taktischem Gebiete brachte der Krieg zwar keine neuen Erkenntnisse von grundlegender Bedeutung, aber doch manche wertvolle Lehre für die Durchführung des Kampfes der Infanterie und Artillerie und insbesondere für das Zusammenwirken der Waffen'. Similarly, Rohde, *Unsere Gefechtsvorschriften*, 4–5, 15, 125–26.
- 56 Meyer, *Der Balkankrieg*, 101.
- 57 Miličević, *Reforma vojske Srbije*, 52; Milan Mijalkovski, 'Četničke (gerilske) jedinice Kraljevine Srbije – borci protiv terora turskog okupatora' [Chetnik (Guerrilla) Units in the Kingdom of Serbia – Fighters against the Terror of the Turkish Occupational Forces], *Zbornik radova Instituta za savremenu istoriju* 9 (2007), 59–81, here 63–71.
- 58 David McKenzie, 'Officer Conspirators and Nationalism in Serbia 1901–1914', in Stephen Fischer-Galatafi and Béla K. Király (eds), *Essays on War and Society in East Central Europe, 1740–1920* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1987), 128.

- 59 Aleksandar Životić, 'Srpski gerilski odredi na prostoru stare Srbije 1911–1912' [Serbian Guerrilla Units in Old Serbia 1911–1912], *Zbornik radova Instituta za savremenu istoriju* 9 (2007), 119–36, here 121–33.
- 60 For a good analysis of the social and military role of those *četa* in Serbia, see Alexey Timofeev, 'Serbskie chetniki nakanune i v chode Balkanskih vojn: sotsial'nyi fenomen, natsional'naia traditsiia i voennaia taktika' [The Serbian Chetniks before and during the Balkan Wars: Social Phenomenon, National Tradition and Military Tactic], in Rita Grishina (ed.), *Modernizatsiia vs. voina: Chelovek na Balkanach nakanune i vo vremia Balkanskykh vojn (1912–1913)* [Modernization vs. War: Man in the Balkans before and during the Balkan Wars in 1912–1913] (Moscow: Institut slavianovedeniia Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, 2012), 102–22. Cf. also his contribution to this volume.
- 61 Cf., for Bulgaria, the reports by the French diplomat Matharel, *Balkanskata voina*, 24; and Colonel breveté Desbriere, *Aperçu sur la Campagne de Thrace* (Paris: Librairie Chapelot, 1913), 9, who calls the Bulgarian mobilization efforts 'très simples et très effectifs'. For Serbia, OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, v. Ugron an Berchtold, no. 114, 23 October 1912: Militärische Nachrichten. Reports were more ambivalent for the Ottoman Empire, where, following a report by the Austrian military attaché from Istanbul, mobilization obviously met with organizational difficulties and even resistance from soldiers, who had only been released from service shortly before: OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 440. Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes: Evidenz über den Balkankrieg, 11 November 1912, T. no. 1470 Türkei. Bericht des k.u.k. Militärattachés in Konstantinopel Obersten Pomjankowski.
- 62 Cf., for Serbia, Dalibor Denda, *Automobili u srpskoj vojsci 1908–1918* [Automobiles in the Serbian Army] (Belgrade: Institut za strategijska istraživanja, 2008). The Greek army claimed to have had access to 128 cars in Macedonia and 1,300 in Epirus; most of them, however, were small ones: OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 380. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Kral an Berchtold, no. 23, Salonica, 26 January 1913: Betreffend das Automobilwesen im griechischen Heer.
- 63 Cf., for the Bulgarian army, Nikola Ivanov, *Spomeni 1861–1918* [Memoirs 1861–1918], Vol. II (Sofia: Izdat. na Ministerstvoto na Otbranata Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1997), 75; 'Dokumentalen razkaz za Balkanskata voina: Iz nepublikovanata kniga na Petăr Stoilov' [Documentary Narrative on the Balkan War: From the Unpublished Book of Petăr Stoilov], *Istorichesko bādeshte* 1–2 (2003), 254. For Serbia, Borislav Ratković, 'Mobilization of the Serbian Army for the First Balkan War', in Király and Djordjević, *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*, 146–57, here 146. The British parliamentarian Noel Buxton, otherwise full of praise for the standard of the Bulgarian army, gives an illustrative description of the slow pace with which the army was moving towards the Thracian war theatre: Noel Buxton, *With the Bulgarian Staff* (New York: The Macmillan Comp., 1913), 11.
- 64 Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, *Meine Führung im Balkankriege 1912* (Berlin: Mittler, 1913), 117, 172–73; Günter von Hochwächter, *Mit den Türken in der Front*

im Stabe Mahmud Muchtar Pashas – Mein Kriegstagebuch über die Kämpfe bei Kirk Kilisse, Lüle Burgas und Cataldza (Berlin: Mittler, 1913), 68, 71. See also Maurice Baring, *Letters from the Near East 1909 and 1912* (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1913), 128.

- 65 Cf., for example, the record of the proceedings of the preparation committee of the Bulgarian army, criticizing the lack of many basic supplies in mid September 1912, in Georgiev and Trifonov, *Istoriia na Bŭlgarite*, 22. See also the diary of Nikola Dodov, who, being drafted in September 1912, recognized that ‘many of the soldiers were not equipped with full clothes’: Nikola Dodov, *Dnevnik na Balkanskata voina* (Sofia: Voenna izdat., 2006), 12. Vasil Kolarov, later one of the leading figures in the Bulgarian Communist Party, took part in the Balkan Wars as a soldier. In his diary, he too notes that his regiment gave the impression of a ‘half-naked army’, with many soldiers marching without any real uniform: Vasil Kolarov, *Pobedi i porazheniia: Dnevnik* [Victories and Defeats: Diary] (Sofia: Christo Botev, 2001), 24. For the Ottoman army and their deficits in equipment and ammunition, see Hochwächter, *Mit den Türken in der Front*, 12, 69.
- 66 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 387. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Tarnowski an Berchtold, Sofia, no. 93, 27 December 1912: Zum bulgarisch-türkischen Feldzug; *ibid.*, P.A. XII 440. Liasse XLV/22 ad Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg: Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes Tagesbericht, 20 December 1912: B. no. 1870 res. Bulgarien.
- 67 Shortage of ammunition and a lack of supply were identified by a governmental commission as among the reasons for Bulgaria’s defeat in the Second Balkan War: OeStA, HHStA P.A. XV Bulgarien 75: Berichte, Weisungen, Varia 1913, Freiherr von Mittag an Berchtold, no. 75 A-J, Sofia, 6 November 1913: Zur Lage. On the Ottoman army, cf. OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 440. Liasse XLV/22 ad Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes: Evidenz über den Balkankrieg, 11 November 1912; T. no. 1470 Türkei. Bericht des k.u.k. Militärattachés in Konstantinopel Obersten Pomjankowski; Hochwächter, *Mit den Türken in der Front*, 25, 56, 69.
- 68 Vladan Gjurdjewitj [Djordjević], *Die Entwicklung der öffentlichen Gesundheitspflege im serbischen Königreich vom XII. Jahrhundert bis 1883* (Berlin: Pasch, 1883), 23–39. In 1870–71, Djordjević had tried to study Prussian practices during the German-French war first-hand; he was not allowed to enter the battlefields but was restricted to visits to the military hospitals behind the front lines.
- 69 Mile Ignjatović, ‘Srpsko ratno hirurško iskustvo, I. deo: Ratna hirurgija u vreme srpskih-turskih ratova’ [Serbian Military Surgery I: Military Surgery during the Serbian-Turkish Wars], *Vojnosanitetski pregled* 60(5) (2003), 631–40.
- 70 Emil Knorr, *Entwicklung und Gestaltung des Heeres-Sanitätswesens der europäischen Staaten* (Hannover: Helwig, 1880), 913.
- 71 Mile Ignjatović, ‘Srpsko ratno hirurško iskustvo, II. deo: Ratna hirurgija u Srbiji u vreme Srpsko-bugarskog rata’ [Serbian Military Surgery II: Military Surgery during the Serbian-Bulgarian War], *Vojnosanitetski*

- pregled 60(6) (2003), 757–62; Pavle Jović, 'Vojni lekari – prvi državni pitomci za studije medicine u inostranstvu' [Medical Doctors – the First State Sponsored Students for Medicine Abroad], *Vojnosanitetski pregled* 59(2) (2002), 215–16.
- 72 Mile Ignjatović, 'Srpsko ratno hirurško iskustvo, IV. deo: Ratna hirurgija u Srbiji u vreme balkanskih ratova' [Serbian Military Surgery IV: Military Surgery during the Balkan Wars], *Vojnosanitetski pregled* 61(2) (2004), 217–29; Vladimir Stanojević, *Istorija srpskog vojnog saniteta* [History of Serbian Military Medicine] (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992), 70, 93.
- 73 On the role of women and women's organizations in medical preparations for war, cf. Svetlana Stefanović, *Nation und Geschlecht: Frauen in Serbien von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Ph.D. dissertation (Leipzig: University of Leipzig, 2011), 181; Vera Gavrilović, 'Žene lekari u Prvom Balkanskom ratu' [Women Doctors in the First Balkan War], in SANU (ed.), *Proi Balkanski rat: Okrugli sto povodom 75. godišnjice 1912–1987* [The First Balkan War: Round Table on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary 1912–1987] (Belgrade: SANU, 1991), 98.
- 74 'In jedem Verwundeten sah die Mutter ihren eigenen Sohn, die Tochter ihren Vater oder ihren Bruder oder ihren Geliebten, die alle ebenfalls in den Dienst des Vaterlandes sich gestellt ...': Catherina Sturzenegger, *Serbisches Rotes Kreuz und internationale Liebestätigkeit während der Balkankriege 1912/13* (Zurich: Orell Füssli, 1914), 25.
- 75 Cf., with regard to Serbia, Fritz Tintner, 'Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen im Bulgarisch-Türkischen Feldzug', *Der Militärarzt* 47(4) (1 March 1913), 54; Burghard Breitner [Bruno Sturm], *Kriegstagebuch: Balkankrieg 1913* (Vienna/Leipzig: Braumüller, 1913), 114–16, 123. For Bulgaria, see *Klinisch-therapeutische Wochenschrift Wien* 20(10) (10 March 1913), 312; 'Schlachtenbummlerinnen', *Das Rote Kreuz: Zentralorgan für alle Wohlfahrts- und Wohltätigkeitsbestrebungen* 38(5) (1913), 4.
- 76 Clyde Sinclair Ford, *The Balkan Wars: Being a Series of Lectures Delivered at the Army Service Schools* (Washington, DC: Press of the Army Service Schools, 1915), 138; the author had served in Turkish as well as Bulgarian hospitals during both wars.
- 77 Cf. the speech by Dr Kirschner in *Verhandlungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Chirurgie: 42. Congress, abgehalten zu Berlin, 26.–28. März 1913* (Berlin, 1913), 214: '... kann man ihnen den Vorwurf nicht ersparen, daß sie, obwohl sie sich erwiesener Maßen seit Jahren planmäßig auf den Krieg vorbereiten, für die Bereitstellung geeigneter Transportmittel sehr wenig gethan haben'.
- 78 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 441. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes: Tagesbericht, 7 February 1913: Bulgarien. Eindrücke von der bulgarischen Armee im Feldzuge 1912. Instead of the 1,300 to 1,400 doctors that would have been needed, the army disposed only 680; cf. Konstantin Trošev, *Čeští lékaři v Bulharsku v době Balkánských válek (1912–1913)* [Czech Doctors in Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars 1912–1913] (Varna: Slavena, 2003 [Prague: Univerzita Karlova, 1984]), 131.

- 79 Michail Arnaudov, *Istorija na Sofijskija univerzitet Sv. Kliment Ohridski prez pãrooto mu polustoletie 1888–1938* [History of the University of Sofia St. Kliment of Ohrid during Its First 50 Years 1888–1939] (Sofia: Prodvorna pechatnitsa, 1939), 355–60. For Serbia, see Milan Jovanović-Batut, *Medicinski fakultet srpskog univerziteta* [The Medical Faculty of the Serbian University] (Belgrade, 1899); *Zdravlje* 8 (1912), 233.
- 80 'Aus den ärztlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs: Erfahrungen und Erlebnisse aus dem Balkankriege', *Klinisch-therapeutische Wochenschrift Wien* 20(10) (10 March 1913), 310; 'Im Feldlazarett von Podgoritza', *Österreichische Illustrierte Zeitung* 22(7) (17 November 1912), 181.
- 81 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 389. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Weinzettl an Berchtold, no. 14 A-C, Cetinje, 19 February 1913: Der Angriff auf Scutari: 'Die alten Klagen, dass der Krieg ohne genügende Vorbereitung und insbesondere was das Sanitätswesen anbelangt, mit an barbarischen Zeiten erinnernder Sorglosigkeit begonnen wurde, werden wieder lauter denn je'. Cf. also for the early weeks of the war, *ibid.*, 385, Frh. von Giesel an Berchtold, no. 83 vertraulich, Cetinje, 14 October 1912.
- 82 See, for example, the report by British nurses: 'during the first weeks the only bedding was in the form of mattresses, which were placed on the floor', in *The British Journal of Nursing* 51(1) (321) (26 July 1913), 1. Similarly, from the view of an American military doctor, Ford, *The Balkan Wars*, iv.
- 83 'The Treatment of the Sick and the Wounded in Constantinople', *The Lancet. A Journal of British and Foreign Medical and Chemical Science, Criticism, Literature and News* 180(4,660) (21 December 1912), 1,749; 'Constantinople', *The Lancet* 180(4,656) (23 November 1912), 1,470. The situation was considered to be better only for Greece, where, despite organizational problems, the wounded encountered better conditions: Dr Franz Goldhammer, 'Kriegsärztliche Erfahrungen aus dem griechisch-türkischen und griechisch-bulgarischen Krieg', in P[aul] v. Bruns (ed.), *Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen aus den Balkankriegen 1912/13* (Tübingen: Laupp'sche Buchhandlung, 1914), 14–17.
- 84 Muhtar Paşa, *Meine Führung im Balkankriege*, 133 (quotation). On the situation in San Stefano, see Baring, *Letters from the Near East*, 162–87. On the number of casualties, OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 440. Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes, Tagesbericht, 4 December 1912: T. no. 1612, 4 December 1912: Tschataldscha Linie.
- 85 On the impact on the Bulgarian army, cf. Christian Promitzer, 'Combating Cholera during the Balkan Wars: The Case of Bulgaria', in Pettifer and Buchanan, *War in the Balkans*, 76–101. I thank Christian Promitzer for making the manuscript of this article available to me before publication. Cf. the first-hand description from the Chataldzha front in Khr. Nedialkov, *Chataldzha: Spomeni i vpechatlenija na uchastnik* [Chataldzha: Memories and Impressions of a Participant] (Sofia: Pechatnitsa na Armeiiskii Voenizdatelskii fond, 1924), 27–29, and also 'Niakolko dumi za cholera v Bulgarska voiska prez voinata' [Some Words about the Cholera in the Bulgarian Army during the War], *Letopis na Lekarskija Sãjuz v Bãlgariia*

- 8–10 (1913), 501–9, which mentions 60,000 cholera casualties among the Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian and Turkish armies and population.
- 86 Their number can hardly be calculated precisely, but it certainly exceeded several hundred. Konstantin Trošev, in his work on Czech doctors, counts 242 sanitary missions in Bulgaria alone, with 224 medical doctors and more than 300 nurses. Russian missions were the most numerous, followed by missions from the Austrian part of the monarchy and from Bohemia; cf. Trošev, *Čeští lékaři*, 135–37. Slightly different figures, based on the Bulgarian Red Cross, are in Georgiev and Trifonov, *Istoriia na Bŭlgarite*, 95–100; cf. also the reports of Red Cross missions in *Bulletin International de la Croix-Rouge* 44(173) (1913), 56–60; *ibid.* 44(174) (1913), 138–45; *ibid.* 44(175) (1913), 217–20. In Serbia, more than 300 medical experts, among them 120 doctors, most of them from Russia, were present during the wars: Ilija Petrović, 'Foreign Medical Help in Serbian Liberation Wars until 1918', *Archive of Oncology* 18(4) (2010), 143–48; Ana Stojić, 'Pomoć Belgijskog Crvenog Krsta Kraljevini Srbiji tokom Balkanskih Ratova' [The Assistance of the Belgian Red Cross to the Kingdom of Serbia during the Balkan Wars], *Miscellanea* 32 (2011), 529–42. As a first systematic analysis of Austrian assistance, see also Indira Duraković, 'Experimentierfeld Balkan: Ärzte am Schauplatz der Balkankriege 1912/13', *Südost-Forschungen* 68 (2009), 298–327.
- 87 Claire Stobart, *War and Women: From Experience in the Balkans and Elsewhere* (London: Bell & Sons, 1913).
- 88 Breitner, *Kriegstagebuch*, 158, 163; Ladislaus von Fényes, *Tagebuch eines Mannes vom Roten Kreuz: Erlebnisse aus dem Balkankrieg* (Berlin: Verlag von Karl Siegesmund, 1913), 8; Alexander Fraenkel, 'Einige allgemeine Bemerkungen zur modernen Kriegschirurgie', in Bruns, *Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen*, 1–13, here 1–3. See also Anton Dilger and Arthur W. Meyer, 'Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen aus den beiden Balkankriegen 1912/13', *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Chirurgie* 127(3–4) (1914), 225–379, here 265; Antonín Wiesner, *Moderní válka po stránce lékařé* [The Modern War from the Perspective of the Doctor] (Prague: Vlastním nákladem J. Otto, 1913), 4. Members of an American mission, who left the Serbian-Bulgarian theatre of war after only a few days, were obviously, as the Serbs and the American consul-general complained, 'more interested in their studies' than in providing help: quoted by Ignjatović, 'Srpsko ratno hirurško iskustvo, IV. deo', 225. On the medical interests of Austrian doctors, see also Heinz Flamm, 'Das Österreichische Rote Kreuz und österreichische Bakteriologen in den Balkankriegen 1912/13 – Zentennium des ersten Einsatzes der Bakteriologie auf Kriegsschauplätzen', *Wiener Medizinische Wochenschrift* 162(7–8) (2012), 132–47.
- 89 Alfred Exner, *Kriegschirurgie in den Balkankriegen* (Stuttgart: Enke, 1915), 7.
- 90 Anton Waldmann, *Arzt und Soldat, Berlin 1936: Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag des Heeres-Sanitätsinspektors im Reichskriegsministerium Generaloberstabsarzt Prof. Dr. Anton Waldmann* (Berlin, 1938).
- 91 Clyde Sinclair Ford, *Gunshot Roentgenograms: A Collection of Roentgenograms Taken in Constantinople during the Turco-Balkan War, 1912–1913, Illustrating Some Gunshot Wounds in the Turkish Army* (War Department, Office of the

- Surgeon General, Bulletin 9, October 1915) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1916).
- 92 Josef Hamburger, 'Der Sanitätsdienst im Balkankriege', *Der Militärarzt* 48(7) (25 April 1914), 129–40, here 137, 140.
- 93 'Der Balkankrieg hat keine eingreifende Aenderung in den Anschauungen der Kriegschirurgie gebracht, er hatte aber für letztere eine große Bedeutung als Schule für praktische Tätigkeit': *Klinisch-Therapeutische Wochenschrift* 20(10) (10 March 1913), 310; Tintner, 'Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen', 50. Fritz Tintner appreciated the Balkan Wars as a testing ground not only because 'the new weapons enriched our knowledge', but also because 'the unpleasant effect of insufficient medical care produced such ugly consequences'.
- 94 Fred Fox, *The Balkan Peninsula* (London: Black, 1915), 143.
- 95 Cf., for example, the information given by the Austrian Red Cross Mission: 'Aus den ärztlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs: Erfahrungen aus dem Balkankriege', *Klinisch-Therapeutische Wochenschrift* 20(8) (24 February 1913), 245. See also Stobart, *War and Women*, 11–15; and the description of the Bulgarian field hospitals near the Čorlu front line by the Russian war correspondent N.P. Mamontov, *S bolgarskimi voiskami*, 165. He mentions dying soldiers lying on the floor.
- 96 Ivan G. Popov, *Spomeni ot bālgarsko-turskata voina prez 1912–1913* [Memories from the Bulgarian-Turkish War] (Sofia: Pechat. Gutenberg, 1914), 110.
- 97 Cf. the memories of the nurse Catharina Sturzenegger, *Serbisches Rotes Kreuz*, 61–63; Josef Ballner, 'Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen aus dem Bulgarisch-Türkischen Kriege', *Der Militärarzt* 47(10) (24 May 1913), 145.
- 98 Bertold Reder, 'Der Krankenzug der Österreichischen Gesellschaft vom Roten Kreuze auf dem bulgarisch-serbischen Kriegsschauplatz', *Der Militärarzt* 48(2) (7 February 1914), 33–45, here 41. Cf. also the inspection report by the delegate of the International Red Cross, Dr Marval, *Bulletin International de la Croix-Rouge* 44(174) (April 1913), 145–63.
- 99 Dilger and Meyer, 'Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen', 370; von Fényes, *Tagebuch eines Mannes vom Roten Kreuz*, 81; Noel Buxton, *The Wounded* (World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series 3[2]) (February 1913), 4; Central-Comitee der Deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz (ed.), *Beiträge zur Kriegsheilkunde aus den Hilfsunternehmungen der Deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz während des Italienisch-türkischen Feldzug 1912 und des Balkankrieges 1912/13* (Berlin: Springer, 1914), 157–58. Among the wounded Bulgarian soldiers, 27 per cent came to a hospital only after a trip of up to five days on an oxcart and another two to three days by train: Hamburger, 'Der Sanitätsdienst im Balkankriege', 133. See also OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 441. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes: Tagesbericht, 7 February 1913: Bulgarien. Eindrücke von der bulgarischen Armee im Feldzuge 1912.
- 100 'The British Red Cross in the Balkan War', *The Lancet* 182(4,961) (26 July 1913), 235.

- 101 *Verhandlungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Chirurgie*, 214. See also Otto Polák, *Dojmy lékaře z Balkánské války* [Impressions of a Doctor from the Balkan Wars] (Prague: Vlastním nákladem J. Otto, 1913), 18.
- 102 Béla K. Király, 'East Central European Society and the Warfare in the Era of the Balkan Wars', in Király and Djordjević, *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*, 11.
- 103 Orlando Figes, *The Crimean War: A History* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012).
- 104 Cf. the sometimes differing figures in Ratković-Kostić, 'Srpska vojska u XIX. veku', 42; for 1885, see Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića*, 254; Borislav Ratković, 'Mobilizacija srpske i turske vojske za prvi balkanski rat oktobra 1912 godine' [The Mobilization of the Serbian and the Turkish Army for the First Balkan War in October 1912], *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 36(1) (1985), 200–202.
- 105 For Bulgaria, cf. the official figures in Ministerstvo na Voinata (ed.), *Voinata mezhdu Bălgariia i Turtsiia 1912–1913 god* [The War between Turkey and Bulgaria 1912–1913], Vol. I: *Podgotovka na voinata* [The Preparation for the War] (Sofia: Ministerstvo na Voinata, 1937), 566; Radko Dimitriev, *Treta armiiia v Balkanskata voina 1912 godina* [The Third Army during the Balkan War 1912] (Sofia: Armeiski Voenno-izdatelski fond, 1922).
- 106 For Greece, see Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, 'The Balkan Wars 1912–13: Their Effect on the Everyday Life of Civilians', in Council of Europe, *Crossroads of European Histories*, 89–100, here 90.
- 107 Reder, 'Der Krankenzug der Österreichischen Gesellschaft vom Roten Kreuze', 38.
- 108 Oberst M. Gärtner, 'Über die Verwendung der Feldartillerie im Balkankriege 1912/13', *Streffleur's Militärische Zeitschrift* 55(7) (1914), 1,038; Oskar Hanasiewicz, 'Militärärztliche und militärische Eindrücke aus dem Balkankrieg 1912/13', *Streffleur's Militärische Zeitschrift* 55(7) (1914), 1,096.
- 109 Popov, *Spomeni*, 51–55; Nedialkov, *Chataldza*, 33.
- 110 Kutschbach, *Die Serben im Balkankrieg*, 60, 137–39.
- 111 Ludwig Schliep, *Im Julifeldzug 1913 auf dem Balkan* (Berlin: Paetel, 1914), 65–66.
- 112 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 390. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg: Generalkonsul Ritter von Zambaur an Berchtold, no. 27 geheim, Skutari, 10 March 1913: Fortgesetztes Bombardement der Stadt Skutari und dessen Folgen.
- 113 Colin Ross, *Im Balkankrieg* (Munich: Martin Mörikes Verlag, 1913), 91. Cf., similarly, Emanuel Škatula, *Válka na Balkáně* [The Balkan War] (Prague: Práva Lidu, 1913), 422.
- 114 German General Staff, *Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, Heft 50: Der Balkankrieg 1912/13, Erstes Heft*, 151–52.
- 115 Exner, *Kriegschirurgie in den Balkankriegen*, 44, also 23.
- 116 Général Herr, *Sur le théâtre de la guerre des Balkans: Mon journal des routes (17. novembre–15. décembre 1912)* (Paris/Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1913), 27; Rohde, *Unsere Gefechtsvorschriften*, 23; Dilger and Meyer, 'Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen', 354, 364.
- 117 'Dnevnik na voinika Raicho Maidovski po vremen na voinata sa Sărbiiia' [The Diary of the Soldier Raicho Maidovski in the Time of the War with

- Serbia], in Georgiev and Trifonov, *Istoriia na Bŭlgarite*, 202–4. Cf. also the diary of the Bulgarian orthodox priest Ivan Dochev, who had volunteered during the war, *Saga za Balkanskata vojna: Dnevnik na Sveshtenik Ivan Dochev* [The Story of the Balkan War: The Diary of the Priest Ivan Dochev] (Sofia: Iztok-zapad, 2012), 55. Referring to reports from the Bulgarian military psychologist Spiridon Kazandzhiev, historian Snežana Dimitrova describes similar experiences: Snežana Dimitrova, ‘Of Other Balkan Wars: Affective Worlds of Modern and Traditional (The Bulgarian Example)’, *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs* XVIII(2) (2013), 29–54, here 32. Cf. a similar description from the Greek war theatre in T.S. Hutchison, *An American Soldier under the Greek Flag at Bezanie* (Nashville, TN: Greek-American Publ. Comp., 1913), 165.
- 118 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 391. Von Herzfeld an Berchtold, no. 17/res. Adrianople, 17 April 1913: 2. Teil des Berichts über die Belagerung Adrianopels. Cf. the experiences of an Ottoman officer in ‘Im Nachtangriff von Adrianopel’, *Reichspost*, 14 November 1912.
- 119 Popov, *Spomeni*, 105–7.
- 120 ‘Die schwierige Lage der bulgarischen Armee’, *Neue Freie Presse*, 24 November 1912.
- 121 Based on a report by General von der Goltz, who had been in charge of the reform of the Ottoman army: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA AA), R 14 223 Akten betr. den Balkankrieg, Bd. 8: Kaiserl. Dt. Botschaft Pera, 7 November 1912, Privatbrief Frh. von Wangenheim.
- 122 Kutschbach, *Die Serben im Balkankrieg*, 130.
- 123 Azmanov, *Moiata epokha*, 86. Cf. also a similar report in OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 441. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Evidenzbureau des k.u.k. Generalstabes, Tagesbericht, 7 February 1913: Bulgarien. Eindrücke von der bulgarischen Armee im Feldzuge 1912; and Howell, *The Campaign in Thrace*, 157.
- 124 Ross, *Im Balkankrieg*, 79.
- 125 Stobart, *War and Women*, 80; Herbert F. Baldwin, *A War Photographer on Thrace: An Account of Personal Experiences during the Turco-Bulgarian War 1912* (London: T.F. Unwin, 1912), 150.
- 126 Škatula, *Válka na Balkáně*, 448. Similarly, the Hungarian medical assistant Ladislaus von Fényes spoke about a ‘Freudenfest der Verheerung und Vernichtung’ (a celebration of devastation and destruction): von Fényes, *Tagebuch eines Mannes vom Roten Kreuz*, 116.
- 127 Roger Chickering, ‘Militärgeschichte als Totalgeschichte im Zeitalter des totalen Krieges’, in Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann (eds), *Was ist Militärgeschichte?* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000), 301–14, here 307.
- 128 Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London/New York: Routledge, 2000), 131–32.
- 129 ‘Der Krieg machte sich nicht nur bis ins letzte Haus fühlbar, sondern er war geradezu der Alleinherrscher, dem das ganze Getriebe des Volks- und Staatslebens widerspruchslos diente.’ Reder, ‘Der Krankenzug der Österreichischen Gesellschaft vom Roten Kreuze’, 33.
- 130 For Bulgaria, cf. *Fremdenblatt*, 11 October 1912; for Montenegro, OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, k.u.k. Militärattaché in

- Cetinje. Res. no. 110. Mobilisierung in Montenegro. Cetinje, 6 October 1912.
- 131 With the exception of Greece, this obviously did not reach very significant numbers. Austrian diplomats in the United States did not confirm the high figures of repatriates mentioned in the press. For Greece, they estimated that the number might have reached 6,000 to 7,000 persons, for the rest of the Balkan states no more than 2,000: OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 387. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Frh. v. Zwiedineck an Berchtold, no. XCIX-M, Washington, 5 December 1912, streng vertraulich; *ibid.*, Abschrift eines Schreibens des k.u.k. Konsuls Kirchknopf an den k.u.k. Geschäftsträger, New York, 19 October 1912; *ibid.*, Abschrift eines Schreibens des k.u.k. Generalkonsuls von Nuber an den k.u.k. Geschäftsträger, New York, 24 October 1912; *ibid.*, Beilage ad Bericht ddo. Washington, 5 December 1912, no. XCIX-M. Bericht aus Chicago, 6 October 1912, no. 276, reservat; *ibid.*, no. 288, res. Chicago, 29 October 1912.
- 132 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Vizekonsul Fillunger an Berchtold, no. 73 geheim, Odessa, 12 October 1912.
- 133 Mehmet Hacısalihoglu, 'Inclusion and Exclusion: Conscription in the Ottoman Empire', *Journal of Modern European History* 5 (2007), 264–86; Erik Jan Zürcher, 'The Ottoman Conscription System 1844–1914', *International Review of Social History* 43(3) (1998), 437–49; Fikret Adanır, 'Christliche Rekruten unter dem Halbmond: Zum Problem der Militärdienstpflicht für Nichtmuslime im spätosmanischen Reich', in Gerhard Grimm (ed.), *Von der Pruth-Ebene bis zum Gipfel des Ida: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Emanuel Turczynski* (Munich: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1989), 153–64.
- 134 Cf. in this sense also the memoirs of the Ottoman head of staff Mahmud Muhtar Paşa, *Meine Führung im Balkankriege*, 164. Neither did foreign analysts hold the Christian soldiers in any sense responsible for the bad performance of the Ottoman army during the war. Cf. OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 441. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Tagesbericht, 28 May 1913: Evb. NO 2000/28: Über die Ursachen der türkischen Niederlagen.
- 135 The Red Crescent, which had been formed in 1867 and was formally recognized in 1877, had previously promoted the idea of a nursing school for women; however, it was created only in the aftermath of the wars. See Zuhâl Özyaydın, 'Upper Social Strata Women and Nursing in Turkey', *Nursing History Review* 14 (2006), 161–74, here 163–64.
- 136 *Srпкиnje u službi otadžbini i narodu za vreme Balkanskih ratova 1912 i 1913 g. kao i za vreme Svetskog rata od 1914–1920* [The Female Serb Serving the Fatherland and the People during the Balkan Wars 1912/13] (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska ženska sekcija Fidaka, 1933), 26. 'Narodna odbrana', the irredentist organization involved in political and paramilitary activities, before the outbreak of the war also urged Serbian women not only to fulfil their duties as nurses, but also to join the *Sokol* with its semi-military gymnastic activities and the rifle clubs: *Narodna odbrana* [People's Defence] (Belgrade: Nova štamparija Davidović, 1911), 25.
- 137 Eyal Ginio, 'Mobilizing the Ottoman Nation during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Awakening from the Ottoman Dream', *War in History* 12(2) (2005), 156–77, here 156.

- 138 Roger Chickering, 'Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept', in Manfred F. Boemke and Roger Chickering (eds), *Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experience, 1871–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13–26; Stig Förster, 'Das Zeitalter des totalen Krieges, 1861–1945', *Mittelweg* 36(6) (1999), 12–29.
- 139 Stanoje Stanojević, *Srpsko-turski rat 1912 godine* [The Serbian-Turkish War] (Belgrade: Kon, 1928), 206. Similarly, Dušan Z. Putniković, *Ratni memoari. Knjiga proa: Rat sa Turcima 1912 god* [War Memories. First Book: The War with the Turks 1912] (Niš: Štamparija Sveti Car Konstantin, 1938), 5–6.
- 140 Cf. Ioannis Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität 1870–1912: Staat und private Akteure vor dem Hintergrund der 'Megali Idea'* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002). On textbooks and nationalism, cf. Christina Koulouri, *Dimensions idéologiques de l'historicité en Grèce (1834–1914): Les manuels scolaires d'histoire et de géographie* (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 1991).
- 141 Cf. Czar Ferdinand's order of the day to the army, no. 15, 6 September 1912, in Kosta Nikolov, *Treta odredna Armia v bälgaro-turskata vojna prez 1912–1913 godini*, chast I: *Lozengradaska operaciia* [The Third Army during the Bulgarian-Turkish War 1912–1913, Part I: The Lozengrad Operation] (Sofia: Voenen zhurnal, 1914), 152.
- 142 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, von Braun an Berchtold, no. 46, Athens, 26 October 1912: Manifestation der Allianz.
- 143 *Srpske Novine* 1229 (6 October 1912), 1.
- 144 Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, "'Revenge! Revenge! Revenge!'" "Awakening a Nation" through Propaganda in the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913)', in Hans-Lukas Kieser, Kerem Öktem and Maurus Reinkowski (eds), *World War I and the End of the Ottomans: From the Balkan Wars to the Armenian Genocide* (London/New York: Taurus, 2015), 77–102; Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, 'Illustrated Atrocity: The Stigmatisation of Non-Muslims through Images in the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan Wars', *Journal of Modern European History* 12(4) (2014), 460–78.
- 145 Muhtar Paşa, *Meine Führung im Balkankriege*, 120–21.
- 146 Jovan Cvijić, 'Balkanski rat i Srbija' [The Balkan War and Serbia], *Srpski Književni Glasnik* 29(9) (1912), 651–64; Aleksandar Belić, 'Srbija i stara Srbija' [Serbia and Old Serbia], *Ilustrovana ratna kronika* 2 (25 October [7 November] 1912), 2.
- 147 Editorial, *Ilustrovana ratna kronika* 1 (18 [31] October 1912), 1.
- 148 Cvijić, 'Balkanski rat i Srbija', 664.
- 149 Cf., in particular, Vladan Djordjević, *Die Albanesen und die Großmächte* (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1913). For similar tendencies among the Serbian public discourse at this time, see Holm Sundhaussen, 'Serbische Volksgeschichte: Historiker und Ethnologen im Kampf um Volk und Raum vom Ende des 19. bis zum Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts', in Manfred Hettling (ed.), *Volksgeschichten im Europa der Zwischenkriegszeit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 301–25; Predrag J. Marković, *Ethnic Stereotypes: Ubiquitous, Local or Migrating Phenomena? The Serbian-Albanian Case* (Bonn: Michael-Zikic-Stiftung, 2003), 55–60. Differing from Sundhaussen in his argument, Marković emphasizes that even at that time more ambivalent pictures of the Albanians were present within the Serbian discourse.

- 150 As quoted in *Ilustrovana ratna kronika* 1 (18 [31] October 1912), 8.
- 151 Keith Brown, "'Wiping Out the Bulgarian Race": Hatred, Duty and National Self-Fashioning in the Second Balkan War', in Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz (eds), *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013), 298–317; this semi-racist perception was already evident during the late nineteenth century in the context of the Macedonian question. Cf. Adamantios Skordos, 'Das panslawische Feindbild im Griechenland des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts', *Südost-Forschungen* 71 (2012), 76–105, here 91–94.
- 152 George W. Gawrych, 'The Culture and Politics of Violence in Turkish Society, 1903–1914', *Middle Eastern Studies* 22(3) (1986), 307–30; Elçin Kürsat-Ahlers, 'Die Brutalisierung von Gesellschaft und Kriegsführung im Osmanischen Reich während der Balkankriege (1903–1914)', in Andreas Gestrich (ed.), *Gewalt im Krieg: Ausübung, Erfahrung und Verweigerung von Gewalt in Kriegen des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 1996), 50–74. For children's literature, see Cüneyd Okay, 'The Impact of Balkan Wars on Children's Poetry in the Ottoman Empire', *Études balkaniques* 42(1) (2006), 89–99.
- 153 'România mandatară a civilizației Europene' [Romania's Mission for the European Civilization], *Gazeta ilustrată* 2 (6 July 1913), 1.
- 154 Cf., as one of the many examples, Putniković, *Ratni memoari*, 6, describing the feeling of 'revenge' when entering Kosovo in 1912.
- 155 Carl Schmitt, 'Totaler Feind, totaler Krieg, totaler Staat', in Carl Schmitt, *Positionen und Begriffe* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994 [1937]), 268–273.
- 156 On poetry during the Balkan Wars, cf. Evelina Kelbecheva, 'Voina i tvorcestvo' [War and Creativity], *Godishnik na Sofiiskiiia univerzitet Sv. Kliment Okhridski; Centăr po kulturoznanie* 80/81 (1987/88), 101–74, here 101–13. In a rather affirmative and uncritical way, see also Strahil Popov, 'Balkanskata voina i bălgarskata literatura' [The Balkan Wars and Bulgarian Literature], *Literaturna misāl* 27(7) (1983), 84–104.
- 157 Isidora Sekulić, 'Nekim našim omladincima' [To Some of Our Youngsters], *Slovenski jug*, 31(9) (1912), 242.
- 158 *Ilustrovana ratna kronika* 1 (18 October 1912), 1.
- 159 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14–18: *Understanding the Great War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002), 116.
- 160 Rumjana Koneva, *Goliamata sreshta na bŭlgarskiiia narod: Kulturata i predizvoikatelstoa na voimite 1912–1918 g.* [The 'Big Meeting' of the Bulgarian People: Culture and the Challenge of the Wars 1912–1918] (Sofia: Akad. Izdat. Prof. Marin Drinov, 1995); Kelbecheva, 'Voina i tvorcestvo', 101–74; Evelina Kelbecheva, 'Between Apology and Denial: Bulgarian Culture during World War I', in Ariel Roshwald and Richard Stites (eds), *European Culture in the Great War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 215–42.
- 161 Mihajlo Vojvodić, 'Naučnici Srbije i prvi balkanski rat' [Scientists from Serbia and the First Balkan War], in SANU, *Prvi Balkanski rat*, 33–51.

- 162 Cf. Ljubinka Trgovčević, *Naučnici Srbije i stvaranje Jugoslavije* [Scientists from Serbia and the Creation of Yugoslavia] (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1986).
- 163 Cf., for the role of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Svetozăr Eldărov, *Pravoslaviето na vojina: Bălgarska pravoslavna cărkva i voinite na Bălgariia 1878–1945* [Orthodoxy and War: The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the War in Bulgaria] (Sofia: Voенno izdat., 2004), 163–69.
- 164 Cf. Ivan Ilchev, *Rodinata mi – prava ili ne! Vănshnopoliticheska propaganda na balkanskite stran 1821–1923* [My Homeland – Right or Wrong! Foreign Policy Propaganda in the Balkan Countries 1821–1923] (Sofia: Universitetsko izdat. Sv. Kliment Okhridski, 1996), 432–39.
- 165 Cf. the detailed rules and instructions for journalists in Bulgaria in René Puaux, *De Sofia à Tchataldja* (Paris: Perrin, 1913), 74–81. For the practice of applying these rules, cf. the Bulgarian historian Nikola Milev, who served in the censorship department during the war: Nikola Milev, *Pod stenite na Odrin* [At the Walls of Edirne] (Tărnovo: ASTA, 1993), 13. For Greece, cf. OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Frh. von Braun an Seine Excellenz Leopold Grafen von Berchtold, no. 41, F. vertraulich. Athens, 12 October 1912. For Serbia, *ibid.*, von Ugron an Berchtold no. 112, Belgrad, 19 October 1912: Proklamation des Krieges in Serbien.
- 166 Cf., for Montenegro, OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 412. Liasse XLV/5 Balkankrieg: Frh. von Giesl an Berchtold: Frage der Entsendung des k.u.k. Milităr-Attachés in das montenegrinische Hauptquartier bei Beginn der Operationen, no. 78-B vertraulich, Cetinje, 6 October 1912. For Serbia and Greece, *ibid.*, Stephan von Ugron an Berchtold, no. 264 Res.: Nichtzulassung fremder Militărattachés auf dem Kriegsschauplatz, Belgrad, 19 October 1912; *ibid.*, K.u.k. Kriegsministerium no. 3536, Vienna, 24 July 1913. For Bulgaria, *ibid.*, Graf Tarnowski Telegram no. 250, Sofia, 20 October 1912. Only after many futile attempts did military attachés in the Ottoman Empire finally get access to the front lines; cf. *ibid.*, Telegram Markgraf Pallavicini, Pera, 19 October 1912, no. 493; *ibid.*, Telegram no. 529, 30 October: Akkreditierte Attachés sind nach mehreren Aufschüben mittlerweile auf Kriegsschauplatz aufgebrochen.
- 167 Fox, *The Balkan Peninsula*, 98. Fox concludes that ‘the Balkan War probably will close the book of the war correspondent’ (p. 107). Similarly, see von Mach, *Briefe aus dem Balkankrieg*, 74–76; Ross, *Im Balkankrieg*, 106–10.
- 168 Ute Daniel, ‘Der Krim-Krieg 1853–1856 und die Entstehungskontexte moderner Kriegsberichterstattung’, in Ute Daniel (ed.), *Augenzeugen: Kriegsberichterstattung vom 18. bis 21. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2006), 40–67.
- 169 Reginald Rankin, *The Inner History of the Balkan War* (London: Constable and Comp, 1914), 61.
- 170 On the *Ilustrovana kronika rata*, cf. Milan Miljković, ‘War Poetry and the Visual Culture of War: The Case of the Illustrated War Chronicle (Belgrade)’, *Zeitschrift für Balkanologie* 52(2) (2016), 201–16, here 215.
- 171 Cf., on the regional and international coverage of the wars in film, Petar Kardjilov, ‘The First Balkan War and the Cinematographer Chronicle Documentaries Filmed at the Balkan Fronts’, *Études balkaniques* XLVIII(3)

- (2013), 122–49; Dobrinka Parusheva, 'Svetlina vărchu voinata: Vizualno predstavjane na voinata v bălgarskata iliustrovana presa, kraja na XIX. i nachaloto na XX. vek' [Svetlina about the War: Visual Representation of the War in the Bulgarian Illustrated Press], *Bălgarska etnologiiia* 3 (2014), 275–98, here 290, 295; Karl Kaser, 'Vizualizatsija na Balkanite: Balkanskite vojni, Părvata Svetovna Voina i vizualnata modernizatsiia' [The Visualization of the Balkans: The Balkan Wars, the First World War and the Visual Modernization], *Bălgarska etnologiiia* 3 (2014), 332–51.
- 172 Cf., for Serbia, Jaša Tomić, *Rat na Kosovu i Staroj Srbiji 1912 godine* [The War in Kosovo and Old Serbia in the Year 1912] (Novi Sad: dr-a Svetozara Miletića, 1913 [reprinted 1999]), 54–59; Mišić, *Moje uspomene*, 271. For Bulgaria, cf., among many others, the leading politician Simeon Radev, *Ot triumf do tragediia* [From Triumph to Tragedy] (Sofia: Strelets, 2003), 11. For a military source, cf. Nikolov, *Treta otdelna Armiiia*, 21, who mentions an 'unexpected enthusiasn' among the recruited soldiers.
- 173 See the examples from the press in Weber, *Die Balkankriege*, 48.
- 174 On Fényes, cf. Gábor Demeter, 'The Balkan Wars 1912–1913 in the Hungarian Press, Military Literature and Personal Memoirs', unpublished manuscript.
- 175 Von Fényes, *Tagebuch eines Mannes vom Roten Kreuz*, 46; Major Felix Wagner, 'Meine Eindrücke vom thrasischen Kriegsschauplatz und von der türkischen Armee im Zweiten Balkankrieg', *Streffleur's Militärische Zeitschrift* 55(2) (1914), 258.
- 176 The term refers to the alleged overall euphoria in Germany regarding the war when fighting started in August 1914. The assumption of this 'August experience', long taken for granted in the research literature, has now been convincingly questioned by several authors. Cf., for France, Jean-Jacques Becker, *Comment les français sont entrés dans la guerre* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977); for Germany, cf., among others, the study of local reactions to the war by Benjamin Ziemann, *Front und Heimat: Ländliche Kriegserfahrungen im südlichen Bayern 1914–1923* (Essen: Klartext, 1997).
- 177 Lancelot L. Farrar, Jr., 'Aggression Versus Apathy: The Limits of Nationalism during the Balkan Wars 1912–1913', *East European Quarterly* 37(3) (2003), 257–80.
- 178 Hochwaechter, *Mit den Türken in der Front*, 3.
- 179 Cf. the Austrian reports from Trapezunt, Damaskus and Adana, OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, v. Moricz an Berchtold, no. 4648, Trapezunt, 13 October 1912; *ibid.*, Ranzì an Berchtold, no. 55/res. Damaskus, 14 October 1912; *ibid.*, 386, K.u.K. Vice-Consulat d'Autriche-Hongrie J. no. 223, Adana, 24 October 1912: Vertraulicher Bericht; *ibid.*, P.A. XII 411. Liasse XLV/V: Balkankrieg; Generalkonsul von Moricz berichtet über das Meeting für den Krieg, Z 39, Trapezunt, 7 October 1912; *ibid.*, Generalkonsul von Moricz, berichtet über die Stimmung, Z 42, Trapezunt, 16 October 1912; *ibid.*, Consul Dr Ranzì: Eindruck der türkischen Niederlagen auf die hiesige Bevölkerung, no. 65/res. Damascus, 15 November 1912.

- 180 While the reports from Üsküb/Skopje and Janina found an 'indisputable pro-war mood' (unleugbare kriegsfreudige Stimmung), particularly among the Albanian population and the younger Turkish officers, diplomats from Monastir/Bitola reported that even among the Muslim population hardly any spontaneous or more profound enthusiasm was perceivable ('Aber selbst unter den Mohamedanern kann von einem spontanen und tiefgreifenden Enthusiasmus nicht gesprochen werden'): OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Heimroth an Berchtold, no. 114, Üsküb, 8 October 1912; *ibid.*, 385, Halla an Berchtold, no. 121, Monastir, 13 October 1912, vertraulich: Die Mobilisierung; *ibid.*, P.A. XXXVIII Konsulate 384. Janina 1911–1917, Bilinski an Berchtold, Eindruck der Mobilisierungsnachricht, no. 79 vertraulich, Janina, 7 October 1912.
- 181 'Die feurigen Reden, die einige Studenten hielten, um die Menge zu Schivio-Rufen zu begeistern, fanden keinen Widerhall. Trotzdem bemerkte man nie Unwilligkeit über den Krieg. Es war in den letzten Jahren tüchtig gearbeitet worden, der Armee im besonderen hatte man große Sorgfalt gewidmet.' Adolf Vischer, *An der serbischen Front: Erlebnisse eines Arztes auf dem serbisch-türkischen Kriegsschauplatz 1912* (Basel: Spittler, 1913), 19.
- 182 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg, k.u.k. Militärattaché in Belgrad, Res. no. 197, 6 October 1912: Die Stimmung in Belgrad; *ibid.*, von Ugron an Berchtold, no. 10g.B., Belgrad, 15 October 1912; *ibid.*, k.u.k. Militärattaché in Belgrad Res. no. 232: Die Stimmung in Belgrad und die Stellung der Armee im Lande: 'daß von einer kriegerischen Stimmung oder von einer besonderen Begeisterung in der Bevölkerung nicht gesprochen werden kann'; *ibid.*, Stephan von Ugron an Berchtold, no. 113.B., Belgrad, 20 October 1912, Vorlage zweier Notizen des Gerenten des k.u.k. Vize-Konsulates in Nisch. Similarly, see the report by the German Embassy: PA AA, R 14 218 Akten betr. den Balkan-Krieg 1912/13, Bd. 3: Kaiserl. Dt. Gesandtschaft für Serbien no. 62 an S.E. Reichskanzler Bethmann-Hollweg, 4 December 1912.
- 183 PA AA, R 14 218 Akten betr. den Balkan-Krieg 1912/13, Bd. 1: Kaiserl. Dt. Ges. für Serbien no. 69 an S.E. Reichskanzler Bethmann-Hollweg, 20 December 1912; *ibid.*, R 14 220 Bd. 5, 16 October 1912.
- 184 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 438. Liasse XLV/15: Balkankrieg, Gerent Ledinegg an Seine Excellenz Leopold Grafen von Berchtold, no. 12, Antivari, 22 June 1913: Militärisches-Teilweise Mobilisierung. Already in late November 1912, the Austrian military attaché from Cetinje reported that while enthusiasm for the war among the population had not disappeared, it was obvious that it had waned considerably. He even reported on deserting soldiers. Cf. *ibid.* 386. K.u.k. Militärattaché in Cetinje, no. 237 Res. Politische Situation in Montenegro, Cetinje, 26 November 1912; similarly, *ibid.*, 387, k.k. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Res. 1594: Montenegro, Krieg mit der Türkei, Cattaro, 5 December 1912.
- 185 'Dokumentalen razkaz za balkanskata voina', 254. For Sofia, cf. also OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Liasse XLV/3: Tarnowski an Berchtold, no. 77 A-B, Sofia, 12 October 1912, speaking of 'calm determination' rather than 'noisy euphoria'. Similar also is the report in the *Neue Freie Presse*,

- 8 November 1912 ('Der Tag der Mobilisierung in Bulgarien'), which saw 'no noise, no joy, but determination'.
- 186 Gardikas-Katsiadakis, 'The Balkan Wars 1912–1913', 90.
- 187 Nikola Ivanov, *Balkanskata vojna 1912/13* [The Balkan Wars 1912/13], Vol. II (Sofia: Pečatn. na Armeiskiia voenno-izd. fond, 1924), 113. On rumours about mutinies during the spring of 1913, see also G.K. Abadzhiev, *Deistviia na 1. Brigada ot 5.p. Dunavska diviziia v Voinite prez 1912–1913 god* [The Military Engagement of the 5th Danube Division during the Wars of 1912–1913] (Sofia: Pechatnitsa na Armeiiskia voenno-izdatelstvo fond, 1925), 58. Cf. also M. Veleva, 'Vojnishkite buntove prez 1913 g.' [Military Uprisings in 1913], *Istorieski pregled* 14(1) (1958), 14–24; Richard C. Hall, "'The Enemy Is Behind Us": The Morale Crisis in the Bulgarian Army during the Summer of 1918', *War in History* 11(2) (2004), 209–19, here 210. On the deteriorating spirit among the soldiers, cf. also the diary of Nikola Dodov, who reports from censored letters by Bulgarian soldiers: Dodov, *Dnevnik*, 71, 87.
- 188 Cf. M. Arnaudova, 'Balkanskata vojna v spomenite na Georgi Popaianov i Petko Chorbadzhiev (Rosen)' [The Balkan Wars in the Memory of Georgi Popaianov and Petko Chorbadzhiev (Rosen)], *Izvestiia na dърzhavnite archive* 47 (1984), 166–69, where one of the two witnesses, himself a volunteer, describes his depressed feelings when confronted with the many dead and dying soldiers both on the battlefield and in the field hospitals. Cf. also the diary of the Bulgarian priest Ivan Dochev, who had great patriotic passion at the beginning of the war and whose writing, while not losing its patriotic undertone, becomes more and more sober: *Saga za Balkanskata vojna*, passim.
- 189 Čedomir Popov, *Istorija srpskog naroda* [History of the Serbian People], Vol. 6/1, *Od Berlinskog kongresa do ujedinjenja* [From the Congress of Berlin to Unification] (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 2000), 383, 401.
- 190 Ignjatović, 'Srpsko ratno hirurško iskustvo, IV. deo', 217; Ratković-Kostić, 'Srpska vojska u XIX. veku', 39. Cf. the slightly differing figures of 36,500 dead and 55,000 wounded in both wars in James M.B. Lyon, "'A Peasant Mob": The Serbian Army on the Eve of the Great War', *The Journal of Military History* 61(3) (1997), 481–503, here 484; for Bulgaria, see Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, 135; for Greece, see André Andréades et al., *Les effets économiques et sociaux de la guerre en Grèce* (Paris/New Haven, CT: Presses Univ. de France, 1928), 84. For the Ottoman army, Erickson calculated 50,000 killed in action, 75,000 casualties of diseases as well as 100,000 wounded; Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, 329.
- 191 Hall, *The Balkan Wars*, 90.
- 192 Cf. the description by the Austrian medical doctor Hanasiewicz, who observed that in the streets one could find wounded and refugees everywhere, a sight that influenced the general mood in a negative way; Hanasiewicz, 'Militärärztliche und militärische Eindrücke', 1,096.
- 193 Cf. the Ottoman petitions against Greek and Bulgarian persecutions: OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 411. Liasse XLV/V: Balkankrieg, Ambassade Impérial Ottomane, Note verbale no. 38150, 31 December 1912; *ibid.*, 387, Pallavicini an Berchtold, no. 96, Constantinople, 26 December 1912:

- Vorlage einer Pforten-Notiz: Bulgarische Greuel in Dedeagatsch und Cavalla; *ibid.*, P.A. XII 438. Liasse XLV/15: Balkankrieg, Ambassade Impériale Ottomane: Note verbale no. 39306, 17 July 1913; *ibid.*, Ambassade Impériale Ottomane, Note verbale no. 39431, Vienna, 20 August 1913; *ibid.*, Ambassade Impériale Ottomane, Note verbale no. 39432, Vienna, 22 August 1913. For Bulgarian petitions concerning Serbian, Greek and Ottoman atrocities, see *ibid.*, 438, Tarnowski an Berchtold, no. 47-C, Sofia, 14 August 1913: Notizen des bulg. Auswärtigen Amtes über griechische, serbische und türkische Grausamkeiten gegen Bulgaren; *ibid.*, Tarnowski an Berchtold, no. 48 C, Sofia, 23 August 1913: Beilage; *ibid.*, Légation Royale de Bulgarie: Note verbale no. 462, Vienna, 21 July 1913. Against the Serbs, *ibid.*, Légation Royale de Bulgarie, Note verbale no. 429, Vienna, 21 July 1913. From the Serbian side against Bulgaria, *ibid.*, Königl. Serbische Gesandtschaft an das Kaiserliche und Königliche Ministerium des Aeusseren, Vienna, 8/21 July 1913: Promemoria. For Greek protests against Bulgaria, see, for example, *ibid.*, Frh. von Mittag an von Berchtold, no. 66, Sofia, 12 October 1913: Enquete-Resultate über die Vorgänge in Doxate.
- 194 On the Ottoman side, cf., among others, Comité de publication des atrocités balcaniques, *Les atrocités des coalisés Balkaniques no. 1* (Constantinople, 1913). For a semi-official Ottoman publication, cf. Jean Ruby, *La Guerre d'Orient et les Atrocités des États Balkaniques: Rapport et documents* ([no place], 1912). Several documentations were exchanged between the Bulgarian and the Greek sides during the Second Balkan War: Comité de publication des atrocités balcaniques, *Atrocités bulgares en Macédoine* (Athens, 1913); *idem*, *Les cruautés bulgares 1912–1913* (Athens, 1914); *idem*, *The Crimes of Bulgaria in Greece* (Washington, DC, 1914); Prof. Dr L. Miletitch, *Atrocités Grecques en Macédoine pendant la Guerre Greco-Bulgare* (Sofia, 1913). And as a response to the Greek accusations, *Réponse a la brochure des professeurs des universités d'Athènes 'Atrocités Bulgare en Macédoine' par les professeurs de l'université de Sophia* (Sofia, 1913). Bulgarian Women's Associations also took part in this media war against their Greek counterparts: OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 438. Liasse XLV/15: Balkankrieg: Les voleurs crient 'au voleur'. Réponse des femmes bulgares à la protestation des femmes grecques contre les atrocités bulgares. Sofia, 24 November 1913.
- 195 Cf., for example, OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 438. Telegramm no. 1306, Adrianople, 7 September 1913 signed by inhabitants of local Muslim villages from Western Thrace; *ibid.*, 386, Bilinski an Seine Excellenz Leopold Grafen von Berchtold, no. 91, Janina, 23 November 1912: Griechische Greuelthaten an der mohamedanischen und wallachischen Bevölkerung; *ibid.*, 388, Kral an Berchtold, no. 5, 8 January 1913: Untaten bulgarischer und griechischer Banden im Sandžak Drama, reporting a petition of the local population about atrocities; *ibid.*, 392, Mensdorff an Berchtold, no. 50-D, London, 23 May 1913: Eingabe der albanesischen Delegierten über von Griechen begangene Grausamkeiten. From Greek communities against Bulgarian atrocities, see *ibid.*, P.A. XXXVIII Konsulate 374: Adrianopel 1906–1917, M. von Nettovich an Berchtold: Intervention griechischer Bewohner wegen der von den Bulgaren

- begangenen Greuelthaten, no. 79, Adrianople, 30 October 1913; *ibid.*, von Herzfeld an Berchtold: Unterdrückung der griechischen Bevölkerung, Z 32./P., Adrianople, 16 April 1914.
- 196 Not by chance, his war reports, forgotten and ignored for decades, were reprinted during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s: Leo Trotzki, *Die Balkankriege 1912/13* (Essen: Arbeiterpresse-Verlag, 1996 [1926]). On Trotsky as a war correspondent, cf. also Maria Todorova, 'War and Memory: Trotsky's War Correspondence from the Balkan Wars', *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs* XVIII(2) (2013), 5–28.
- 197 Von Mach, *Briefe aus dem Balkankrieg*, 72–76. Suspicious for his obviously often fabricated information in particular is Hermenegild Wagner, war correspondent for the Vienna based *Reichspost*. Cf. the English edition of his wartime memories: Hermenegild Wagner, *With the Victorious Bulgarians* (New York/Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913). For a careful discussion of the correspondents' information on atrocities, cf. Weber, *Die Balkankriege*, 25–35, 44.
- 198 Cf. Carl Pauli, *Kriegsgreuel. Erlebnisse im türkisch-bulgarischen Krieg 1912: Nach den Berichten von Mitkämpfern und Augenzeugen bearbeitet* (Minden: Wilhelm Köhler o. J., [1913]); Leo Freundlich, *Albaniens Golgotha: Anklageakten gegen die Vernichter des Albanervolks* (Vienna: J. Roller, 1913), included also in the recently edited enlarged correspondence: Leo Freundlich, *Die Albanische Korrespondenz: Agenturmeldungen aus Krisenzeiten Juni 1913–August 1914*, ed. Robert Elsie (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012). See also Carlo Villavicenzo, *Im belagerten Scutari: Nach Aufzeichnungen der Skutariner Jesuiten* (Vienna: Verlag d. Kongregationszeitschr., 1913).
- 199 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington, DC: The Endowment, 1914). For the background of the commission, see Nadine Akhund, 'The Two Carnegie Reports: From the Balkan Expedition of 1913 to the Albanian Trip of 1921', *Balkanologie* 14(1–2) (2012), 1–17, <http://balkanologie.revues.org/index2365.html> (accessed 1 April 2014).
- 200 Cf., for example, PA AA, R 14 222, Dt. Botschaft Pera an Reichskanzler Bethmann-Hollweg, 24 October 1912; OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 388. Prochaska an Berchtold, no. 5, Prizren, 30 January 1913: Die Kämpfe in Luma, claiming that due to the situation there is hardly any chance of getting unbiased information.
- 201 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 388. Graf Mensdorff an Berchtold no. 11 G, London, 31 January 1913: Interpellation im englischen Unterhause über Grausamkeiten am Balkan; *ibid.*, 389, Graf Mensdorff an Berchtold, no. 16 F, London, 15 February 1913; *ibid.*, 390, Mensdorff an Berchtold, no. 21, London, 3 March 1913: Massacres von Albanesen durch serbische Truppen.
- 202 The Austrian Foreign Ministry, for example, suggested to its ministers that news about Serbian atrocities should be made public, but without giving the impression that they were based on Austrian sources: OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII. 386. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg 386, Für den Einlauf, Vienna, 19 November 1912.

- 203 The Austrian consul in Macedonia, Heimroth, for example, time and again sent his own assistants in the field to check the news on atrocities as closely as possible before reporting to Vienna: OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII. 386. Telegramm an von Ugron no. 2703, Belgrad, 15 November 1912, or *ibid.*, 389, Heimroth an Berchtold, no. 26, Uesküb, 9 February 1913: Grausamkeiten der Serben gegen Albaner. Hesitating to confirm Serbian atrocities, see, for example, *ibid.*, 388, Ledinegg an Berchtold, vertraulich, Antivari, 10 January 1913. For similar reluctant British diplomats, see *ibid.*, 390, Mensdorff an Berchtold, no. 21, London, 3 March 1913: Massacres von Albanesen durch serbische Truppen. The French consulate in August 1912 sent its own mission to prove Greek accusations of Bulgarian atrocities, coming to the conclusion that without any doubt cruelties were committed by the regular army, but on a much lesser scale than claimed: *ibid.*, 438, Telegramm Baron Braun, no. 463, Athens, 3 August 1912. The French correspondent Henry Barby, generally sympathetic to the Serbian cause, is biased when he rejects Austrian reports on violence by the Serbian army as unfounded 'alleged cruelties' ('*prétendues atrocités*'); cf. Henry Barby, *La Guerre des Balkans: Les victoires serbes* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1913), 255.
- 204 OeStA, HHStA 390 Ugron an Berchtold, no. 67 A-C, vertraulich, Belgrad, 27 March 1913: Mitteilungen des italienischen Militärattachés über die serbischen Greuelthaten. With regard to Bulgarian accusations against the Greek army, see *ibid.*, 438, Kral an Berchtold, no. 150, Salonich, 9 August 1913: Eingabe des bulgarisch-katholischen Bischofs für Mazedonien an einige Grossmächte; *ibid.*, P.A. XXXVIII Konsulate 374: Adrianopel 1906–1917, von Herzfeld an Berchtold: Ansiedelung mohamedanischer Flüchtlinge und Lage der griechischen Bevölkerung, Z 31./P., Adrianopel, 8 April 1914.
- 205 Cf., for example, the report by the consulate officer in Kirkilisse on the Bulgarian occupation of the district, OeStA, HHStA. P.A. XII Türkei 389, Pallacivini an Berchtold, no. 7 F, Constantinople, 6 February 1913: Die Bulgaren in Kirkilisse and of the Austrian Vicekonsul in Serres; *ibid.*, 438, Kral an Berchtold, no. 114, Salonich, 30 June 1913: Vorlage eines Berichts des k.u.k. Vizekonsuls in Serres.
- 206 The reliability of a long report by the Italian bishop Miedia about Serbian violence against the Albanian and Muslim population in Üsküb/Skopje, for example, was discussed in detail by the Austrian consulate, who concluded it to be well founded at least in the general picture it conveyed: OeStA, HHStA., P.A. XII Türkei 389, Dr von Heimroth an Seine Excellenz Leopold Grafen von Berchtold, no. 26, Uesküb, 9 February 1913: Grausamkeiten der Serben gegen Albaner; cf. also the report by a 'nationally minded' Bulgarian priest on Bulgarian (!) violence, *ibid.*, 387, Kral an Berchtold, no. 209, Salonich, 17 December 1912: Die bulgarischen Greuel im Inneren; reports by railway servants, *ibid.*, 388, Kral an Berchtold, no. 7, Salonich, 7 January 1913.
- 207 Cf., for example, the *Daily Chronicle* of 12 November 1912 with regard to Serbian violence against Albanians; similarly, with regard to Serbian politics against the Muslim population in Macedonia, see OeStA, HHStA

- P.A. XII 386. Türkei Liase XLV/3: Balkankrieg, von Ugron an Berchtold, no. 136, E Belgrad, 15 November 1912: Nachrichten aus Üsküb; and with regard to the Bulgarian politics, *ibid.*, Kral an Berchtold, no. 187, Salonich, 23 November 1912: Greuelthaten der Bulgaren auf dem flachen Lande Mazedoniens.
- 208 Theodora Dragostinova recently stressed for the Bulgarian-Greek the continuity of ethnic homogenization. The process started before the Balkan Wars, accelerated during the war and was 'completed' after its end. Theodora Dragostinova, 'Continuity vs. Radical Break: National Homogenization in the Greek-Bulgarian Borderlands before and after the Balkan Wars', *Journal of Genocide Research* 18(4) (2016), 405–26.
- 209 Usually complaints about attacks on Muslim villages, besides other acts of violence, include the general information that 'women and young girls were violated'. OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 390, von Pázel an Berchtold, no. 14, Prizren, 9 March 1913: Aeusserung zu einigen, in einem Memorandum des Prizrener katholischen Erzbischofs angeführten Greuelthaten; *ibid.*, von Heimroth an von Ugron in Belgrad, no. 22/po. Uesküb, 18 March 1913: Protest des franz. Gesandten wg. serbischer Übergriffe im Kaza Gilan Anfang März; *ibid.*: k.u.k. Militärattaché in Cetinje, 17 March 1913, Z. 1324: Grausamkeiten montenegrinischer Truppen; *ibid.*, 391, Generalkonsul Kral an Berchtold, no. 71, Salonich, 21 April 1913: Die Zwangskonversionen der türkischen Landbevölkerung durch die Bulgaren: Bericht aus Cavalla; *ibid.*, 389, Heimroth an Berchtold, no. 26 streng vertr., Uesküb, 9 February 1913: Grausamkeiten der Serben gegen Albaner; *ibid.*, 413, S.M.S. Kais. u. König. Maria Theresia. Res. no. 410. Missionsbericht für die Zeit vom 10 bis 12 November 1912, Salonich, 13 November 1912 on the Bulgarian occupation of Salonika; OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 206. Berichte 1912 VII–XII, 1913 I–IX: Markgraf Pallavicini an Berchtold: Beschwerde des ökumenischen Patriarchates über Ausschreitungen der bulgarischen Okkupationstruppen gegen die griechisch-orthodoxe Bevölkerung, no. 34, Jeniköy, 19 June 1913; *ibid.*, P.A. XXXVIII Konsulate 416. Saloniki 1913–1915: Generalkonsul Kral an Berchtold, Prekäre Lage der Land- und Stadtbevölkerung im Inneren Mazedoniens, Zl. 104, Salonich, 23 June 1913 on sexual violence by the Bulgarian army in Serres; *ibid.*, P.A. XXXVIII Konsulate 397. Monastir 1912–1914, 1916: Vizekonsul Zitkovszky an Berchtold: Serbische Greuel, no. 142, 13 December 1913; for a British account, cf. also Cpt. Boyle's detailed report on his trip to Thracian villages shortly after the war had ended, in which he wrote about rape, though this sounds stereotypical and the results hard to verify: The National Archive, Royal Navy (TNA, RN): ADM 116/1193, Cpt. Boyle to Sir F. Elliot, Athens, 5 August 1913.
- 210 The many reports on mutilation, for example, were often told in semantic stereotypes of the traditional 'Türkengreuel' ('Turkish atrocities'), but nevertheless were confirmed from time to time by foreign medical doctors, who were confronted with injuries obviously resulting from acts of mutilation. Cf. OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII. 386. Tarnowski an Berchtold, no. 84 A–E, Sofia, 5 November 1912: Zum Kriege.

- 211 Stefan Sotiris Papaioannou, *Balkan Wars between the Lines: Violence and Civilians in Macedonia 1912–1918*, Ph.D. dissertation (Maryland: University of Maryland, 2012), 122–39.
- 212 Referring to a ‘highly reliable’ Bulgarian priest, the Austrian consul-general in Saloniki reported ‘an intimate cooperation’ between the regular army and the ‘bands’ in Bulgarian-occupied Macedonia in early 1913, thereby making practically all official orders to restrict the activities of the bands irrelevant. OeStA, HHStA 389, Kral an Berchtold, no. 30, Salonica, 5 February 1913: Atrocitäten und Plünderungen der bulgarischen Banden während des Krieges.
- 213 PA AA, R 14 276, Bericht des österreichischen Generalkonsuls in Üsküb, 24 October 1913; similar reports in *ibid.*, R 14 221, Akten betr. den Balkankrieg, Bd. 4: Dt. Residentur Cetinje, 20 October 1912; *ibid.*, R 14 222, Akten betr. die Balkan-Kriege 1912/13, Bd. 7: Kaiserl.-Dt. Konsulat Saloniki, no. 3209, 25 October 1912.
- 214 ‘If isolated cases of crimes have occurred’, as the Serbian government wrote in response to an intervention by the British government, ‘the offenders have been punished ... in the same manner as all offences committed by the members of comitadji bands which could not be controlled by the military authorities’. OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII. 389. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg 389, Mensdorff an Berchtold, no. 19, London, 28 February 1913: Beilage Memorandum des Foreign Office. Similarly, for the Bulgarian position, Radev, *Ot triumf do tragediia*, 67; see also Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stanchoff in a conversation with the Austrian consul-general in Saloniki, OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 387. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankrieg 387, Kral an Berchtold, no. 197, Salonich, 5 December 1912: Gespräch mit Minister Stanchoff. The Greek government rejected all complaints about acts of violence against the civilian population, explaining the few it could not deny as pure ‘revenge’ for the many ‘Turkish atrocities’: *ibid.*, 388: Telegramm Baron Braun, no. 1275, Athens, 7 January 1913.
- 215 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 386. Kral an Berchtold, no. 188, vertraulich, Salonica, 22 November 1912: Die Ereignisse von Serres; *ibid.*, 390, Legationssekretär Bilinski an Seine Excellenz Leopold Grafen von Berchtold, no. 24, Janina, 27 March 1913: Situation in Janina; *ibid.*, 414 P.A. XII. Türkei Liasse XLV/5: Balkankrieg, Kral an Berchtold ZI 213/ vertraulich: Die Zustände in Cavalla.
- 216 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 386. Politischer Gegenstand no. 126, Üsküb, 18 November 1912. Similarly, from the Macedonian theatre of war, the Austrian consul in Saloniki, Kral, reported with respect to the Bulgarian army that despite some orders forbidding arbitrary violence against civilians, owing to the ‘intimate cooperation’ between the regular army and the irregular forces, the army had in no way tried to stop the activities of the bands: *ibid.*, Kral an Berchtold, no. 30, Salonica, 5 February 1913: Atrocitäten und Plünderungen der bulgarischen Banden während des Krieges. A French fact-finding commission came to the conclusion that ‘Bulgarian’ atrocities against the Greek population, however exaggerated they may have been in local reports, had been organized ‘in a systematic

- way' by the army: *ibid.*, 438 P.A. XII. Türkei Liasse XLV/15: Balkankrieg, Telegramm Baron Braun, no. 463, Athens, 3 August 1912.
- 217 OeStA, HHStA. P.A. XII 390. Heimroth an von Ugron, no. 12/pa, Üsküb, 18 March 1913.
- 218 Cf., for example, Andrija Jovičević, *Dnevnik iz balkanskih ratova* [Diary from the Balkan Wars] (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1996), 125; Azmanov, *Moiata epokha*, 95; Dodov, *Dnevnik*, 32; Stefan Khristov Kamburov, *Edin mnogo dälg päť: Dnevnik na Stoian Khristov Kamburov* [A Very Long Way: The Diary of Stoian Khristov Kamburov] (Sofia: Pres izdatelstvo, 2003), 17, who writes about paramilitary volunteers (*opälchentsi*) burning down Muslim houses and 'taking away what they could carry' of what had been left behind by the fleeing Turkish population; similarly, see Nikolov, *Treta otdelna Armiia*, 129.
- 219 Papaioannou, *Balkan Wars between the Lines*, 128–32.
- 220 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Konsul Halla an von Berchtold, no. 130 vertraulich, Monastir, 30 October 1912: Die Verteidigung Monastirs; *ibid.*, 386, Generalkonsul Kral an von Berchtold, no. 189, Salonich, 26 November 1912: Bericht der k.u.k. Consularagentie in Cavalla vom 8.d.M. Zl: 343 über die Ereignisse in Drama und Cavalla.
- 221 Jörg Baberowski, 'Einleitung: Ermöglichungsräume exzessiver Gewalt', in Jörg Baberowski and Gabriele Metzler (eds). *Gewalträume: Soziale Ordnungen im Ausnahmezustand*, Frankfurt/M. 2012, 7–27.
- 222 Cf. the fighting around Ioannina in November 1912, about which Austrian observers reported that 'andartes and the village population' committed atrocities against the local Muslim and Wallachian population. OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Bilinski an Berchtold, no. 89, Janina, 17 November 1912: Zur Situation. Here it is reported that paramilitaries and the 'local population committed awful crimes against soldiers and the unarmed Muslim population'. See also the report by the German major in the Ottoman army Günter to the German Foreign Office in PA AA, R 14 225 Akten betr. den Balkan-Krieg, Bd. 10: 22/23 October 1912. On violence committed by Greek andartes, cf. also the diary by French consul Guy Chantepleure (pseudonym of Jeanne-Caroline Violet-Dussap), who was in the city during the siege: Guy Chantepleure, *La ville assiégée: Janina Octobre 1912–Mars 1913* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1913), 230.
- 223 Kamburov, for example, describes in his diary how local Bulgarian peasants burned the Ottoman *tefter* (register) after their village had been 'liberated' by Bulgarian forces, thus preventing any claim on property by the fleeing Turkish population. Kamburov, *Edin mnogo dälg päť*, 23. Reports about the local Serbian population from Mitrovica distributing the land of their Muslim neighbours among themselves can be found in OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 391. v. Uron an Berchtold, no. 82 a-B, Belgrad, 15 April 1913: Militärische und politische Berichte aus Nisch und Mitrovitza, Beilage.
- 224 Cf. examples from the following reports: PA AA, R 14 222, Kaisl.-Dt. Konsulat Saloniki, 25 October 1912; *ibid.*, Kaisl. Gesandtschaft Sofia, no. 70, Abschrift eines Berichts des öster. Konsuls Herzfeld in Adrianopel.

- 225 Cf., for example, the report on the city of Monastir in OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 389. Atrocitäten und Plünderungen der bulgarischen Banden während des Krieges; similarly, for Monastir and Üsküb, *ibid.*, 386, Halla an Berchtold, no. 137, Monastir, 25 November 1912: Die Auslieferung Monastirs an die Serben; *ibid.*, 386, Politischer Bericht Dr Heimroth, no. 125, Üsküb, 18 November 1912; *ibid.*, 388, Halla an Berchtold, no. 6, vertraulich Monastir, 17 January 1913: Verwüstung der mohamedanischen Distrikte des Vilajets Monastir. Under the pretext of collecting weapons, as reported from the Greek and Bulgarian conquest of Salonica, soldiers 'being guided by local vagabonds' entered the houses in the city's Turkish and Jewish quarter, plundering whatever they could find. *Ibid.*, Kral an Berchtold, no. 183, Salonica, 17 November 1912: Die Ausschreitungen der bulgarischen und griechischen Truppen. The Austrian consul in Adrianople reported his own observations that after the Bulgarian conquest of the city, 'the mob' together with soldiers and *komitadži* had plundered the houses of beds, other furniture and 'even a piano'. *Ibid.*, 391, Tarnowski an Berchtold, no. 27, E, Sofia, 14 April 1913; Beilage Dr Max von Herzfeld, no. 1/re Adrianople, 9 April 1913: Inzidenzfall nach der Einnahme der Stadt. For the city of Kavalla, see the report based on first-hand observations after the Bulgarians had left the city, by British Navy Cpt. Boyle, TNA, RN: ADM 116/1193, Cpt. Boyle to Sir F. Elliot, Athens, 5 August 1913 [3751], confidential.
- 226 PA AA, R 14 230, Akten betr. den Balkan-Krieg Bd. 15: Bericht des österreichischen Konsuls in Janina, 11 March 1913. See the more detailed original report on the conquest of Janina, in OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 390. Liase XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Bilinski an Berchtold, no. 12, Janina, 11 March 1913: Fall der Festung Janina. His colleague Halla from Monastir/Bitola spoke in a similar way about 'an unbound Christian population' when Greek soldiers had entered the city of Korca. *Ibid.*, 388, Halla an Berchtold, no. 1, Monastir, 4 January 1913: Der Einzug der Griechen in Korca.
- 227 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII, 389. Heimroth an Berchtold, no. 26, streng vertraulich, Uesküb, 9 February 1913.
- 228 Von Fényes, *Tagebuch eines Mannes vom Roten Kreuz*, 102.
- 229 Kamburov, *Edin mnogo dälj päť*, 19. A very similar description can also be found in the diary of Petär Zhechev Kurdomanov: Stanka Georgieva, *Voinishki dnevnik na Petär Zhechev Kurdomanov za Balkanskata voina* [The War Diary of Petär Zhechev Kurdomanov on the Balkan Wars] (Sofia: RITT, 2001), 81. Based on 'neutral' eyewitnesses, whom he assumed to be reliable, the Austrian consulate officer Bilinski reported similar cases from the Greek conquest of Ioanina. OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 390. Liase XLV/3: Balkankrieg, Legationssekretär Bilinski an Berchtold, no. 24, Janina, 27 March 1913: Situation in Janina.
- 230 PA AA, R 14 220 Akten betr. den Balkan-Krieg 1912/13, Bd. 5: Telegramm no. 49 aus Cetinje an AA, 19 October 1912; OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 386. Liase XLV/3: Balkankrieg, k.u.k. Militärattaché in Belgrad Res. no. 283: Einfluß der Sicherheitsverhältnisse in den neu besetzten Gebieten bei einem Kriege mit der Monarchie; based on the information of a Swiss railway engineer in Üsküb, *ibid.*, 386, Stephan von Ugtron an Berchtold,

- no. 136 E, Belgrad, 15 November 1912: Nachrichten aus Üsküb; *ibid.*, 387, Kral an Berchthold, no. 203, Salonich, 9 December 1912: Die Greuel von Strumitza; *ibid.*, P.A. XII 438. Liasse XLV/15: Balkankrieg, Graf Tarnowski an Berchthold, no. 48 D, Sofia, 17 August 1913: Massacrierung bulgarischer Kriegsgefangener; on the alleged killing of prisoners by Serbian soldiers in Prizren, *ibid.*, P.A. XXXVIII Konsulate 405, Prizren 1912–1914: Telegramm no. 236, 6 April 1914, 5.20 Uhr. Austrian Prince Windisch-Graetz, who witnessed the war as part of a Bulgarian unit, also speaks about the killing of prisoners during the campaign at Dedeagach. See, based on Windisch-Graetz's personal notes, Alfred von Dietl, *Taktische Schilderungen aus den Balkankriegen 1912/13*, Vol. I (Vienna: Seidel, 1914), 29.
- 231 The Bulgarian side, for example, claimed to have taken 20,000 prisoners after the battle of Kirkilisse. OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Liasse XLV/3: Balkankriege, Telegramm Graf Tarnowski, no. 5019, Sofia, 24 October 1912. After the Greek conquest of Saloniki, up to 25,000 prisoners of war were reported. *Ibid.*, 386, Freiherr von Braun an Berchtold, no. 52, Athens, 10 November 1912: Zur Besetzung Saloniki's durch die griechische Armee. On the increasing number of prisoners of war, cf. also the reports by the International Red Cross, *Bulletin International de la Croix Rouge* 173 (1913), 56–60.
- 232 On interventions by the Ottoman government against Bulgaria, cf. PA AA, Kaiserliche Deutsche Botschaft in Konstantinopel, betr. Balkankrieg, Spec. 202 VII 8a, Bd. 84: Sublime Porte, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères no. 34 032, 26 June 1913; OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII. Türkei Liasse XLV/21 Balkankrieg, Ambassade Impériale Ottomane: Note verbale. Au Ministère Impérial et Royal des Affaires Étrangères no. 3938 3, 7 August 1913 ('... que les bulgares poussent leur sauvagerie jusqu'à massacrer les prisonniers de guerre Ottomans se trouvant en Bulgarie'); *ibid.*, 392, Graf Tarnowski, Sofia, 12 April 1913: Telegramm in Chiffren; and against Greece, *ibid.*, 386, Kral an Berchtold, no. 186, Salonica, 23 November 1912: Nichteinhaltung der Uebergabebedingungen durch die Griechen in Salonich; against Serbia, *ibid.*, 411, Ambassade Impériale Ottomane no. 37857: Note verbale, Vienna, 19 November 1912. On Bulgarian complaints against Greece, cf. *ibid.*, P.A. XV Bulgarien 75: Berichte, Weisungen, Varia 1913, Telegramm 658 Baron Mittag, Sofia, 5 November 1913; for Greek accusations against Bulgaria, see *ibid.*, P.A. XII 438. Frh. von Braun an Berchtold, no. 28, Athens, 20 June 1913: Behandlung griechischer Kriegsgefangener seitens Bulgarien.
- 233 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 391. Dr Max von Herzfeld an Berchthold, no. 17/ res. Adrianople, 17 April 1913: 2. Teil des Berichts über die Belagerung Adrianopels. This issue was confirmed even by the Bulgarian general Vazov, who however explained the situation by the general shortage of food in the city and blamed cholera for most of the prisoner deaths. The situation improved over time, but did not reach 'international standards', as the Austrian consul noticed. *Ibid.*, 392, Graf Tarnowski no. 29-D, Sofia, 22 April 1913: Unterbreitet Bericht no. 14, Res. ddo. 19 April 1913 über Lage türkischer Kriegsgefangener in Adrianopel. On the situation in the camp in Niš, cf. *ibid.*, 411, Stephan von Ugron an Berchtold: Beilage

- zu Bericht no. 125, 3 November 1912. Based on the information of his consulate officer from Kirkilisse, the Austrian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Pallavicini, reported that Ottoman prisoners were treated with 'une façon inhumaine'. Ibid., 389, Pallavicini an Berchtold, no. 7 F, Constantinople, 6 February 1913: Die Bulgaren in Kirkkilisse. Similarly, see British diplomatic reports on Turkish prisoners of war at Corfu and in Salonica: TNA, RN: ADM 116/1192, Report on Affairs at Corfu, 13 April 1913; *ibid.*, 116/11990: Turco-Balkan War 3, Report on Affairs in Salonika, 24 November 1913. On the miserable food supply of prisoners in Montenegro, see OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Giesl an Berchtold, no. 89, *vertr.*, Cetinje, 28 October 1912: Unterredung mit König Nikola. The Carnegie Commission also reported on hunger among the prisoners in Greek-controlled Macedonia. Ibid., 438, Prinz Emil Fürstenberg an Berchtold no. 41 D, Athens, 6 September 1913: Die Carnegie-Mission in Griechenland.
- 234 OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII 385. Légation Royale de Bulgarie, no. 445, 26 July 1913: Note verbale, in which the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry rejected the Ottoman accusation that the Bulgarian army had killed more than 3,000 prisoners of war at the camp of Stara Zagora alone.
- 235 Complaints about the mistreatment of prisoners of war were sometimes obviously instrumentalized to exercise diplomatic pressure in view of the open questions concerning the postwar settlement. Cf., for example, the Ottoman note on the killing of Turkish prisoners of war by Bulgarian forces, OeStA, HHStA P.A. XII. Türkei Liasse XLV/21 Balkankrieg: Ambassade Impériale Ottomane: Note verbale. Au Ministère Impérial et Royal des Affaires Étrangères no. 39383, 7 August 1913; *ibid.* Note verbale no. 39410, 12 August 1913.
- 236 PA AA, Kaiserl.-Dt. Botschaft in Konstaninopel für 1912/13, Betr. Balkan-Krieg Spec. 202 VII 8 a, Bd. 73, Kaiserl.-Dt. Gesandtschaft Belgrad no. 89, 23 November 1912 on Ottoman complaints against Serbia; *ibid.*, Bd. 84, Kais. Dt. Ges. Athen, J. no. 1723, 29 July 1913; *ibid.* Kaiserl.-Dt. Gesandtschaft Sofia, J. no. 1749, 23 August 1913; *ibid.*, Bd. 73, Kaiserl. Dt. Ges. Athen, no. 1058, 22 November 1912. On a generally fair treatment, see also 'Die Berichte englischer Kriegskorrespondenten', *Neues Wiener Tageblatt*, 26 October 1912; 'Die ersten türkischen Gefangenen im bulgarischen Hauptquartier', *Neue Freie Presse*, 24 October 1912.
- 237 Cf. Central-Comitee der Deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz, *Beiträge zur Kriegsheilkunde aus den Hilfsunternehmungen der Deutschen Vereine vom Roten Kreuz*, 674, 681, 717, 705–53.
- 238 *Bulletin International de la Croix Rouge* 175 (1913), 200–206.
- 239 Papaioannou, *Balkan Wars between the Lines*, 306.
- 240 Herfried Münkler, *Gewalt und Ordnung: Das Bild des Krieges im politischen Denken* (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1992), 111.
- 241 Adam Roberts, 'Land Warfare: From Hague to Nuremberg', in Michael Howard et al. (eds), *The Laws of War: Constraints of Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 116–39, here 117.
- 242 John Horne and Alan Kramer, *Deutsche Kriegsgreuel 1914: Die unumstrittene Wahrheit* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2004); Alan

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- 243 Joanne Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing* (London: Granta, 1999), 26–30.
- 244 Isabel Hull, 'Prisoners in Colonial Warfare: The Imperial German Example', in Sybille Scheipers (ed.), *Prisoners in War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 157–72.
- 245 Alan Kramer, 'Prisoners in the First World War', in Scheipers, *Prisoners in War*, 75–90.
- 246 Hans Mommsen, 'Anfänge des ethnic cleansing und der Umsiedelungspolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg', in Eduard Mühle (ed.), *Mentalitäten – Nationen – Spannungsfelder: Studien zu Mittel- und Osteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Festschrift für Hans Lemberg* (Marburg: Verlag Herder-Institut, 2001), 147–62, here 147.
- 247 Abazi, 'Between Facts and Interpretations', 218.
- 248 Koselleck coined the term 'Sattelzeit' in Reinhart Koselleck, 'Einleitung', in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart 1972), XIII–XXIII.
- 249 Howell, *The Campaign in Thrace*, 141.
- 250 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14–18: *Understanding the Great War*, 59.

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